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ABSTRACT 
THE GREEN REPUBLIC: 
A Conservation History of Costa Rica, 1838-1996 
Costa Rica is often cited as a "model" for environmental 
conservation. This dissertation seeks to track the history of 
conservation efforts in Costa Rica via analysis of the devel-
opment of its national parks and other protected areas. The 
focus of the work will be on discussing how Costa Rica came 
to establish its conservation system which today includes 
over twenty-five percent of the country's terrain. It will 
describe the system, discuss key leaders involved, and analyze 
conservation in light of what it was in response to: rapid 
destruction of tropical ecosystems due to the expansion of export-
related agricultural commodities. How and why were national 
parks and biological reserves proposed and designated? Who has 
been behind them? Why and how did these individuals become 
involved in their country's conservation movement? What has been 
the overall impact of conservation on the nation's environmental 
well being, economy, and education? What challenges have 
conservationists had to confront; what goals and dilemmas await 
them? Importantly, the work will address what Costa Ricans have 
said and are saying about these conservation concerns. Emphasis 
will be placed on policy reactions—laws and decrees and how they 
came about. 
To limit the scope of this project, "conservation" here 
will imply the creation of national parks, biological reserves, 
national wildlife refuges, and indigenous reserves that have 
been set aside for long-range preservation for future genera-
tions. While there have been many works written about Costa 
Rica's national parks, what is missing is a historical work that 
links development of conservation patterns with agricultural and 
political history. The intent of this dissertation is to show 
how conservation policy came about, how leaders in the movement 
worked to forge changes, and how conservation thought has evolved 
from the early days of Costa Rican independence to 1996. 
- Sterling Evans 
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PREFACE 
Esta tierra pertenece a los costarricences, algunos 
ya han muerto, otros todavía viven, pero la mayorfa 
. . . aún no ha nacido. 
- anonymous 
(This land belongs to the Costa Ricans, some have 
already died, others are still living, but the 
majority . . . has not even been born.) 
The vision exemplified in the above oft-quoted saying makes 
Costa Rica an intriguing case study in environmental history. 
Its implied message, that Costa Rica is a country with a mind for 
the future—a future based on the environmental well-being of its 
land and inhabitants—begs the question of how such a model de-
veloped and what measures have been instituted to ensure its suc-
cess. More implicitly, this idea must be tested by tracing the 
successes and failures of the Costa Rican conservation experi-
ence. Such analysis is the goal of this work. Does Costa Rica 
live up to its nickname "the garden of the Americas?" Does it 
embody what New York Times writer John Oakes in 1988 called the 
"greening" of the region? Is it on the path of what a conference 
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that same year concluded was toward a Centroame^rica verde? Is 
Costa Rica a "green" republic? 
To attempt answering such questions, this dissertation seeks 
to track the history of conservation efforts in Costa Rica via 
analysis of its national parks and other protected areas. The 
focus of the paper will be on discussing how Costa Rica came to 
establish its conservation system which today includes over 
twenty-five percent of the country's terrain. It will describe 
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the system, discuss the key leaders involved, and analyze conser-
vation in light of what it was in response to: rapid environmen-
tal destruction of tropical ecosystems due to the expansion of 
export-related agricultural commodities. How is this agricultur-
al modernization different from past agricultural experiences 
and how has it affected conservation efforts? What conservation 
measures or agricultural practices from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries influenced conservation patterns? How and 
why were national parks and biological reserves proposed and 
designated? Who has been behind them? Why and how did these 
individuals become involved in their country's conservation 
movement? What has been the overall impact of conservation on 
the nation's environmental well-being, economy, and education? 
What challenges have conservationists had to confront; what 
goals and dilemmas await them? Importantly, the paper will ask 
what Costa Ricans have said and are saying about these conser-
vation concerns. Emphasis will be placed on policy reactions— 
laws and decrees and how they came about. Thus, the project will 
evaluate the so-called "model." 
Only two other works approach this subject in book form. 
The first, Luis Fournier's Desarrollo y perspectiva del movimien-
to conservacionista costarricense (1991) lists some of the early 
conservation policies and discusses the beginning of Costa Rica's 
conservation movement. But while written from the perspective of 
someone who was actively involved in conservation policy making, 
the book is a rather short condensation of conservation laws and 
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the people behind them with little analysis or in depth discus-
sion. Dr. Fournier!s intent for the book was to be introductory— 
he provided directions for future research for which I am forever 
grateful. 
The other book is David Rains Wallace's The Quetzal and the 
Macaw: The Story of Costa Rica's National Parks (1992). Wal-
lace's work is limited, however, to the "story" of national parks 
only, includes no archival data, and does not put national park 
development in the larger context of Costa Rican conservation 
history. Its strength lies in the interviews Wallace incorpor-
ated into The Quetzal and the Macaw's narrative—interviews that 
I have drawn upon here since the voices of the people involved 
(some of whom I also interviewed and some I did not) are impor-
tant to be heard in this conservation history. I have duly cited 
Wallace's work where used, but have attempted to be broader in 
historic range, more comprehensive in conservation policy making, 
and more reliant on archival records and newspapers than The Quet-
2 
zal and the Macaw intended to be. I have also drawn on many 
articles and essays written by Costa Ricans and others that 
pertain to individual aspects of conservation policy. Those 
sources helped greatly in piecing together the larger picture. 
To limit the scope of the project, "conservation" here will 
imply the creation of governmental and private areas of land 
(national parks and monuments, biological reserves, wildlife 
refuges, indigenous reserves, and private ecological reserves) 
that have been set aside for long-range preservation. This 
vi 
project will not address in any great length such environmental 
concerns as pollution, urban sprawl, toxic wastes, air and water 
quality, sanitation, or human health issues. These important 
matters have a literature all their own and exceed the boun-
daries of this particular conservation history. Nor is this work 
a comparison of Costa Rican conservation efforts with those of 
other republics in the region (although unique features of Costa 
Rica's geography, history, and society will be weighed vis-á-vis 
conservation successes.) Rather, this work is an attempt to 
synthesize diverse elements of Costa Rica's past (natural his-
tory, government, education, etc.) to evaluate the successes and 
failures of the nation's conservation system. 
Costa Rican botanist and long-time conservation proponent 
Luis Fournier has written that "in reality, we are no longer just 
a few people clamoring for a rational use of the environment, and 
what in the past for many was merely a romantic or Utopian dream, 
has been transformed into something vital for the future of the 
country, and is coming to be understood by a greater number of 
3 
Costa Ricans." The intent here is to follow the development of 
this Costa Rican pattern of thinking. Disagreement exists wheth-
er this is a long, historic phenomenon—pre-dating and including 
the colonial era—or if it is a recent product of late twentieth-
century scientific understanding. Some scholars point to the 
ecologically sustainable ways of pre-Columbian native peoples 
vii 
in Costa Rica as a base for an enduring environmental awareness. 
Others note that farmers in the colonial and early national eras 
4 
practiced responsible agriculture and thus continued a conscien-
5 
tious land use pattern. 
Some researchers, however, suggest that environmental aware-
ness has resulted only in the past twenty-five years. Estrella 
Guier, the director of environmental education at UNED (the Uni-
versidad Estatal a Distancia, usually translated as the National 
Open University) remarked: ,fIt is only recently that a conscience 
among some towards a rational and balanced exploitation of 
natural resources has been created." Dr. Fournier agrees: 
"Fortunately in the [1970's] . . . in Costa Rica there has been 
a change of attitude in the people . . . with respect to the 
6 
problem of the environment." 
Both sides will be examined herein. But has Costa Rica man-
aged its natural resources rationally, and if so, what mechanisms 
(structural and attitudinal) have proven successful and are in 
place to continue the trend? 
To address these concerns, this work is divided into two 
parts: I. Costa Rica's history of conservation, and II. the coun-
try's framework for what will be called "building a green repub-
lic." Emphasis in Part I is placed on such issues as the legacy 
of tropical research, the environmental dilemma of Costa Rican ag-
riculture, and the conservationist response via public lands man-
agement—especially stressing the role national parks have played 
in the Costa Rican conservation strategy (Chapters One through 
Five). Surprisingly, a large percentage of public land was pro-
tected during the severe economic crisis of the early 1980's. Re-
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porting how this unique, perhaps paradoxical, experience trans-
pired is discussed in Chapter Six and the government's push to 
restructure and decentralize conservation efforts in the late 
1980s and 90s is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Part II examines other aspects of Costa Rica's conservation 
experience and how they apply to the structure in place for the 
future. Analysis of the important roles played by environmental 
education and non-governmental organizations occurs in Chapters 
Eight and Nine. Campesino and indigenous movements are important 
dimensions of the overall story and are included in Chapter 
Nine. And more recent phenomena such as ecotourism and biodiver-
sity inventorying are discussed in Chapters Ten and Eleven. 
But to quote a Spanish proverb, all that glitters is not 
gold. This work would be terribly remiss and blind to the facts 
if it omitted a discussion of the serious challenges facing Costa 
Rica's environmental model. What is often called "the grand 
contradiction" is the paradox of Costa Rica's development of an 
extraordinary national park system simultaneous to massive de-
forestation in unprotected areas. The fact that only since 1969 
more than twenty-five percent of Costa Rica has been protected in 
one form or another must be balanced with the fact that over 
sixty percent of the country is deforested and that the rate is 
growing by four percent a year. Equally disturbing is that seven-
teen percent of the land is composed of highly degraded or ser-
iously eroded soil rendering it almost useless for agriculture or 
for reforestation. 
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Keeping things in perspective, however, is important. Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes is credited with the thought that where things 
are now is less important than the direction in which they are 
going. And therein lies the hope for Costa Rica. In their grow-
ing conservation ethic and respect for nature, the people of Cos-
ta Rica have been motivated for a change in direction to preserve 
their natural heritage. The history of how this occurred, then, 
merits attention and is the underlying purpose of this study. 
In his conservation history of Mexico, Lane Simonian has 
written that environmental history should become "more inter-
national in scope." "In many places, people have fought to pro-
tect nature," he continues, and " [t]heir stories should be 
7 
told. . . . " What follows is the account of many who have worked 
to make Costa Rica a green republic—a country that conserves 
natural resources for those who have yet to be born. 
x 
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INTRODUCTION: The Costa Rican Uniqueness Factor 
Costa Rica is . . . something of a model in Latin 
America. The enormous ecological variety encom-
passed in such a small area makes the country a 
tropical laboratory. 
- Carolyn Hall (1) 
The first thing to understand about Costa Rica's environmen-
tal history is how the country is so specifically different in 
many ways from the rest of the world. A preliminary glance re-
veals that Costa Rica is one of the least impoverished countries 
in the Third World, has the highest per capita income in Central 
America, maintains one of the highest literacy rates in the world 
(ninety-eight percent, according to some accounts), and leads Cen-
2 
tral America in elementary and higher education. Likewise with 
the possible exception of Cuba, Costa Rica enjoys the best feder-
al health care coverage in the Western Hemisphere and has one of 
the highest life expectancy ages (seventy-four years) and one of 
3 
the lowest infant mortality rates in Latin America. 
Remarkably, Costa Rica has no military.* Abolished in 1948 
under the reform platforms of Jose" Figueres, the government con-
verted army fortresses into museums and freed federal funds for 
* Costa Rica does, however, maintain active national police units 
(the Civil and Rural Guards) and nine government agencies control 
their own security forces. Some units receive military training, 
but there is no central command structure to enable them to as-
sert undue influence over civilian society, as is frequently the 
case elsewhere in Latin America. Moreover, the head of the units 
is appointed by each new president every four years (with consti-
tutionally-prohibited re-elections), further precluding the 
chance for military caudillos to establish a power base. 
1 
other endeavors—a stand which has been warmly supported by the 
people of Costa Rica. Echoing the sentiment of many who call 
Costa Rica the "Switzerland of Central America,'1 Gabriel Ureña 
has suggested that militarism ("that political plague of other 
countries in Latin America") could not prosper here where "law, 
4 
peace, and a respect for human dignity are sacred precepts." 
Pertinent to this work, of course, is the fact that Costa 
Rica has developed one of the most complex systems of protecting 
natural areas in all of Latin America. And protecting wildlands 
means protecting species which Costa Rica has in incredible abun-
dance. Flying, roaming, or swimming through the country are 850 
species of birds, 220 species of reptiles, 160 species of amphibi-
ans, 280 species of mammals (almost half of which are different 
species of bats), and 130 species of fresh water fishes. Even 
more impressive is the diversity within the plant kingdom. There 
are approximately 9,000 species of vascular plants (four percent 
of the world's total) of which 1,200 are different species of 
orchids and 1,200 are different species of hardwood trees. In 
some places the trees grow at a density of 200 or more species 
5 
per acre. The number of insect species is another story. Al-
ready numbered in the tens of thousands, research entomologists 
continue to discover thousands of previously unidentified species 
from the tree canopies of Costa Rica's many tropical forests.* 
* The National Biodiversity Institute (see Chapter 11) is working 
to inventory Costa Rica's biological species. Insect collectors 
were bringing in some 100,000 specimens a month in 1990 when the 
director asked that they try to restrain themselves! (6) 
2 
What makes this biological information of such interest is 
that the high speciation occurs in so small an area. Costa Rica, 
a country of only 19,600 square miles (just smaller than West 
Virginia), is only 250 miles long and 150 miles wide at its 
widest point (see map, Figure 1). Yet the number of plant and 
animal species there is greater than that of the United States 
and Canada combined. 
Costa Rica's phenomenon in biodiversity can be explained in 
large part by the country's unique geological history. Formed 
during the Pliocene (only three to four million years ago), an up-
lift united a small archipelago to become a land bridge between 
North and South America. Costa Rica is located in the middle of 
this region which geographer Carolyn Hall refers to as the only 
place in the world that is "both interoceanic and intercontinen-
7 
tal." Noted Swiss biologist Henri Pittier, who studied and 
worked in Costa Rica in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, was one of the first scientists to discern that such 
a meeting point allowed the free transfer of species from north 
to south. The transcontinental meeting point, then, greatly en-
riched the flora and fauna of the isthmus, an accepted theory 
referred to by another scientist as being that of a "biological 
8 
bridge [and] filter." 
But the abrupt variations in topography and climate played 
an even greater role in species diversification in Costa Rica. 
What Hall has called a "great complexity of surface land forms" 
includes three distinct mountain ranges (the Central, Guanacaste, 
3 
Figure 1: The Republic of Costa Rica 
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and Talamanca cordilleras) which climb up to 6,000 feet eleva-
tion, and five major natural areas.* Hall explains that the dif-
ferent "microclimates" that developed in each region produced "an 
ecological diversity peculiar to the world's tropical, mountain-
ous regions" where elevation bears greater responsibility than 
latitude for "rapid and qualitatively different environmental 
9 
changes. . . . " 
Leslie R. Holdridge, an internationally respected forestry 
biologist who spent much of his adult life in Costa Rica, devel-
oped in the 1960s and 70s a bioclimatic classification system of 
life zone ecologies for his adopted country. He identified 
twelve distinct life zones in Costa Rica (i.e. tropical dry for-
est, montane wet forest, etc.) based on temperature, rainfall, 
evaporation, humidity, and elevation. That these different life 
zones occur in such close proximity to each other in such a small 
area creates what has been termed a "biogeographical combination" 
or a "complex ecological mosaic" of species diversification. In 
evolutionary terms, a "riot of adaptations" occurred as plants 
11 
and animals specialized to fit into such complex environments. 
The history of another species in Costa Rica, Homo sapiens, 
has also been shaped by the unique biogeography of the area. 
Dense tropical forests and steep mountainous terrain prevented a 
large pre-Columbian indigenous population to thrive in the area 
that is today Costa Rica. The exact number of native people who 
* They are: Central Valley, Northern Wet Caribbean, Dry Pacific, 
Southern Wet Pacific, and Southern Wet Caribbean regions. (10) 
5 
lived there prior to the European encounter is a topic of consid-
erable academic contention. Estimates ranging from 27,000 to 
400,000 are debated by anthropologists and historians, but one of 
the most respected authorities on the subject argues that an 
approximate figure of 80,000 reflects the most realistic pre-
12 
colonial population. Whichever figure is correct, these native 
people were also a result of the isthmian land bridge—"descen-
dants of the Meso-American and South American cultures who main-
tained intercultural contact . . . , n according to anthropologist 
Luis Tenorio. And scholars tend to agree that the population was 
sustainable to their tropical environment. The native population 
today is around 36,500—far less than in other parts of Central 
America—but the Indians share the country with approximately 
13 
3,000,000 other residents. (Indigenous issues in Costa Rica's 
conservation history as well as current concerns are discussed in 
Chapter Nine.) 
Spaniards in the sixteenth century were not all that im-
pressed with Costa Rica. Christopher Columbus may have thought 
the coastal areas scenically beautiful and held high hopes that 
riches there were awaiting his arrival (hence his naming the area 
"Costa Rica"—Rich Coast), but gold and other minerals were not 
to be found in significant quantities and the humid, thickly 
forested terrain did not seem hospitable to early explorers 
and settlers coming from Spain's more temperate and dry regions 
like Castile and Extremadura. Hence, during the colonial era 
Costa Rica evolved quite differently than many other areas of 
6 
the Spanish world. Far away, and not easily accessible from the 
audiencia (provincial) capital at Guatemala City, Costa Rica had 
little early agricultural development and therefore European set-
tlement made less impact on the natural environment. Jean Gar-
riere suggests that "because Costa Rica was a relatively poor, 
isolated and thinly populated corner of the Spanish Empire, the 
loss of forest cover associated with European settlement was 
limited." Carolyn Hall points out that only a few thousand 
Spaniards ever settled in Costa Rica between 1502 and 1821 but 
that the "poorest Spanish colony became the most prosperous re-
14 
public." Again this unique feature of Costa Rica's past was 
largely due to its environment. 
By the 1830s Costa Ricans discovered that the soil and cli-
mate of the volcanic montane region of Costa Rica's central val-
ley was ideally suited for the production of coffee. At the same 
time in history there was a growing world demand for the beverage 
which seemed to stimulate workers in industrial occupations. 
Hence, through the efforts of an English merchant named William 
LeLecheur (who introduced Costa Rican coffee to Great Britain in 
1843), a strong European market became well established for the 
new commodity. But coffee in Costa Rica is a unique example of 
how a developing agricultural product did not necessarily impair 
the environmental well-being of the countryside. While Carriere 
has referred to the coffee industry as Costa Rica's "first wave 
of deforestation," he also shows how most of the country remained 
15 
under forest cover until the 1950s. Another study credits Costa 
7 
Rica's "coffee monoculture" as being 
a rare exception to the general rule of monocultures 
producing a dependent, stale economy and subsequent 
underdevelopment. Coffee cultivation in mid-1800s 
Costa Rica established a social climate that encour-
aged strong development of natural sciences. (16) 
Costa Rica accomplished such a feat by opening up trade patterns 
with a previously closed European market.* This provided the 
stimulus for scientists to travel to Costa Rica to study its 
unique geography and later to instruct Costa Ricans about the 
more scientific end of their natural resources. 
Equally important is the fact that most Costa Rican coffee 
growers farmed on small, family-owned cafeteras and were compara-
tively responsible land stewards as opposed to the elite landhold-
ers who practiced large-scale plantation monoculture (the latifun-
dista experience typical in much of the rest of Latin America). 
Early twentieth-century tropical researchers Amelia and Philip 
Calvert observed that "the number of small landowners and coffee 
growers in Costa Rica is very great"—a "great advantage . . . in 
contrast with the conditions prevailing in the larger countries 
of that part of the world." They went on to explain that 
where many own small pieces of ground, a much greater 
. . . interest in the prosperous development of com-
munity and of peaceful progress exists than where 
there are only a few great landowners and the great 
mass of the population, having nothing to lose, are 
more indifferent and more easily drawn in the wake 
of political adventures. (17) 
* international markets had been officially closed to Spanish 
overseas territories during the colonial era due to Spain's m. 
date for colonies to trade solely with the mother nation. 
8 
A middle class thus emerged that not only valued the land but 
established the base for a stable democracy that would force 
18 
fewer pressures upon the natural environment. 
As Hall has suggested, Costa Rican agriculturalists soon dis-
covered that their country's "large number of life zones permit-
ted] the cultivation of a much wider range of crops than would 
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otherwise be possible at this lattitude." Bananas, Costa Rica's 
next agricultural boom, and other crops of the twentieth century, 
however, were not as friendly to the environment. But a basis 
was established for creating an environmental awareness by the 
very geographic make-up of the country. A cyclical pattern 
evolved: the geography which made Costa Rica unique led at first 
to the development of a different kind of agricultural society— 
one based on relatively small landholdings. Eventually, as 
agricultural conditions and international markets dictated, more 
and more forested land was turned into croplands, plantations, 
and pastures. This dangerous exploitation of natural resources, 
however, aroused a dormant ecological conscience in many Costa 
Ricans to address the need to protect what remained of the 
nation's natural heritage. Problems and solutions of this envir-
onmental model are examined below, but whether via its cultivated 
lands or its conservation areas, Costa Rica remains today'a green 
republic—a country lush in tropical verdure and well-established 
in environmental policy-making. 
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COSTA RICA'S 
HISTORY OF CONSERVATION 
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CHAPTER 1 
A LEGACY OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT AND TROPICAL RESEARCH 
To those who with effort, caring and dedication 
from 1841 to 1941 established the basis for bio-
logical sciences in our homeland. May their labor 
be a permanent example for future generations. 
-plaque at entrance of the University 
of Costa Rica's School of Biology 
Listed with the above message are the names of twenty-three 
professional biologists (some foreign and some Costa Rican) who 
have played a profound role in the conservation history of Costa 
Rica. Part of Costa Rica's uniqueness has been its historic abil-
ity to lure a significant number of foreign scientists and to es-
tablish a sound training system for local scientists to study and 
understand the nation's diverse natural history. Mario Boza, one 
of Costa Rica's leading conservationists, explained that "the di-
versity and wealth of Costa Rica's flora and fauna, as well as 
the majesty of its countryside, have attracted the attention of 
scientists and naturalists from all over the world since the mid-
1 
1800s." The legacy of scientific investigation—indeed the drive 
to understand Costa Rica's biological uniqueness—became an impor-
tant seed for the development of a national conservation ethic 
and thus to an appreciation for conserving natural resources. 
Costa Rican biologist Luis Fournier acknowledged these links when 
he wrote that "Costa Rican ecological thought developed from the 
numerous observations about the country's natural history in the 
past century and early decades of this century by foreign and 
2 
national naturalists." 
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Tracing the history of interest in Costa Rican ecology and 
conservation goes back to the sixteenth century. Fernandez de 
Oviedo (a Spanish naturalist who travelled to colonial Costa Rica 
in the 1700s) was one of the first to recognize the area's dis-
tinct biodiversity and warned against deforestation. But while 
there were other early decrees and proclamations for forest pres-
ervation and soil conservation in 1770s and 1830s, there was not 
a base of support for conservation issues in Costa Rica until the 
final decades of the nineteenth century. 
Largely ignored by the colonial government, Costa Rica by 
the time of independence was one of the poorest and least devel-
oped areas of the United Provinces of Central America. After sep-
arating from the federation, Costa Rica never had the wherewithal 
nor the population to support higher education. There was vir-
tually no national scientific or professional training. Charles 
Stansifer shows that by 1845 Costa Rica had no bookstores, hospi-
tals, universities (elementary education was only marginal), re-
search or scientific organizations, or even theatres. He goes on 
to say that the few scientifically trained persons in Costa Rica 
at this time were either Guatemalans, Nicaraguans, or Costa Ri-
cans who had studied at foreign schools. A study by Luis Gomez 
and Jay Savage claims that European naturalists were at first 
more interested in studying the more geologically wealthy regions 
of Mexico and Peru because of world fascination with gold and sil-
ver. Clearly, Costa Rica's early national years were character-
ized by what Costa Rican noted biologist Rafael Lucas Rodríguez 
12 
has called a "slow development of modest and utilitarian under-
3 
standing of Nature." 
Two events outside of Costa Rica, however, reversed forever 
the scientific community's disinterest in Costa Rica's tropical 
ecology: international demand for coffee and speculation for a 
trans-isthmus canal in lower Central America. Part of coffee's 
role in Costa Rican conservation history has already been men-
tioned. Not only did the railroads, built to transport coffee 
beans to port, open up many unexplored areas of the country, but 
the coffee trade with Europe brought many foreigners to Costa Ri-
ca. Some were scientists who because of socio-political repres-
sion and scientific stagnation in their home countries were ex-
cited by the prospect of marketing their services in a new area 
and by the adventure of visiting a poorly understood biological 
region. One German scientist who visited Costa Rica in the early 
1850s explained that Germany in the mid-nineteenth century was 
divided into competitive regional states which were governed by 
"reactionary police regime[s]." Thus for many professional re-
4 
searchers, the Americas "seemed like the place to go." Schools 
and fine arts developed more quickly with the advent of foreign-
ers, triggering more communication and travel between Europe and 
Costa Rica. News of the country's vast diversity sparked inter-
est for European naturalists to visit and "those who came usually 
5 
stayed." 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century when a growing com-
mercial interest emerged for constructing a Central American can-
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al to connect the Altantic with the Pacific, attention focused 
on Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Colombian province of Panama. 
Scientists were drawn to the region to investigate canal site 
possibilities. Two German naturalists, Moritz Wagner and Karl 
Scherzer, became enchanted with Costa Rica and stayed to research 
its natural history. According to one historian of the subject, 
their writings (especially Die Republik Costa Rica) "probably did 
more to draw European scientists [to Costa Rica] than any other 
6 
work." 
One such scientist who followed was the Danish botanist 
Anders Sandre oersted who was the first to publish a detailed de-
scription of Costa Rican plants. Others were William More Gabb 
(from Great Britain) who studied Costa Rican geology, paleontolo-
gy, and zoology; and Joseph Warscewicz (from Lithuania) who stud-
ied horticulture and ornithology and was the first to send di-
verse bird collections to the most respected natural history 
museums of the time in Berlin and London. In the 1880s F. Dun-
cane Godman and Osbert Salvin studied in Costa Rica and published 
their Biologia Centrali-Americana, one of the most complete bio-
logical works about the region up to that date. The German geolo-
gist and naturalist Karl Sapper also conducted investigations in 
Costa Rica, and the American ornithologist George N. Lawrence was 
the first to catalogue Costa Rican birds, listing 511 species— 
two-thirds of all Costa Rican bird species known today. The re-
search of these scientists inspired even greater interest in 
Costa Rica abroad. 
14 
Two other German scholars who went to Costa Rica in the mid-
1800s were more influential in the legacy of tropical research. 
Alexander von Frantzius and Carl Hoffman, both medical doctors, 
landed in Costa Rica somewhat by chance. Von Frantzius was ad-
vised to move to the tropics to improve his health and Hoffman 
was intrigued by the adventures of exploring mountains. They 
both practiced medicine in Costa Rica and in spare time climbed 
Poas and Irazu volcanoes—coming to know the ecologies of both 
mountains intimately and producing major collections of their 
flora and fauna. Historian Carlos Melendez claims that these two 
German scientists "converted our country . . . initiating a pro-
7 
digious era for [the study of] our science." 
Alexander von Frantzius was the first scientist to catalogue 
Costa Rican mammals. He also wrote extensively on the native 
tropical plant life and through his botanical explorations and 
publications "made Costa Rica known to the scholarly world." He 
also produced the first academic work on Costa Rican climatology. 
Carl Hoffman, although far less published than von Frantzius (he 
only published three important articles on volcanoes), did become 
known for his taxonomy of Costa Rican plant and animal species 
(of which twelve bear his name today) and also sent impressive 
collections to Berlin.* 
* Hoffman served as an army surgeon for the Costa Rican forces in 
the battle against American filibuster William Walker in 1856. 
While in Guanacaste Province (northwest Costa Rica) he noted the 
unusual diversity of bats which he collected and studied. His 
work in this area became the first scientific research of bats in 
Costa Rica. 
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room of which was used as a laboratory and meeting place for stu-
dents. Three such Costa Rican students, José Zeleddh, Anastasio 
Alfaro, and J.F. Tristan (known as the "drugstore gang"), became 
close assistants, accomplished biologists, and early leaders in 
the effort to research tropical issues and educate others. 
An important step in Costa Rica's favor and a move that was 
unwittingly conservationist, was the government's spirited at-
tempt in the mid-1800s to improve the educational system. The 
University of Santo Tomás was founded in 1844 as a way to attract 
scholars and educate professionals. But lacking enough local 
teachers and scientists, the government decided to recruit Europe-
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an educators to teach Costa Ricans. The administrations of Jesus 
Jiménez and Tomás Guardia in the 1860s and 70s invited many Ger-
man and Swiss teachers. Many foreigners who came, however, left 
after short stays when they discovered that they were expected to 
spend more time teaching than doing research. One who stayed was 
Helmuth Polakowski, who became an expert in tropical botany. 
The University of Santo Tomás was abolished in 1888 by Presi-
dent Bernardo Soto. His influential and politically powerful min-
ister of public instruction Mauro Fernández believed that no uni-
versity could succeed without a strong secondary school system in 
place. He was actively involved in starting the challenging 
school, Liceo de Costa Rica, changing education to be sponsored 
by the state instead of by the church, enacting legislation to 
make education compulsory to the seventh grade, opening up high 
schools to women, and beginning an even stronger push to attract 
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foreign teachers. Several more Swiss scholars accepted the chal-
lenge. One, Henri Pittier, was another individual who was des-
tined to change the course of the country's biological thought 
and to begin what has been called the "golden age of Costa Rican 
9 
natural history." 
Described as "determined, indefatigable and tyrranical," 
Henri Pittier had a bold "multidisciplinary approach to field 
biology." To acquaint himself seriously with the country, he 
climbed every volcano more than once, lived with different in-
digenous peoples, and collected as many specimens as he could 
to "amass a body of information unsurpassed to that date." He 
was intrigued and captivated by Costa Rica's biodiversity, cal-
ling the country the "botanical and zoological emporium of the 
10 
continent." 
Pittier branched out from the confines of his own research 
to organize the National Agricultural Society and to create the 
National Observatory. He also recruited many other scientists 
to study in Costa Rica and with their help developed the largest 
herbarium in Latin America at the time. More importantly, he 
founded and succeeded in acquiring government funding for the 
Physical Geographic Institute (IFG—called the National Geograph-
ic Institute after 1914). This institute, soon to become one of 
the leaders of its kind in Latin America, was in charge of collec-
ting biological data, managing the herbarium, recording all mete-
orological information, researching national agricultural prob-
lems, and perhaps most importantly, accurately mapping the 
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republic. All of these successes, unheard of in much of the rest 
of Latin America, created a national base to encourage scientific 
thought and to spur others to pursue research topics in Costa Ri~ 
11 
can natural history. 
Disagreeing with the government's 1904 decision to place the 
IFG under the auspices of the National Museum, Pittier moved to 
the United States and accepted employment with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Capable scientists like Adolphe Tonduz, Car-
los Wirklé, and George Cherrie carried on Pittier's work in Costa 
Rica, and Anastacio Alfaro (one of von Frantzius' "drugstore 
gang") became the director of the museum and the IFG. By the 
time Pittier left Costa Rica, "sciences from anthropology to lim-
12 
nology flourished." 
The National Museum, then, became the focus for scientific 
research. Alfaro (only twenty-two years old at the time he was 
appointed director) had the able help of José Zeledón. Zeleddn 
was sent to study at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, 
D.C., and established important liasons with American scientists. 
With these connections, the floodgates were now open for U.S. re-
searchers to start pouring into Costa Rica—a flow that never 
waned. Some of these biologists included Edward Cope and Edward 
Taylor in herpetology, and Philip and Amelia Calvert in entomolo-
gy. The Calverts, who were primarily interested in studying the 
life histories of tropical dragonflies, travelled around Costa 
Rica for a year (May 1909 to May 1910) and ended up writing a com-
prehensive field biology study entitled A Year of Costa Rican Nat-
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ural History. Concerned about what "transformations" in the land 
would occur in Costa Rica due to the Panama Canal (influx of 
people, more transportation, etc.), the Calverts wrote that the 
book's mission was to "leave for the future a picture of what the 
past contained." To do so, they studied with (and received valu-
able local assistance from) such scientists as Adolphe Tonduz, 
Henri Pittier, J.F. Tristan, C.H. Lankester, and José Zeleddn and 
acknowledged the "liberal and enlightened Costa Rican government" 
for its recognition of the importance of studying tropical sci-
ences. The government's attitude coupled with Costa Rica's "high 
mountains, rushing rivers, . . . great variety of climate and of 
natural products," they wrote, made "such wonderful inducements 
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for naturalists and entomologists." Swiss biologist Paul Biolley 
also made important contributions in entomology and malacology in 
these years. By 1914 Costa Rica had become the center of scien-
tific research in tropical America. 
Attracted to such a place in the 1930s was American botanist 
(and later ornithologist) Alexander Skutch. Skutch arrived in 
Costa Rica to extend his dissertation research on the leaves of 
banana plants but ended up staying for the next forty years. In 
that time he homesteaded a small farm in the Valley of El Gener-
al, meticulously studied the life histories of a variety of trop-
ical birds, and did research on many different plants. His work 
resulted in over 200 journal articles and a dozen books on topics 
ranging from ornithology and botany to tropical conservation and 
philosophy. Summing up why he and many others in his field were 
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so enchanted with Costa Rica and why he stayed for so many years, 
Skutch wrote that 
in the mid-1 930s, Costa Rica was still largely unspoiled. 
Its population of less than a half a million people . . . 
was concentrated in the narrow Meseta Central. . . . Other 
advantages . . . to the naturalist were its political sta-
bility and the friendliness of its people. . . . Costa Ri-
ca has a record of continuous, orderly constitutional gov-
ernment that scarcely any other country in Latin America 
can match. Thus the naturalist working in some remote 
spot was not likely to have his studies suddenly interrupt-
ed or his thin lines of communication cut by a violent up-
heaval, as has happened to many in Latin America. . . (14) 
Without a university of even an agricultural school (until 
1926) to support professional research efforts, however, the 
period from the 1920s to the 1950s witnessed a decline in Costa 
Rican scientific study. Because field research was viewed by 
many as a "pastime for the eccentric or the wealthy," few Costa 
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Ricans became involved. An attempt in the 1920s to reopen a uni-
versity hindered rather than helped these efforts because of a 
lack of trained faculty in the biological sciences. When the Uni-
versity of Costa Rica finally was established in the 1940s the 
National Museum was placed under its direction, managed poorly, 
and many of the specimen collections of earlier scientists were 
ruined. 
Despite these setbacks, progress occurred with the establish-
ment of the National School of Agriculture in 1926. Staffed with 
people like José Orozco (a sylviculturist who urged forest protec-
tion), Josa Arias (who developed an early conservation plan), and 
Rafael Chavarria (a conservationist-minded director) this school 
became instrumental in teaching farmers proper use of controlled 
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burning, how to avoid erosion, and other soil conservation tech-
niques. Luis Fournier writes that the School of Agriculture went 
on to play ,!a great role in helping form conservationist 
thought.11 One instructor there, Enrique Jiménez (educated in Bel-
gium), taught with a "conscience for environmental problems," 
later became Costa Rica1s Secretary of Agriculture, and was in-
strumental in the passage of the Ley de Quemas (a law regulating 
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controlled burns) to protect the forests. 
Progress also occurred in the 1930s and 40s through the work 
of an exceptionally bright Costa Rican scientist named Clodomiro 
Picado Twight. Educated at the Sorbonne, Picado returned to his 
homeland to concentrate on the study of Costa Rican natural re-
sources. He published hundred of scientific articles, pioneered 
research on bromeliads, and wrote The Poisonous Snakes of Costa 
Rica. He has been called the "first Costa Rican academic biolo-
17 
gist." Unfortunately Picado died at an early age in 1944 and 
never lived to be a part of the University of Costa Rica (UCR). 
His statue, however, graces the front lawn of the School of Biolo-
gy at UCR as an inspiration to future biologists. 
But while Clodomiro Picado conducted independent research, 
and efforts of the National School of Agriculture centered pri-
marily on conservationist farming practices, there still lacked 
a professional outlet for scientific study and a center to train 
others in tropical research. This changed in the 1950s via the 
expansion of the University of Costa Rica. In the early fifties 
Antonio Balli (an Italian biologist) and Rafael Lucas Rodriguez 
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Caballero (a Costa Rican educated at the University of Califor-
nia) organized the biology department at UCR. Rodriguez, whom 
Luis Fournier has called a man with "great vision for the fu-
ture," published a forward-looking work on areas in Costa Rica 
18 
that he believed required protection. He was also instrumental 
in working to have the biology department changed to become the 
School of Biology, a separate division at the university, in 
1955. A full-time staff of professional biologists was hired and 
Archie F. Carr, a herpetologist at the University of Florida, de-
signed the curriculum. Carr spent years studying and lobbying 
for the protection of the green sea turtle (Chelonia mydas) that 
oviposits on Costa Rica's northeast coast. The School of Biology 
became one of the best of its kind in Central America and has 
served as a sprinboard for research into tropical studies for Cos-
ta Rican and other Latin American students. It was dedicated to 
Dr. Rodriguez in 1979. A national wildlife refuge, established 
in Guanacaste Province in 1977, also bears his name. 
Another influential faculty member of the UCR's School of Bi-
ology was Alexander Skutch who taught there for many years. In-
creasingly over time, Skutch's beliefs in natural history and eco-
logical harmony evolved into conservation advocacy. He decried 
how man "covers larger areas with his highways and constructions, 
destroys thriving forests to make cultivated fields and pastures 
for his beef cattle, contributes to the spread of deserts by over-
19 
exploiting arid lands, and poisons seas with his wastes." For 
Skutch, the study of natural history, tropical ecology, and con-
22 
servation complemented his beliefs in ajimsa yoga regarding the 
sanctity of all life and for the preservation of a harmonious bal-
ance of nature. According to fellow biologist and environmental-
ist Luis Fournier, this "very special philosophy toward nature, 
of great significance from a conservationist point of view, with-
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out doubt influenced [the conservation] movement in Costa Rica." 
The University of Costa Rica is important in Costa Rica's 
conservation history in other ways also. The National School of 
Agriculture (changed to be called the School of Agronomy) became 
a division of UCR and continued its instruction of conservation 
values. The Costa Rican zoologist Alvaro Wille (educated at the 
University of Kansas) developed the entomology section there 
likewise has become a valued, regional center for tropical is-
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sues. UCR's law school also became actively involved in environ-
mental policy via its Center for the Study of National Problems. 
The momentum continued with the development of organizations 
promoting conservation issues in Costa Rica. In 1942 the Inter-
American Institute for Agricultural Sciences (IICA) was founded 
in Turrialba by the Organization of American States (OAS). It 
specialized in training individuals in agricultural sciences, 
forest conservation, and wildlife management. In 1972 the insti-
tute's board members voted to end affiliation with the OAS and to 
form an independent research and training organization with the 
new name CATIE—Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y 
Enseñanza (Tropical Agronomical Research and Higher Education 
Center). It is headquartered in a beautiful campus-like facility 
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with modern laboratories, classrooms, and library just outside of 
the city of Turrialba. CATIE has sponsored a wide variety of 
tropical agricultural programs over the years and has attracted a 
great number of national and international scientists and stu-
dents to study sustainable tropical agronomy and forestry. 
Dr. Leslie Holdridge (engineer of the bioclimatic system to 
classify life zone ecologies) was one of the early and most in-
strumental leaders at CATIE, and was an instructor there for many 
years. He believed in rainforest preservation and later pur-
chased a heavily forested tract of land in the north central part 
of the country ("La Selva") that he used for more intensive study 
of tropical lowland systems. Moving to CATIE in 1952 to study 
under Holdridge1 s direction an to earn his Masters in Science was 
a Venezuelan graduate student named Gerardo Budowski. Budowski, 
who went on to Yale University to pursue a doctorate in forestry 
(his dissertation dealt with tropical forest succession based 
largely on his research at CATIE), has used his knowledge of trop-
ical ecosystems to promote conservation both in his adopted coun-
try of Costa Rica and in a variety of positions abroad. He went 
on to become a CATIE instructor and later its Director General, a 
scientist at UNESCO in Paris (where he organized the 1968 World 
Biosphere Conference), and for six years was the Director General 
of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
in Switzerland. He is currently on the international board of 
trustees of the World Wildlife Fund, president of the World Eco-
tourism Society, Director of Natural Resources at the University 
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for Peace in Costa Rica, and still maintains ties with his "be-
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loved" CATIE as Senior Advisor to the Director General. 
In 1966 CATIE initiated a course on national parks and wild-
life under the direction of Dr. Kenton Miller (a biologist from 
the United States) who likewise came to appreciate very deeply 
Costa Rica's tropical environment and potential for conservation. 
He taught there for several years and later became an inter-
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national authority on national park development. One of his 
CATIE students in the late 1960s was a Costa Rican named Mario 
Boza who went on to spearhead the country's national park pro-
gram. Boza had recently graduated from UCR with a degree in 
agronomy and had wanted to study teak wood production at CATIE. 
Heeding the advice of his instructor Gerardo Budowksi, however, 
he got involved with Kenton Miller's national parks course, wrote 
a Master's thesis on the development and management of a national 
park at Poás Volcano, and has been in the forefront of Costa Ri-
ca's conservation program ever since. He went on to become the 
nation's first director of its fledgling national park service, 
natural resources advisor to President Rodrigo Carazo, universi-
ty professor, founder and director of the conservation organiza-
tion Fundación de Parques Nacionales, author of several books on 
Costa Rican national parks, assistant director of the Ministry of 
Natural Resources, and currently is in charge of the Caribbean 
Conservation Corporation's Paseo Pantera project to link conserva-
24 
tion areas throughout Central America. 
Through people like Leslie Holdridge, Gerardo Budowski, and 
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Mario Boza, CATIE has actively influenced the scientific and con-
servation leadership of Costa Rica for over five decades and has 
had an impact on conservation in other tropical countries. In 
1982 Craid McFarland, CATIE's director of the Wildlife and Water-
shed Program, conducted a survey to inventory the conservation 
strategies of other Third World nations (i.e. national parks, pro-
vincial or state parks, national forests, biological reserves, 
watershed conservation, management plans, legislation, finances, 
etc.) to serve as a base data pool to improve CATIE's ability to 
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understand the conservation needs in other nations. Likewise, 
the center continues to attract many foreign students each year. 
There have been other private sources of conservation in Cos-
ta Rica that have played large roles in the country's legacy of 
scientific thought. In the early 1950s American Quakers from 
Alabama, fleeing a militarisitic U.S. government involved with 
the Korean conflict, were attracted to Costa Rica because of its 
abolition of the army and looked for a place to settle. They 
chose an area near Monteverde in north central Costa Rica to prac-
tice low technology agriculture and dairy farming. Much of the 
surrounding area had been deforested by local farmers, but the 
Quakers, under the leadership of Wilford Guindon, recognized the 
need to preserve forests on the mountainsides to protect the im-
portant watersheds in their region. To that end they established 
an 800 acre reserve in a pristine montane environment that abut-
ted their farms. Today the area is part of the Monteverde Cloud 
Forest Preserve which protects habitat for many endangered spe-
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cies, especially Well known of which is the resplendent quetzal 
(Pharomacro mocino). 
In 1959 Archie Carr founded the Brotherhood of the Green Tur-
tle and its subsidiary the Caribbean Conservation Corporation 
(CCC)—the first non-governmental conservation organization in 
Costa Rica. Because of uncontrolled commercial turtle and turtle 
egg hunting, numbers of the giant reptiles had dropped to danger-
ously low levels and were threatened with extinction. Carr under-
stood the urgency of the situation and the CCC set out to re-
search the ecology of the turtle and to advocate protection of 
its most important nesting habitat at Tortuguero (meaning literal-
ly "place of the turtle") on Costa Rica's northern Caribbean 
coast. The organization's work culminated with the establishment 
of a protected area for turtles in 1970 and when it was enlarged 
into a national park (with carefully monitored visitation poli-
cies) in 1975. It continues to research, track, and count green 
turtle populations and has branched out into other regional con-
servation campaigns. 
Dr. Carr's sons, Archie III and David—both of whom have 
spent considerable time conducting research on tropical conser-
vation in Costa Rica—are now the helm of the CCC. They, along 
with Mario Boza and James Barborak (a U.S. biologist who started 
coming to Costa Rica in the 1970s as a conservation consultant 
for the National Park Service), are leading the efforts of the 
Paseo Pantera project. A joint effort with Wildlife Conservation 
International (a division of the New York Zoological Society), 
27 
the CCC's objective is to halt the fragmentation of biologically 
diverse habitats ranging from southern Mexico to Panama. Working 
to connect conservation areas with ecosystem corridors, however, 
also provides protection for important watersheds in the region-
vital sources for water and flood control for thousands of Cen-
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tral Americans. 
Another organization called the Tropical Science Center 
(TSC) also has played an active role in Costa Rican conservation. 
TSC is a private consulting firm that was established in 1962 by 
three American biologists—Leslie Holdride (the internationally 
known tropical forestry scientist), Robert Hunter (a forester and 
land-use specialist), and Joseph Tosi (an agricultural scien-
tist). The TSC has assisted the IICA (CATIE) with many projects, 
developed a biological station at Rincón de Osa, organized confer-
ences and training sessions, and worked for the creation of pri-
vate biological reserves for field research and education. 
The TSC has left its largest mark in Costa Rican conserva-
tion history through its efforts to preserve the Monteverde Cloud 
Forest Preserve. The TSC fs connection to the Quakers'watershed 
conservation program stems from the work in the early 1970s of an 
ornithology graduate student from the United States named George 
Powell and his scientist wife Harriet Powell. According to Jos-
eph Tosi, the Powells were conducting dissertation research on 
birds of the Tilarán Mountains where they were "astounded'1 by the 
"extraordinary biological richness of the cloud forest" and 
"alarmed" by the threat posed to the area by hunters, land spec-
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ulators, and squatters. In 1972 George Powell approached the TSC 
for advice on establishing a non-profit association to enable him 
to apply for and receive grants for purchasing and protecting the 
area. "We were immediately interested," Dr. Tosi explains, and 
after visits with Powell to the area "we were in agreement that 
the area warranted full protection." Over the next few years 
Powell and the TSC set up the fund, received hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars from international conservation organizations to 
acquire the land, and expanded the area into a 10,000 acre pre-
serve. The TSC became its managing agent and Powell served sever-
al years as its director. The objectives of the preserve were to 
"protect and preserve the existing ecological communities in the 
area of the continental divide," to use the area for "non-
destructive biological research," and to promote "environmental 
education, both formal and informal, through controlled visita-
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tion by the public." 
Today the Monteverde Preserve is one of the best known 
parks in Costa Rica. With the help of the TSC and its offspring 
organization the Monteverde Conservation League (in Canada), the 
preserve is now over 27,000 acres and continues to expand. Expan-
sion has meant that squatters who moved onto the land to farm in 
the 1970s and 80s had to move. The Monteverde Conservation 
League and the World Wildlife Fund raised funds to help offset 
the cost of re-locating and re-settling them by "selling" tracts 
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of land to donors for twenty-five dollars an acre. 
In the early 1980s a study group of the TSC created a recom-
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mendation for Costa Ricafs National Park Service to develop the 
Tilarán Mountain area into a national park that would include the 
Monteverde Preserve. While this recommendation was denied in 
1981 due to "a lack of money to pay the numerous occupants" and 
landholders in the region, it remains a private nature reserve 
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and open to the public. In 1 995 over 50,000 people visited Monte-
verde despite the slow, rough mountain roads leading there. 
Plans to improve the roads were discussed but abandoned by the 
TSC as a measure to limit tourist access and prevent overburden 
on the fragile mountain environment. Dr. Tosi boasts that Monte-
verde remains today as "one of the most efficient, well organ-
ized, and exemplary private reserves of its kind in the world." 
Its relatively small area is home to more than 2,500 species of 
plants, 100 species of mammals, 120 species of reptiles and am-
phibians, 400 species of birds, and tens of thousands of insect 
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species. 
A spin-off of the Monteverde conservation strategy occurred 
with the establishment of the Children's Rain Forest Preserve. 
Adjacent to Monteverde, this protected area is the result of a 
Swedish teacher's efforts to save unprotected areas surrounding 
the preserve that she observed were seriously threatened when 
she visited the site in the late 1980s. She returned to Sweden 
with these concerns and enlisted the help of her nine-year-old 
students. They started a fundraising drive to purchase (through 
the Monteverde Conservation League) thirty-five acres next to the 
preserve. The idea soon spread to other parts of Sweden and 
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Europe, Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and Japan. 
Through the efforts of school children across the world, then, 
more than 17,500 acres are now protected in the Children's Rain 
Forest Preserve and similar measures have started in other parts 
of the world. Joseph Franke has written that the program's suc-
cess is "an example of how important conservation ideas often 
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start small but have far-reaching effects." 
By the early 1960s research and instruction on tropical ecol-
ogy was increasing in the United States. Six leading universi-
ties in this field (Michigan, Florida, Miami, Kansas, Harvard, 
and Washington) saw the need to consolidate efforts to develop a 
research field station in the tropics. Costa Rica was chosen as 
the site because of the number and proximity of its geographic 
zones, its broad biological diversity, and its politically stable 
government. In 1963 the consortium of these six schools plus the 
University of Costa Rica formed the Organization for Tropical 
Studies (OTS). Its mission was "to provide leadership in educa-
tion, research, and the wise use of natural resources in the 
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tropics." According to one of its founders, Jay Savage of the 
University of Florida, the OTS was established "to develop a cen-
ter for advanced graduate education in tropical sciences . . . 
[and] to develop a cadre of knowledgeable ecologists who had 
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course and field experience in tropical environments." 
The OTS has been accused of suffering from so-called "scien-
tific imperialism" in its early years of existence. This "big 
stick" or "missionary" attitude was manifest in the fact that 
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some U.S. and European scientists went to Costa Rica to show the 
locals what to do and how to perform research in their own coun-
try. Soon, however, OTS personnel learned to cooperate with the 
host government and have since included Costa Rican and other 
Latin American students and instructors in all research endeav-
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ors. Over the years more than 700 papers have been generated by 
OTS research and many ecologists trained there have gone on to 
work for conservation issues or have become teachers themselves. 
Dr. Savage stated that "almost every major figure in tropical 
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biology today" has been associated with the OTS. 
These OTS instructors and students have made a profound im-
pact on the conservation history of Costa Rica and other tropical 
places. Early OTS directors who had an innovative environmental 
vision for tropical education were Norman Scott and Donald Stone. 
Daniel Janzen, one of the OTS's first students and who later 
taught there, moved to Costa Rica and has spent much of his life 
in researching and working to protect the tropical dry forest en-
vironment of Guanacaste. Another shining example of an OTS "prod-
uct" is Rodrigo Gámez, a plant virologist, former molecular biolo-
gy professor .at UCR, and past natural resources advisor to Presi-
dent Oscar Arias. Gámez, an OTS board member in the early 1990s 
and currently director of Costa Rica's National Biodiversity 
Institute, stated that 
my association with the OTS helped open my eyes 
to the importance of biological diversity, partic-
ularly for a country like Costa Rica. From trying 
to figure out what all those gringos [were] doing 
down there, many Costa Ricans have developed a 
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greater appreciation of the nation's biological 
wealth. The OTS has played a crucial role in 
providing credibility for conservation. (36)' 
A big boost to the organization occurred in 1968 when Leslie 
Holdridge sold his property known as "La Selva" (the forest), an 
intact, relatively undisturbed lowland forest ecosystem, to the 
OTS. La Selva was an island in an area of increasing timber and 
cattle pressures, and, as Dr. Savage pointed out, Holdridge's 
"foresight in preserving a sample of undisturbed forest cannot be 
overstated." Located near Puerto Viejo in northeastern Costa Ri-
ca, La Selva became the OTS's biological station and center of 
tropical research. While only four and a half square miles in 
size, La Selva has half as many species as all of California, 
including 320 species of trees, 394 species of birds, 143 species 
of butterflies, 122 species of reptiles and amphibians, 104 spe-
cies of mammals, and forty-two species of fishes. From this div-
ersity, David Clark explains, "the varied and numerous investiga-
tions carried out at La Selva are an important reason why the 
tiny country of Costa Rica is one of the world's largest active 
37 
research sites in tropical field biology." 
In the 1980s La Selva was expanded to border Braulio Car-
rillo National Park (the combination of which has ben identified 
by UNESCO as a World Biosphere Reserve). The expansion ensured 
the seasonal migration of species within the different parts of 
the ecosystem—an activity that was being seriously threatened by 
increased logging and cattle grazing in the region. Along with 
international conservation and philanthropic organizations, the 
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OTS actively participated in the campaign for the expansion, 
which resulted in the creation of a Zona Protectora (Protected 
Zone) by the Costa Rican government. Rodrigo Gámez stressed the 
importance of such a zone when he wrote that 
The park and La Selva were linked by a narrow pro-
tected corridor for numerous species of birds, mam-
mals, and insects and their periodic migrations be-
tween the highlands and the lowlands. Such action 
has received international recognition as one of the 
major recent accomplishments in biological conserva-
tion. We cannot put fences around the parks and re-
serves and forget about what happens outside them. (38) 
The creation of the Zona Protectora attracted even more lo-
cal and international scientists to La Selva. Research usage in-
creased fourfold, with the number of individual researchers there 
increasing by 257 percent in just six years. Laboratory and lodg-
ing facilities expanded, and by 1990 an average of twenty re-
searchers a day were studying at La Selva. Fully one half of all 
OTS usage is by Costa Rican biologists and students and Costa Ri-
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cans are on the staff of every OTS project. Likewise, the OTS 
has provided its services to its host country on many occasions. 
In 1983, for example, Charles Shnell (a Harvard biologist who 
worked in Costa Rica for twenty years and was OTS Vice President 
for Planning) sponsored an OTS biological inventorying project 
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for the newly created Chirripd National Park. 
Today OTS is a consortium of fifty-two U.S. and Costa Rican 
universities. The mutual advantage of it being located in Costa 
Rica are summed up by current OTS co-director David Clark: 
The most important of OTS' experiences . . . is the 
long history of positive relations it has enjoyed 
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with its host country, the Republic of Costa Rica. 
This special relationship affects research in in-
numerable ways, from the ease in which research per-
mits can be obtained to the willingness of talented 
Costa Rican biologists to collaborate in joint pro-
jects. Costa Rica is unusually receptive to foreign 
scientists and the OTS has benefitted greatly from 
this attitude. For its part, Costa Rica has bene-
fitted ecologically, educationally, and scientif-
ically from the relationship. (41) 
One reason that all of these organizations and programs have 
been successful is due to Costa Rica's lack of an "anti-gringo" 
sentiment. Many scientists have felt that foreign biologists are 
generally considered for what they are—biologists and not grin-
gos, and that most Costa Ricans support the need to conserve 
areas for future generations. Likewise, as alluded to above, 
CATIE, TSC, and OTS, while developed by Americans and other for-
eigners, have usually worked well with the government and includ-
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ed Costa Ricans in planning, advice, training, and employment. 
Other important figures in Costa Rican conservation history 
appeared in the 1 960s and 70s. People like Luis Fournier, Sergio 
Salas, and R. Daubenmire (botanists who made important contribu-
tions to forest phenology), Gary Stiles and W.L. Ramirez (zoolo-
gists who specialized in ecology and reproduction of natural 
ecosystems), and Alexander Bonilla (UCR biologist and avid envi-
ronmentalist) all represent part of the result of Costa Rica's 
scientific legacy. Others advocated conservation and changes in 
policies by becoming involved in government agencies. Biologists 
like Mario Boza, Rodrigo Zeleddn, and Carlos Quesada (who devel-
oped guidelines on the rational use of the environment), Alvaro 
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Ugalde (one of the first graduates of UCR's School of Biology, 
long-time advocate of conservation measures, and several times 
director of the National Park Service), Luis Diego Gómez (a bot-
anist who helped revitalize the National Museum to regain its for-
mer status as a center to stimulate Costa Rican field biology), 
Rolando Mendoza (an avid national parks and protected areas pro-
ponent), and Tobias Meza Ocampo (a specialist in wildlife manage-
ment) among many others are descendants of Costa Rica's emphasis 
on science who represent this group. 
Much of these scientists' work was financed through C0NICIT 
(Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas), 
which is similar to the National Science Foundation in the United 
States. Established by the government in 1973, C0NICIT has as-
sisted scientists by funding both large-scale programs (i.e. the 
national Plan de Desarrollo—a long-range research priority set-
ting plan) and small-scale projects (i.e. plant pathology and spe-
cies-specific population studies). The government's support of 
CONICIT is another reflection of how the nation's understanding 
of the importance of scientific inquiry. 
While the percentage of Costa Ricans who are scientists is 
small (and of those, the percentage of field biologists even 
smaller—which is typical of most, if not all, countries of the 
world), interest is there, numbers are growing, and a strong edu-
cational system is in place to foster scientific thought and con-
servationist policies well into the future. The Gómez and Savage 
study concludes that 
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Costa Rica now has a cadre of biologists whose 
orientations have been shaped by the new theoret-
ical ecology, the ecological movement, and the 
stimulus of the OTS. Through their efforts, Costa 
Rica has a solid scientific base in its CONICIT, 
its universities, and the National Museum. It has 
an awareness of ecological problems and the proper 
attitude to face [its environmental] dilemma. (43) 
Daniel Janzen believes that this base will be needed because of 
"how scanty our knowledge [really] is regarding Costa Rican natu-
ral history." Believing that present research will soon be out-
dated, he views the need as great for future well-trained ecolo-
gists. Rodrigo Gámez agrees. He writes that 
Costa Rican intellectual participation in studies 
of tropical biology . . .is, with a few notable 
exceptions, still meager. Research on Costa Rican 
biodiversity and ecology must become a priority 
in our own academic institutions. . . . (44) 
Knowing as much as possible about the natural environment, 
how ecosystems are interrelated, and how they affect humans (as 
well as how man affects nature) is the key to understanding why 
and how to protect it. The beginning of this understanding, 
notes Gerardo Budowski, was the country's physical geography 
itself—"forests and volcanoes" and later "a friendly, democrat-
ic republic" made Costa Rica an enticing destination for foreign 
scientists. Dr. Rafael Rodriguez has classified these ventures 
by foreign and local scientists into three categories: the early 
nineteenth-century explorations (like those of Carl Hoffman, Mor-
ltz Wagner, Karl Scherzer, and Helmuth Polokowski), those of the 
turn of the century (i.e. Henri Pittier, José Zeledon, and Clodo-
miro Picado), and the post-Depression years in which scientists 
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have made many in-roads in understanding the country's biological 
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diversity. Each of the stages has left its stamp on the coun-
try's conservation history. 
But if the number of Costa Ricans with advanced degrees in 
the biological sciences is small, the number of Costa Ricans who 
support conservation is large. Most may not actively lobby for 
ecological issues, but many do support the causes that will pre-
serve their natural heritage. This support is rooted in the lega-
cy of Costa Rica's emphasis on tropical science and is manifested 
in society today. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 
From the beginning of humanity, man has main-
tained a close contact with nature and has 
obtained from it the necessary resources for 
his subsistence. . . . Contemporary man, in 
the same form as his long-gone ancestors, de-
pends on the natural environment to satisfy 
his basic needs. 
- Luis Fournier (1) 
An Historical Setting 
The point at which dependence on the natural environment be-
comes exploitation of the natural environment is the problem ad-
dressed in this chapter. Today, as was noted earlier, a large 
percentage of Costa Rica is deforested and suffers from degraded 
land, erosion, and habitat loss for many species of flora and 
fauna, including a large number of endemic species (ones native 
to that area and not found elsewhere). Exactly how this scenario 
unfolded deserves careful, historical study to understand the 
dilemma and Costa Rica's responses to it. 
Costa Rica's unique geography forged a distinct land-use pat-
tern for native peoples and European settlers. Some anthropolo-
gists have argued that indigenous people, who inhabited Costa Ri-
ca for at least 10,000 years before the arrival of Spaniards, did 
2 
little to deteriorate the natural environment. Indians recog-
nized the areas where not much would grow and did little to alter 
that land's condition. In fact, Indians primarily developed 
agriculture in only four of Costa Rica's twelve life zones (pre-
montane moist forest, promontane wet forest, tropical moist for-
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est, and tropical wet forest) and limited cultivation to such 
local crops as yuca (manioc), chiles, tomatoes, beans, corn, avo-
cados, pejibayes, and other native fruits and vegetables. Like-
wise, they fished, hunted native animals, and gathered wild 
fruits and nuts. Carolyn Hall explains that "Indians exploited 
the natural environment while simultaneously conserving its 
3 
potential resources." 
In order to conserve, the Indians learned resource manage-
ment techniques. They cleared forests with controlled burning in 
small parces (referred to as swidden agriculture) and, to guard 
against erosion during the rainy season, seeded the areas with 
various plants which provided a permanent cover. Their small, 
stable population necessitated subsistence farming only—produc-
ing enough food for the family or basic community units. One 
study that compared archaelogical evidence to present day indige-
nous activities concluedes that "[i]t might seem like a paradox 
that we consider the Indians as conservers of their environment 
because it was precisely from their system that we inherited the 
custom of burning terrain and even the practice of hunting, fish-
ing, and gathering, or in other words, a production economy that 
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is also extractive and exploitative." 
The Spanish agricultural experience in Costa Rica, however, 
was exploitative in a different way. Early settlers not only 
gathered and cultivated native products but soon introduced such 
European commodities as sugar cane, citrus fruits, cereal grains, 
and livestock—what Carolyn Hall terms "ecological colonialism" 
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and Alfred Crosby calls "the Europeanization" of the flora and 
fauna. Crosby includes Costa Rica in his list of "NeoEuropes" 
that were characterized by "biological expansion" or "ecological 
imperialism" in colonized parts of the world. Put in another 
way, as a different study suggests, the "Europeanization" process 
can be defined as "an amalgam of what they [the settlers] discov-
ered, what they introduced, and what they fashioned for them-
5 
selves." 
Because the colonizers considered Indian ways inferior (less 
productive) to European agriculture, they initiated a slow, con-
tinuous deforestation process. The lands became dedicated to 
livestock grazing and to the cultivation of crops like tobacco, 
sugar cane, and other non-native species which disrupted the in-
digenous way of life in those regions. The comparatively few res-
ident Indians in Costa Rica were not used as slaves near to the 
extent that they were in the more mineral-rich parts of the Span-
ish New World. Instead, they were pushed out of areas the Euro-
pean settlers wanted, or captured and sold as slaves for other 
parts of the Spanish Empire. Their "empirical knowledge of eco-
logically appropriate" agriculture, as Hall has described it, was 
ignored by whites and relegated to the small group of Indians is 
6 
isolated from colonial settlements. 
Environmental impact during the colonial era, however, re-
mained limited due to Costa Rica's relative isolation and low pop-
ulation. While colonial farming practices were inappropriate for 
tropical environments, the crops produced were foodstuffs for a 
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small colonial population at home or tobacco and cacao for local 
and regional markets. Early colonial agriculture (limited to the 
7 
Central Valley) had relatively little impact on the land. 
Everything changed in the late 1830s when coffee was found 
to thrive in some of Costa Rica's climatic zones. Many thousands 
of acres in sloped, cool terrain were cleared for coffee cultiva-
tion. What developed for Costa Rica was an agricultural export 
commodity with subsequent growth ramifications. The emergence of 
a coffee elite class meant that large landholders dominated the 
coffee industry and an agroexport oligarchy of merchant elites 
controlled the trade of coffee to foreign markets. Both groups 
came to dominate politics competitively and advocated increased 
production. Unlike many parts of newly independent Latin Ameri-
ca, however, this trade was controlled by local Costa Ricans and 
not by foreign interests. As demand increased, the elite were 
motivated to turn more and more acres of previously undisturbed 
forest into coffee fields. Since 1845 (the beginning of the 
coffee trade with Great Britain) the government of Costa Rica 
provided further incentives for these efforts through lucrative 
tax breaks to the growers. For more than forty years thereafter 
8 
coffee was virtually Costa Rica's only export product. 
But in Costa Rica an incipient conservation awareness was al-
ready starting to emerge, even during the early years of state-
hood. Not all farms were large landholdings, but small or large, 
as Luis Fournier notes, the scale of agricultural deforestation 
in those years had "little marked effect on the environment." 
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The Spanish, and the Costa Rican, growers had "enough ecological 
sense to settle in regions where the soil and climate were suffic-
9 
iently satisfactory for agricultural activities." 
Likewise there were early calls for conservation. As far 
back as 1775 the Spanish governor of Costa Rica, Juan Fernandez 
de Bobadilla, issued a proclamation to discourage controlled 
burns on the basis that they were clearing too much land of for-
est cover and causing soil sterility. In 1833 and 1846 there 
were decrees regarding forest preservation (the latter pertain-
ing to forest cover near cities). In 1888 a decree to protect 
watershed areas in mountains was announced and by the early twen-
tieth century there were calls for a national forestry code. 
Hunting laws were enacted by 1853 as a means to conserve wild-
life. And, very importantly, a further deterrent to environmen-
tal degradation was Costa Rica's low population which in the 
early years of statehood was less than one person per square 
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mile. 
On the other hand, the advent of the banana industry towards 
the end of the nineteenth century and first few decades of the 
twentieth signalled an even greater agro-export phenomenon with 
greater environmental consequences. Unlike coffee, banana plants 
grow in low, humid zones, can be harvested year round, and are 
less susceptible to yield variations. For these reasons and be-
cause there was a robust market in the relatively nearby United 
States, bananas were introduced into Costa Rica's Caribbean low-
lands in the late 1870s. They thrived there and came to dominate 
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the agricultural landscape of lowland Costa Rica. 
A major difference from the coffee industry is that banana 
production requires a large, expensive labor and transportation 
infrastructure. Plantations could be managed and produce shipped 
to ports only with great investments of capital. Capital and 
labor needs like these discouraged small farmers from entering 
the banana business and opened the door to foreign multinational 
corporations. Such was the case in Costa Rica where the United 
Fruit Company (UFC) came to monopolize the banana scene. 
But because absentee landowners have significantly less con-
tact with the land and are more interested in a good return on 
their investment than in ecologically sensible agriculture, the 
banana industry became damaging to the Costa Rican environment. 
Banana growers (bananeros) practiced continual forest removal to 
raise banana plants since a banana field's productive life is 
limited to seven years. More destructive were Sigatoka and Pan-
ama disease (caused by the soil fungus Fusarium oxysporum) which 
rendered banana fields infertile and caused the bananeros to 
clear more forest for plantations. The diseases forced United 
Fruit to abandon most of their Caribbean lowland banana fields by 
1940 and move their operations to the Pacific Coast of Costa Rica 
near the town of Golfito. Using UFC records, William Holliday 
has figured that from 1900 to 1965, nearly 75,000 hectares 
(185,000 acres) of forest were clear cut for bananas. From 1966 
to 1990, however, the pace of deforestation greatly quickened 
with estimates as high as 62,000 hectares (1 53,000 acres) a year— 
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representing up to eleven percent of Costa Rica's annual defor-
11 
estation. 
Clearing land for banana fields, however, is only part of 
the banana deforestation picture. Where before there were cart 
roads, railroads by 1890 (on the Atlantic side) and 1930 (on the 
Pacific side) were constructed to haul bananas to port and opened 
up new areas to developers. Cattle ranches were needed to feed 
the growing number of plantation workers. And when plantations 
were abandoned, like the ones near Limon by 1940 and the ones 
near Golfito by the early 1980s, banana workers flocked to the 
countryside to settle, farm, and eke out a living in the forest 
environment. Holliday concludes that with these infrastructure 
and social impacts, deforestation due to banana expansion 
accounted for up to twenty percent of Costa Rica's total annual 
12 
deforestation rates. 
The historical setting is now in place to understand what 
has happened to Costa Rica since 1950 and to appreciate the cor-
responding conservationist responses. What economist Osvaldo 
Sunkel has referred to in Latin American history as "extra-
regional interventions in search of natural resources" have eco-
nomic and sociologic repercussions outside the scope of this 
12 
study. More germane is the experience of the banana industry in 
providing a base for intervention that would forever change the 
environmental face of Costa Rica. 
45 
The Agricultural Dilemma 
Costa Rica's past experiences with land use have led to a 
late twentieth-century agricultural dilemma. The problem teeters 
between agro-development (for short-term economic prosperity) and 
environmental management (for long-term protection of natural re-
sources. The noted Latin American economist Raul Prebisch refers 
to this dilemma as a "technical ambivalence" where increased pro-
ductivity has a made an "enormous contribution to human welfare 
. . . but at the same time has had serious consequences for the 
13 
biosphere." The Costa Rican case of this phenomenon since 1950 
merits attention here. 
Referred to as the "era of transformation," the 1950s serve 
as a threshold because of the degree of change experienced on the 
14 
Costa Rican agricultural scene. Up until this point, the "des-
sert crops" (coffee, bananas, and to a lesser extent sugar, ca-
cao, and tobacco) dominated agro-export production. The post-war 
world economy, however, affected Costa Rican production. Europe-
an and North American demand for Costa Rica's products fell after 
World War II because other tropical regions (i.e. Africa and 
Southeast Asia) began vigorously competing on the world market. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s African palm trees were intro-
duced in Costa Rica on former banana plantation lands to begin a 
palm oil industry (for the manufacture of margarine and other 
products) as a way to diversify the agricultural economy. Like 
bananas, this exotic species thrived but required capital inten-
sive management. 
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Another development affecting Costa Rica was the sharp de-
cline in world coffee prices in 1958. Coffee, long Costa Rica's 
sole means of economic leverage in the world import/export arena, 
nevertheless was always vulnerable to demand and at the mercy of 
foreign land speculators and financiers. The government respond-
ed with its program of desarrollo hacia adentro (internal develop-
ment) to promote manufacturing and encourage other agricultural 
15 
industries to develop in Costa Rica. 
One commodity that emerged in the 1960's and 70's was cattle 
Since the colonial years when Spanish settlers introduced domes-
tic livestock to the Central Valley, cattle have thrived on the 
lush valley grasses and have supplied beef for local markets. In 
1855 Carl Hoffman described how the valley was "perfect for cat-
tle." The "superabundant meadows, eternally green, fresh, and 
maintained by the cool temperatures and daily showers," he wrote, 
were the ideal "natural conditions [that] have given to industri-
16 
ous men [the means] to establish a great cattle business." 
The cattle business, however, remained limited to providing 
beef f o r local and regional consumption until the 1970's. Then, 
an exponentially growing North American market (strongly rooted 
in the need to supply fast-food restaurant chains with hamburger 
due to a sharp shortage of cheap cuts in the United States) en-
couraged Central American countries to expand ranching inter-
ests. Costa Rican farmers, ranchers, and speculators leapt at 
the opportunity, especially having discovered that the Asian 
zebu breed of cattle was so well adapted to the terrain and cli-
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mate of Costa Rica. One of the oldest living species, the zebu 
(with the easily recognizable hump between its shoulders and 
large, floppy ears) has lived for millions of years in India and 
is considered to be the most widely distributed breed of cattle 
on Earth today. In a 1969 article, La Prensa Libre (a large San 
San Jose newspaper) explained to its readers why they were see-
ing such dramatic increases in the number of zebu around the 
country. Calling it the "ideal bovine for the tropics," the 
article related how zebu have great resistance to tropical dis-
eases, are able to move their flexible skin to shake off pesky 
insects and to eliminate excess heat (unlike European breeds 
which cannot), and can easily graze on steep slopes. That zebu 
are not susceptible to hoof and mouth disease made U.S. import 
approval possible and gave meat dealers the green light to 
17 
wholesale the beef to the hamburger chains. 
Zebu cattle seemed to be a perfect match for Costa Rica and 
by 1986 the country was the number one beef producer (eighty-nine 
million tons) in Central America. Jeffrey Leonard reports that 
thirty-six million tons of this total were exported, ninety-six 
percent to the United States, which received more beef from Costa 
Rica than from any other Central American country. Another au-
thority on the Costa Rican beef industry explains that this impor-
tation was based on U.S. Department of Agriculture fixed quotas 
for imported beef. In the late 1970s USDA policy allowed for a 
staggering 9.8 percent of all imported beef to be from relatively 
18 
tiny Costa Rica. Cattle raisers there worked hard to meet the 
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annual challenge. 
By the 1980s, however, this 'Volatile dependence" on the 
United States, as Susan Place explained it, became hostage to a 
"fluctuating market" and to the whims of the U.S. Congress which 
established and changed (lowered) these import quotas. The em™ 
phasis on exporting beef triggered a variety of social and envir-
onmental impacts. One social impact was the significant drop in 
locally consumed beef. Simply stated, there was less meat avail-
able due to the push to raise cattle for export. Local prices 
for dairy products and beef subsequently climbed which lowered 
the overall standard of living for the nation. To illustrate 
the dilemma, the scarcity of local beef was especially noted by 
the McDonald's hamburger chain in Costa Rica which in 1 977 had 
19 
to import 140,000 pounds of meat a month from Guatemala. 
The powerful Cámara de Ganaderos (Cattlemen's Trade Associa-
tion) lobby was extremely influential in gaining and maintaining 
governmental support for export production. The government pro-
vided such generous tax and credit incentives to ranchers that 
many dairy farmers switched to raising zebu for beef. The number 
of cattle raised in Costa Rica tripled in three decades: from 
20 
607,850 head in 1 950 to 2,050,350 head in 1985. 
This kind of cattle industry requires massive amounts of pas-
ture. Not exactly known as a prairie republic, Costa Rica had to 
manufacture pastureland through systematic deforestation efforts. 
By 1980 over 6,500 square miles, or about one third of Costa Ri-
21 
ca, had been converted to pasture. More importantly, according 
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to land use capability (LUC) studies, only nine percent of Costa 
Rica is ecologically fit for pasture-land, meaning that the other 
twenty-plus percent is damaged. Julio Calvo, a forester at Costa 
Rica's Institute of Technology, argues that this land is "suffer-
ing from erosion and loss of productivity owing to inappropriate 
management." Geographer George Guess suggests that because of 
erosion, Costa Rican pastureland "works towards its own obsoles-
cence with tragic efficiency." Fifty-four percent of the damaged 
land has been identified by LUC as land that could be used for 
22 
annual crops. 
More alarming than these pasturelands figures is the rate of 
forst loss. Costa Rica in the 1980s and early 1990s was losing 
four percent of its forested land a year—a rate that was higher 
than elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, despite the more publi-
23 
cized information on deforestation from the Brazilian Amazon.* 
A more thorough investigation of deforestation follows, but suf-
fice it to say here that while cattle production at one point 
seemed like an economic salvation, it instead added to Costa Ri-
ca's agricultural dilemma. It lowered the per acre output of pro-
duction, eliminated other crops, and increased the amount of food 
to be imported for local consumption. An estimated 96,000 to 
192,000 acres are taken out of crop use annually for the cattle 
industry. Most of the conversion has been for short-term value 
* El Salvador, Haiti, and Cuba have even less percentage of re-
maining forest cover, but because not much forest is left, the 
rate of deforestation has slowed in those countries. 
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only and has had heavy environmental consequences—part of Costa 
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Rica's struggle to confront an economic reality. Deforestation 
also became a significant rallying call in the enviornmentalist 
community, and action was taken before all remaining forests were 
destroyed. 
Similar to the situation with cattle pastures, the history 
of the banana industry represents a significant chapter in Costa 
Rica's agricultural dilemma. Minor C. Keith completed the Inter-
natioal Railroad of Central America and helped found the United 
Fruit Company in 1898 as a means to bring bananas to a rapidly 
growing market in the United States. As mentioned earlier, the 
Caribbean lowlands of Costa Rica were perfect in climate and soil 
for the banana venture and soon thousands of acres of tropical 
forest were converted to banana plantations. Yet by 1950 ninety 
percent of the region remained in forest cover. By the 1990s, 
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however, the figure was only twenty-five percent. (See Figure 1 
for comparative maps of Costa Rican deforestation.) Ninety-six 
thousands acres (ten percent of which was primary forest) were 
cleared for banana plants in the six-year period of 1986-92 
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alone. 
What has happened since the 1950s is the story of the start-
ling growth of an agricultural commodity industry that owes much 
of its success to cheap labor, chemical pesticides, and a recep-
tive government. The results are continued deforestation and en-
vironmental health hazards. A landmark study of the banana prob-
lem in the Sarapiqui region of northeast Costa Rica defines the 
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Figure 1 : Costa Rican Deforestation over Time 
(source: Fundación Neotrdpica) 
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environmental transformation as a six-step process: economic op-
portunity due to market expansion (in this case, Europe), the 
purchase or governmental concession of land (including rainforest 
"which is promptly cut down"); the importation of workers (histor-
ically from the British West Indies, but more recently from Nica-
ragua); the release of a large percentage of the workforce when 
their service is no longer required; the workers' usually unsuc-
cessful search for other employment (and thus their search for 
land on which to grow subsistence crops); and the resultant 
forest invasions which causes more deforestion. "in this way," 
the authors of the study conclude," Costa Rica, one of the 
world's showcases of conservation, is currently promoting a 
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policy that actually encourages rain forest destruction." 
The three major banana producing multi-national corporations 
(United Brands [Chiquita]), Standard Fruit [Dole]) and Bandeco 
[Del Monte]) plus several other producers have all been dependent 
on chemical pesticides for increased harvest yields. These 
yields, however, have been accompanied by environmental and pub-
lic health disadvantages. In a study entitled "Effects of Banana 
Expansion on Human Health and the Ecological System," University 
of Costa Rica scientists Leonardo Mata and Alfonso Mata summed up 
the situation by writing that "an environmental and sanitary dis-
aster generated by the banana plantations" was the result of the 
industry's "predominant interest in the economics, over the ecolo-
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gy," of the crop. For example. Standard Fruit was using the fun-
gicide DBCP (dibromochloropropane) in the early 1970s until it 
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caused sterility in two thousand workers. They sued the company 
in a U.S. court. Similarly, according to the Mata and Mata 
study, seventy-six percent of all pesticide poisoning claims at 
the National Insurance Institute were filed by banana plantation 
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employees. 
Banana production also has been the source for other forms 
of pollution in Costa Rica. A well publicized case in point was 
in the early 1980s when scientists discovered that Cahuita Nation-
al Park (the country's first coral reef protected area on the 
southern end of its Caribbean coastline) was suffering from sedi-
ment runoff from nearby banana plantations in the Estrella River 
Valley. A graduate student in biology named Jorge Cortés investi-
gated the situation and ended up writing his Master's thesis on 
the sediment runoff that was endangering the coral environment. 
Heavy concentrations of iron, lead, copper, and other metals were 
flowing down the streams from the banana plantations into the 
Caribbean and building up on the fragile reef. Cortes, now a 
marine biologist specializing in coral reefs at the University 
of Costa Rica, claims his work on the Cahuita crisis was the 
"first such work on the subject" and was aimed at "creating an 
awareness" for the danger involved to the marine ecosystem. But 
while the Estrella River Valley plantations were penalized and in-
structed to stem their chemical runoffs, according to Cortes who 
in the mid-1990s conducted a follow-up study at Cahuita, the sit-
uation is "even worse" now with sediment build-up in the soil and 
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mud. 
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Many other cases of fertilizer and pesticide runoff from 
banana plantations (one form of non-point pollution) have been 
evidenced in Costa Rica. In 1992, for example, toxic nemati-
cides from plantations near Tortuguero (Limdn Province) were 
linked to a massive fish kill. A lagoon near Tortuguero was 
"white with dead fish" floating in it. Even so, the director of 
the Ministry of Natural Resources at the time, Hernán Bravo, 
claimed it was difficult to trace the exact origin since it was 
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non-point contamination. 
Likewise, waste generated by the banana industry has been 
cause for concern. The Mata and Mata study found that 3.5 mil-
lion tons of waste a year were produced by the plantations. An 
IUCN report claimed that 2.14 tons of waste (three fourths of 
which is non-biodegradable) are produced for every ton of ban-
anas. Part of the mess has been due to the blue plastic bags 
used to protect bananas hanging on the plants from the damaging 
rays of the sun. The bags were typically removed in the field, 
tossed into the streams or canals, and carried off to the sea 
adding ocean pollution and endangering giant turtles and other 
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marine life. In 1992, under heavy pressure from local and inter-
national environmental groups which were threatening worldwide 
banana boycotts, a consortium of banana growers agreed to con-
struct a recycling plant for the plastic bags (to be Costa Rica's 
largest recycling center), formed a Banana Ecology Commission, 
and started a "zero plastic" program. According to reporter 
Michelle Sheaff, it appeared as if the banana companies were 
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"turning green." Local environmentalists, however, were wary of 
the promises and were concerned that the recycling be performed 
in an ecologically responsible way. Since then, as Jorge Cortés 
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notes, the problem with blue bag pollution has improved. 
The dilemma with Costa Rica's banana industry is both envir-
onmental and social. Some plantation owners say they are working 
to reforest their lands. Jorge Cortés claims none have done so. 
The owners claim to bring in thousands of jobs to the country, 
but bringing more people in can be part of the problem. Luis 
Fournier notes that importing seasonal workers is a huge "demo-
graphic problem" and is Costa Rica's number one environmental 
challenge for the twenty first century. He cites as evidence 
the large influx of Nicaraguan laborers seeking work on banana 
plantations and the pressures on the environment and public ser-
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vices that have resulted. The immigrant work force is in part 
response to the fact that most Costa Ricans refuse to do the work 
(hard labor, low pay, etc.).* But perhaps the problem has a wider 
base. Hardly limiting the blame to the government of Costa Rica 
or the large corporate plantations, John Vandermeer and Ivette 
* Two prominent conservation leaders in Costa Rica disagree with 
Dr. Fournier on this overpopulation/foreign workers point. Alex-
ander Bonilla (personal interview, July 1996, San José,) claimed 
that workers have to have a job and a place to live before 
they can even begin to think about conserving resources. They 
should not be neglected, he argued, but should be encouraged to 
learn sustainable agriculture for survival. Likewise, environmen-
tal attorney Roxana Salazar stated in an interview (July 1996, 
San José) that the banana workers do not represent "an ecological 
problem." In addition, she noted that recent immigration legis-
lation (i.e. the Nicaragua/Costa Rica convention that facilitates 
legal immigration) is working to address the problem. 
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Perfecto assert that the "same biologists, ecologists, and eco-
tourists who love the rain forest when they're in Costa Rica also 
love to slice bananas on their cereal in the morning." They sug-
gest that "with our penchant for viewing the world in isolated 
little disconnected fragments, it is apparently difficult for us 
all to see the connection between the knife that slices the ban-
ana in our cereal and the chainsaw that slices tree trunks onto 
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rain forest floor." 
Agriculture in general cannot be ignored in Costa Rica. Ag-
ricultural land covers one half of Costa Rica (although only ten 
percent of the country is cultivated) and is the number one indus-
try. Two thirds of the national economy revolves around agricul-
ture with bananas as the number one crop (still controlled by for-
eign corporations), followed by coffee, sugar, and of course 
beef. Cacao is still an export crop but is raised primarily on 
small farms. Food crops like rice, corn, beans (the principal 
source of protein for most Costa Ricans), fruits (especially pine-
apples), vegetables, and palm oils are other secondary, but im-
portant, products. There are many small subsistence farms, but 
about three fifths of all Costa Rican farms are either medium 
sized (that use family members and hired labor) or minifundias— 
farms that grow subsistence crops and some export products. 
Large estates make up only three percent of Costa Rican agri-
culture and are said to be "the most extensively exploited [but] 
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least productive" units. Cattle ranchers tend to take too much 
land out of more useful, sustainable production and, as one 
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study notes, employ "few and enrich even fewer." Costa Rica has 
had limited success with land reform but it often has not been 
compatible with the government's emphasis on agricultural devel-
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opment. 
Hopes to stimulate the economy in the 1970s and 1980s by pro-
ducing more internationally marketable products (an economic 
theory known as "comparative advantage") prompted more land to 
be cultivated. Thousands of acres were turned into citrus groves 
and ornamental plant fields. Visions of high yields necessitated 
the introduction of great quantities of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides that the crops required. To cope with with the debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, Costa Rica further accelerated these 
measures. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) insisted that 
Costa Rica produce more nontraditional crops like pineapples, 
flowers, and ornamental plants that could be sold in an ever-
growing world market to generate capital flow to help satisfy 
creditors. By the late 1980s these nontraditional crops account-
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ed for thirty percent of all Costa Rican agro-exports. 
While international lending organizations considered this a 
success, Costa Rica was experiencing difficulties with compara-
tive advantage. Major multi-national corporations (i.e. Del Mon-
te, United Brands, and Phillip Morris) were controlling the 
growth of export products while not enough beans, rice, and corn 
were being planted to feed the nation. "Frijoles si, flores no 
("beans yes, flowers no") became the rallying cry for a 1987 
campesino protest, led by farmer-activist Carlos Campos, to pro-
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test the policies. Warning against an agrochemical "dependency," 
Campos wrote that "the reality is that we Costa Ricans are now 
dying, that we are destroying our soil, and from now on we should 
begin to demonstrate that, as farmers, it is necessary to present 
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alternatives." 
Some studies are more specific about the environmental harms 
of agricultural specialization. Referring to the abuse of chemi-
cal fertilizers and pesticides as a "modernizing artificializa-
tion of the ecosystem," Nicolo Gligo lists erosion of farm land, 
sedimentation of waterways, non-point pollution, salinization, 
increased flood potential, soil sterility, deforestation (and its 
resultant diminishment of biological diversity) as problems stem-
ming from monocultural agriculture. Moreover, "altering the nat-
ural architecture" and modifying the "topologic composition" pro-
duces far fewer calories for the people than the natural ecosys-
tems themselves. The rate of infant mortality began to climb in 
the mid-1980s due to decreased nutrition from less available or 
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overpriced commodities needed by poorer peoples. 
From 1950 to the 1980s, then, Costa Rica sustained vast en-
vironmental damage from its agricultural development. It has 
been suggested that "Costa Rica was rapidly becoming a runaway 
train on a steep and curvy downhill grade" before policies start-
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ed to change to preserve what environment was left. Much of the 
terrain that changed had previously been forested—a topic that 
needs to be discussed next before an analysis of conservation 
efforts can be properly understood. 59 
Deforestation 
The loss of forest deserves special attention here because 
of its impact on the environment and its importance to the devel-
opment of a national conservation awareness. Former Costa Rican 
president and Nobel Prize winner Oscar Arias stated in 1988 that 
we have made very important steps for the preserva-
tion of our natural heritage . . . but at the same 
time we deplore the sad leadership we possess in de-
stroying our forests. No country in Latin America 
has a higher rate of deforestation than ours; today 
less than five percent of the nation's dense forests 
exist outside of protected areas. Such a paradoxical 
situation constitutes a serious threat to the advanced 
successes of conservation. (42) 
The rate of deforestation alluded to by President Arias is alarm-
ing. It has been estimated that before any humans lived in there 
99.8 percent of Costa Rica was covered with forest. The trees 
evolved by succession—the process whereby some species adapted, 
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thrived, and when dead made way for other species to move in. 
But by the 1980s approximately sixty-five percent of Costa Rica 
was deforested. In the high development 1970s Costa Rica had the 
highest rate of deforestation in Central America, experiencing a 
twenty-nine percent forest loss in that decade alone. In turn, 
this led to seventeen percent of Costa Rica's land to be degraded 
with an estimated 680 million tons of topsoil a year being washed 
44 
away due to loss of forest cover. 
While much of this loss was due to expansion of agriculture 
and pasturelands, which increased by 250 percent from 1950 to 
1984, the timber industry is also responsible for massive defor-
estation. In fact it was the timber industry which first opened 
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up many forests for agricultural development by constructing 
roads into previously inaccessible areas and clearing land for 
fields. By the late 1980s there were 17,000 miles of roads in 
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Costa Rica, more than in any other Central American nation. What 
B.E. Lemus in his book Costa Rica Crisis calls the "forest indus-
trial complex" is big business timbering, most of which occurs on 
private land. However, because of imprecise surveying efforts, 
poorly delineated boundaries, and underbudgeted enforcement meas-
ures, logging (and the resultant pasturing) has occurred inside 
protected areas as well. And instead of using a plan of selec-
tive cuttings in forest reserves, timber companies have been 
clearcutting large tracts of densely forested areas for short 
term economic rewards. Two thirds of all harvested timber is con-
sumed as fuel and much is wasted, as Carolyn Hall points out, due 
to "deficiency of extractive methods and the lack of industries 
to use the poorer quality wood." Such waste and non-sustainable 
harvests are fast resulting in a situation that some fear could 
make Costa Rica have to import wood for domestic use by the year 
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2000. 
Along the roads made to haul timber out of the backcountry 
came squatters—poor settlers called precaristas (literally, 
those in a precarious situation or living on the edge)—looking 
for land to farm and a way to feed their families in newly defor-
ested areas. Colonizing farm lands in the tropical forests by 
such people was nothing new in Costa Rica. In the 1830s Alexan-
der Skutch observed squatters moving into the El General Valley 
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who were "eager to take possession of as much land as [they] 
could for this sort of agriculture." The squatters, he wrote, 
"obliged by law to clear and plant at least half [their] area" 
and during each dry season "renewed [their] attack upon the 
dwindling forest." He reminisced that 
January and February were the chief months when the 
woods were leveled. At intervals throughout the morn-
ing, I would hear the dying groan of some great tree 
as it began to strain the shrinking band of wood be-
tween the axe cuts on opposite sides. Then came the 
billowy swish of myriad leaves rushing madly downward 
through the air and a thunderous, earth-quivering thud 
that reverberated far across the valley as the huge 
tree crashed down upon its final resting place. . . . 
Before they felled the tall trees, the laborers cleared 
away all the underbrush with their machetes. This made 
the forest parklike and most inviting. . . . But this 
idyllic state was usually of short duration. Soon the 
big trees were attacked and overthrown, the noble for-
est reduced to a scene of chaos and ruin. (47) 
The precaristas of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s practiced sim-
ilar agricultural techniques, although most used fire instead of 
an ax to clear the forest. The colonizers came out of the in-
terior of the country and migrated towards the coasts. In 1961 
the Law of Lands and Colonization (similar to the Homestead Act 
in the United States) was enacted.* It established an agency 
(ITCO, the Institute on Lands and Colonization) to aid the preca-
ristas and imposed sanctions on landowners retaining uncultivated 
acres. ITCO encouraged migration in the early 1960s to "improve" 
virgin "farm" land. But while the majority of precaristas squat-
ted on land designated as farm areas, they did not settle solely 
* A more detailed discussion of the history and career of this 
law follows in Chapter 3. 
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on private land. The conservation organization Fundación Neo-
trdpica reported that a staggering twenty-five percent of federal-
ly protected land was invaded at one time or another. Crop land 
and cattle pastures were established before the government could 
react and in many cases before it even knew. Likewise, some pre-
caristas (without permission from the landowners) occupied and 
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attempted to farm plantation land belonging to foreign owners. 
By the 1980s, colonization was becoming a significant econom-
ic, sociological, and environmental problem. Some estimates sug-
gested that one sixth of all Costa Rican families were precaris-
tas . Making a long term, better living for their families, how-
ever, in many cases did not materialize. Cleared land and sup-
plies were bought on credit. Interest rates and principal became 
difficult to pay when prices and demand on agricultural commodi-
ties dwindled. Price policies set far from where the campesinos 
worked dictated production needs without the squatters' knowing 
or ability to change crops. An even greater setback was erosion, 
occuring when land was cleared of cover and the topsoil and its 
nutrients would eventually be lost in runoffs during the rainy 
season. Crops could be grown for only three to five years when 
many peasant families were forced to sell out to large real 
estate firms who in turn sold the land to ranchers for use as 
pasture. Intensive grazing made the land suitable for only four 
to six years more before rendering it completely degraded. Mean-
while, the precaristas searched for and moved to new frontiers— 
renewing the destructive cycle. 
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To be fair to the squatters, it is important to note that 
not all research shows precarismo to have had a negative impact. 
Beatriz Villareal, in her authoritative work El precarismo en Cos-
ta Rica, maintains that in 1973 (near the height of the precaris-
ta period) the squatters represented only eight percent of the 
rural population. Daniel Janzen has argued that "squatters have 
never been a problem on government or private land under conspic-
uous use" and that at Guanacaste National Park (a preserve that 
Janzen was instrumental in establishing) squatters would only 
take marginal land. Likewise the OTS in 1984 began an environ-
mental education program for squatters living near its La Selva 
biological station that was aimed at "treating them as friends 
and neighbors and not as invaders." A similar approach was used 
at Monteverde. There, the World Wildlife Fund and the Canadian-
based Monteverde Conservation League sold tracts of land to pre-
caristas for twenty-five dollars an acre to help them relocate 
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away from endangered tropical rainforests. 
When farmlands became ranchlands, however, displaced peas-
ants were not absorbed into the cattle workforce. Coffee produc-
tion requires 130 working days per hectare per year (rice sixty 
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and beans thirty-seven) but cattle require only six. Advances 
in agricultural technology also translated into less need for 
field hands. With so little work to be found in the country (and 
what work there was paid poorly), thousands of precaristas had no 
other choice than to return to San Jose or other cities—the com-
pletion of the colonization cycle. Twenty-five percent of the 
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rural population (n = 150,000) became classified as "landless 
workers/farmers"—the highest percentage in Central America. 
Hence, a development contradiction emerged in the late 1970s 
when 90,3 percent of all land in production (reduced to eighty-
two percent by 1985) for the cattle industry was accounting for 
only twelve percent of total agricultural exports and a small per-
51 
centage of the GNP. 
Those kinds of statistics prompted geographers and econo-
mists to conclude that the beef boom was actually "underdevelop-
ing" the Costa Rican economy, increasing tensions among the 
people, and creating social and economic problems. They pointed 
out how the cattle industry had displaced a sustainable harvest 
of timber—resulting in a $4.68 million net loss in the economy 
from potentially marketable hardwood trees. The cattle industry 
had become a "drag on the economy" instead of its greatest motor 
and had concentrated the wealth into "landed elite" by squeezing 
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out many small farmers. 
The impact of deforestation on Costa Rica is indeed multi-
faceted. There is not only the obvious loss of trees (and there-
fore timber) but also the loss of wildlife habitat (especially 
of threatened and endangered species), scenic value, and water-
shed deterioration. Deforestation also results in river silting 
(caused by erosion on cleared lands), disruption of fisheries and 
traditional fishing grounds, abnormal flood/drought cycles, river-
bank erosion, heavy soil compaction (from cattle), and soil ster-
ility that often leads to complete desertification of the area. 
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An important early study on the subject (from 1972) ex-
plained the desertification process by showing how forest areas 
that were cleared and not allowed to recover "never reached the 
climax stage [of succession]." The clearing caused a "reduction 
in organic matter and nitrogen removal of the original vegetation 
exposing the soil to full sunlight and to receive the full impact 
of rainfall." In turn, surface temperatures rose and humidity 
fell. If the area was burned, the deterioration process was mag-
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nified. 
In addition to the negative environmental effects, deforesta-
tion caused serious economic problems. The decrease in water-
sheds meant a reduction in hydroelectric generating capability 
thereby limiting the flow of electricity and reducing employment 
opportunities in some sectors of the economy. Soil sterility and 
overgrazed pastures led to an overall loss of potential economic 
opportunities from sustainable agriculture. The problem was 
grounded in a wide-spread belief in abundance theory—a lack of 
acknowledgment of a renewable resource problem. The theory was 
defined by one study as that pattern of thinking in the 1960s 
and 1970s based on the "belief that Costa Rica had more than 
enough resources and that no shortages would develop." In con-
trast to nineteenth-century agricultural patterns, many Ticos 
(what Costa Ricans fondly call themselves) in the last forty 
years have believed that "basically the entire country was suit-
able for agriculture and livestock and that forests were only 
impediments to development." Deforestation, then, was seen as an 
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"improvement" to the land. But what Ticos thought might be a 
"giant step towards modernization," wrote geographer John 
Augelli, in reality became a "minimum of socially desirable and 
environmentally adaptive components [resulting in] painful social 
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and ecological costs." 
It took this kind of harsh reality for the goverment of 
Costa Rica to legislate against forest abuse. In the late 1960's 
the Ministry of Agriculture appointed a committee to study the 
problem and draft a bill that would enable the government to lim-
it the deforestation cycle. The result was the Ley Forestal (For-
estry Law) of 1969 which became a monumental turning point in Cos-
ta Rican environmental history.* 
Article 1 of the Ley Forestal proclaimed that the law would 
establish "as an essential function of the State [the means] to 
guard the protection, exploitation, conservation and development 
of the forest resources of the country, in accordance with the 
principle of multiple use of natural, renewable resources." Con-
ceived with the notion of "multiple use" (a concept borrowed from 
U.S. natural resource policy), the Ley Forestal placed all of Cos-
ta Rica's forests under the the charge of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Livestock (MAG). Article 2 directed MAG to "conserve 
forest resources . . . combat soil erosion, control the exploita-
tion of forest resources . . . [and] conserve wildlife" among 
* A more complete history of this legislation is discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 7. 
other duties. Specifically for forest concerns and to be admini-
stered under the auspices of MAG, the General Forestry Director-
ate (DGF) was established in Article 9. Its functions included 
"to administer the forest heritage [defined in Article 18 to 
mean national parks, forests, preserves, and biological reserves] 
. . . [and] to give technical assistance to the timber industry." 
And the Ley Forestal established other protected areas that would 
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not be open to development. 
The Forestry Law of 1969, however, hardly slowed deforesta-
tion. In the decade following promulgation of the law, Costa Ri-
57 
ca experienced a twenty-nine percent total forest loss. Several 
authorities have tried to pinpoint how this could have happened. 
Luis Fournier blamed the lack of long range planning despite in-
creased awareness of conservation needs. Carolyn Hall explained 
how the law was not actively enforced and how the permitting pro-
cess was ineffective. Permits were to have been obtained by for-
est users from the DGF before any timber could be cut from pri-
vate or public lands, but the new forestry agency lacked "the 
funds and trained personnel to enforce the law." While the DGF 
was supposed to have complete control over all timber cuts, it 
has been reported that by 1989 roughly one half of all trees 
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felled lacked the proper permits. 
Likewise, many thousands of trees were harvested in banned 
areas. Deforestation occurred in parks and on the perimeters of 
protected areas which affected their overall environmental integ-
rity. Because funds were scarce, Bill Weinberg reported, insuf-
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ficient vigilance near protected zones opened the way for "ranch-
ing, slash-and-burn campesino farming, high-pesticide corporate 
agriculture (such as banana plantations), or timber exploitation" 
on the borders of the parks and often extending into them. In 
1971, only two years after the Forestry Law was enacted, forestry 
biologist Joseph Tosi of the Tropical Science Center issued what 
became a famous warning stating that by 1985 there would be vir-
tually no natural forests left in Costa Rica if the deforestation 
rates of the time continued. Luckily Dr. Tosi's predictions for 
forest loss did not completely materialize, but by 1987 Costa Ri-
ca was still losing 120,000 acres of forest a year. According to 
a World Resources Institute study, the country's annual rate of 
deforestation in 1990 was 6.9 percent—the highest in all of 
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Latin America. 
The bleakness of the above scenario certainly tested Costa 
Rica's image as a "green republic." Fortunately, the scenario 
is being offset by changes occurring in Costa Rica. Squatter 
colonization persists but has declined dramatically (albeit for 
more economic than environmental reasons) since the mid-1970s. 
In 1977 the Ley de Refprestación (Reforestation Law) was passed 
which was the government's first attempt to restore degraded for-
est lands. It was also a way toward fostering the belief that 
tierras incultas (uncultivated lands) could have values and uses 
other than development. The government repealed the tax on un-
cultivated farmland and established tax incentives, loan assist-
ance, and technological help for reforestation efforts. It has 
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been an expensive project that has not yet been totally success-
ful on a nationwide basis, but has great economic potential for 
providing a sustainable wood products industry. One project near 
Turrialba called Programa de Diversificacicfa (Diversification Pro-
gram) has been successful in repopulating trees and employs the 
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services of local small-scale foresters. 
Reforestation has many logical advantages. To list a few, 
the guaranteeing of watersheds, hydro-power, wildlife habitat, 
erosion control, and the diversification of local economies are 
among the most often cited. Currently, however, there is a lack 
of long-term financial investment and technology for reforesta-
tion to become totally successful and much of the land needed is 
located in private holdings. Lands that were formerly banana 
plantations are especially slow to reforest or to produce much 
of anything else. Likewise, there are many thousands of refor-
ested acres that have become plantations of single tree species 
and therefore, as Hall relates, "insignificant in relation to the 
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magnitude of the ecological problem they are intended to solve." 
The most common plantation tree crop in Costa Rica is that 
teakwood. Teak trees (Tectona grandis) are tall East Indian tim-
ber trees that are an introduced species in Central America and 
thrive in Costa Rica's lowland tropical areas, especially on the 
Pacific Coast. Teakwood is a hard yellowish wood that in the 
past was often used in shipbuilding. It now enjoys a healthy 
world market for other wood products, especially in the increas-
ingly wood-starved Far East. The problem is that thousands of 
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acres of deforested land are being proclaimed "reforested" by 
the teak industry. Advertisements across the country hail such 
benefits as erosion control, soil conservation, and wildlife 
cover that teak plantations supposedly offer. 
The plantations, however, are a far cry from the original 
forest cover. Teak trees are planted in symmetrical rows, grow 
at even heights, have weeded and well-groomed rows between them, 
and are felled at the same time when mature. The reforested 
plantations "help the soil for awhile," forestry botanist Luis 
Fournier recently explained, "but eventually the soil deterior-
ates with more cuttings." The ads the industry uses, he assert-
ed, do not give the complete picture and are used to get more 
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people (often foreigners) to invest. 
As powerful a problem as deforestation is in Costa Rica, in 
many ways it did help wake up a nation to its environmental re-
sponsabilices. The voices of many started to become louder for 
the more rational conservation of natural resources. Lobbying be-
came intensive for the designation of more and more national 
parks and protected areas. Part of that solution meant that the 
government would have to take a more active position in legislat-
ing protection and funding enforcement. Recent steps have been 
taken to crack down on wilderness exploitation. The Rural Guard 
conducts spot checks for illegally cut logs (often hidden in pro-
duce trucks). At the urging of the DGF (and despite great uproar 
from the timber industry, the government declared a state of emer-
gency concerning the deforestation crisis in the late 1980s. 
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Agencies can now suspend permits to cut trees outside of private 
plantations and can prohibit the export of unfinished wood prod-
ucts. Likewise, funds have been earmarked specifically for the 
enforcement of these measures. 
The government also has encouraged sustainable development 
of forest resources (to include agriculture, sylviculture, and 
tourism) to protect its tropical forests. Programs in environmen-
tal education have assisted this effort. According to Weinberg's 
study, "sustainable development" is "virtually a household term 
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among educated Costa Ricans. . . . " 
None of these successes occurred spontaneously. Environmen-
tal reforms, reforestation, national park development, and ecolog-
ical education did not occur in Costa Rica without the will and 
determination of the Costa Ricans. The result can be seen in the 
history of Costa Rican conservation, as will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSERVATIONIST RESPONSE 
The national parks belong to all Costa Ricans equally, 
and therefore they have the right to enjoy them . . . 
but also the duty to protect them. 
- Mario Boza (1) 
An Overview of the Costa Rican National Park Experience 
What do the words "model," "example," "beacon," "showcase," 
"prototype," "the ideal," and "wave of the future" have in com-
mon? Answer: all repeatedly have been used to describe Costa 
Rica's national park system. The descriptions are used to refer 
to the parks' diversity, number, size, management plans, beauty, 
and quickness in being established. The 1970 United Nations List 
of National Parks and Equivalent Reserves listed no national 
parks or protected areas in Costa Rica. Six short years later, 
however, a different U.N. study called A Manual for National 
Parks and Planning referred to Costa Rica as a model on how to 
preserve natural areas and on how to create master plans to pro-
2 
tect flora and fauna. By 1980 Costa Rica had more protected 
areas and more personnel working on conservation issues than any 
other Central American nation and a greater percentage of land 
3 
designated as national parks or reserves than the United States. 
(See map, Figure 1.) 
The figures today speak for themselves: twenty-eight percent 
of Costa Rica is designated as legally protected land (eleven per-
cent in national parks, four percent in indigenous reserves, and 
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Figure 1: National Parks and Equivalent Reserves of Costa Rica 
(source: Juan Diego López Ocampo, Guia verde de Costa Rica 
[San José: Guias de Costa Rica, S.A., 1992]) 
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thirteen percent divided among biological reserves, national for-
4 
ests, national monuments, and national wildlife refuges). (See 
Table 1.) 
Table 1: Protected Areas in Costa Rica 
Designation No. of acres Percentage of total 
1. National Parks 1,336,196 37.7% 
2. National Monuments* 3,624 .1% 
3. Wildlife Refuges 397,820 11 .2% 
4. Biological Reserves 94,954 2.7% 
5. Forest Reserves 651,920 18.4% 
6. Zonas Protectoras** 426,730 12.0% 
7 . Humedales*** 96,485 2.8% 
CO Indigenous Reserves 536,316 15.1% 
total 3,544,045 100% 
* includes two areas designated as "natural reserves" 
** protected watersheds, buffer zones, and biological corridors 
*** state or provincially protected wetlands 
(source: SINAC records as of Dec. 1995) 
The Costa Rican park system is managed by SINAC (National 
System of Conservation Areas) which is a division of MINAE (Minis-
try of Environment and Energy). The protected areas are divided 
into three management types. Type I is "strict" protection 
(national parks, biological reserves, national monuments, natural 
reserves, and wildlife refuges) with the objectives "to preserve 
species [and] to reduce human intervention in environments and 
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ecological processes.!f These areas also include archaeological 
or historically significant sites (i.e. the prehistoric Indian 
ruins at Guayabo National Monument or the Filibuster War memori-
al at Santa Rosa National Park). Over eleven percent of the 
total designated area is under this "strict" classification. 
Type II includes forest reserves and protected zones whose 
objective is "partially to protect the biological diversity as 
they are open to exploitation of resources under certain condi-
tions." They are managed for different degrees of multiple use 
development (i.e. tourism, logging, etc.). They allow limited 
logging but also were established to protect important water-
sheds, wildlife, and forage. Type III is indigenous reserves 
which are for "the conservation of cultures and their environ-
ments and the protection of life systems in these communities 
5 
and the way natural resources are used." There are twenty-one 
Type III Indigenous Reserves. 
The Forestry Law of 1969 (and its various revisions since) 
outlines the differences in the designated protected areas. 
Article 74 legally defines "national parks" as "those regions or 
areas of historic importance that are set off by boundaries de-
termined by executive decree and that for their scenic beauty or 
the national and international importance of their wildlife are 
to be set aside for the recreation and education of the public, 
for tourism, or for scientific research." National monuments are 
smaller areas (2,500 or fewer acres), have less diversity or less 
natural and historic value than national parks, or are areas pro-
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tecting a specific resource. Biological reserves are "forest 
lands whose principal use is for conservation and research of 
wildlife and the ecosystems in which they exist." And national 
wildlife refuges are for "the protection, conservation, propaga-
6 
tion, and management of wildlife species of flora and fauna." 
Some of the language in the Forestry Law reflected a utili-
tarian multiple use perspective of conservation. The economic 
nature of Costa Rica's forest reserves (or national forests) is 
seen in Article 35-A (of the 1990 revision) which defines them as 
"forests whose principal function is for the production of wood." 
Logging and recreation have been high management objectives. 
Zonas Protectoras are defined as areas for "the protection of 
soil, regulation of hydrology, and conservation of watersheds." 
While these definitions are overtly economic in nature, one promi-
nent conservationist acknowledges that the national forests are 
also the "lungs of the cities"—vital oxygen producers for so 
7 
many aspects of the nation's health. 
The importance of the national parks (and other protected 
areas) is multi-dimensional. In the large sense, preserving the 
"natural and cultural heritage" of Costa Rica, as Mario Boza has 
identified the primary objectives of protected areas, seems like 
the obvious mission of the national parks. But in a country with 
such broad diversity of environments and life zones, and one so 
entrenched in agricultural and economic uses of the land, that is 
no small task. Costa Rica has responded to the challenge, how-
ever, by developing parks or preserves in all of its identified 
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geographic zones (with the exception of the wet lowlands montane 
forest which, according to Boza, has no representative natural 
or undeveloped areas remaining). The park service identified 
five management types of national parks to accomplish this goal: 
historical and archaeological, mountainous and volcanic, dryland 
8 
forests, rainforests, and underground and submarine parks. 
The scientific value of this preservation system is probably 
immeasurable. Guanacaste and Santa Rosa national parks, for exam-
ple, are the only protected tropical dry forests in the world. 
Poas Volcano is one of the world's few remaining active volcanoes 
with year-round access for scientific study. Likewise, maintain-
ing as natural a state as possible for tropical plant and animal 
communities represents, as Luid Fournier put it, an "endless foun-
tain of educational and research material for all age levels." 
It also is a "deposit of genetic material" that has scientific, 
medical, and economic potential. The genetic value of species 
protection in habitat protected by Costa Rica's parks and pre-
serves (what Fournier refers to as "open-air laboratories") may 
9 
keep the country in the scientific limelight for decades to come. 
Furthermore, in the next fifty years these protected areas may be 
the only natural territories left in the entire country if devel-
opment continues at its present rate. After a slide presentation 
on endangered tropical forests at a 1990 Legislative Assembly 
hearing to draft a new forestry law, Mario Boza (then Vice Mini-
ster of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines) declared, "what you 
saw in the slides—the national parks are what have saved any for-
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That Costa Ricans realized this threat and acted quickly to 
save as much as they could in all of the representative geograph-
ic zones (save the one listed) exemplifies their awareness for 
the environmental welfare of the country and the foresight of 
many conservation minded individuals. Their experience also has 
served as a regional model for an ecologically troubled Central 
America. Mario Boza and Rolando Mendoza wrote that 
the subject of of national parks is gaining in impor-
tance in other Central American countries due, to a 
certain extent, to the influence of Costa Rica . . . 
for example, the first Central American meeting on 
Management of Cultural and Natural Resources was 
held in San Jose to analyze, among other subjects, 
the zones proposed for a Central American system 
of national parks. . . . (11) 
And former President Oscar Arias took the importance of the parks 
one step further to include a global responsibility: 
Our system of national parks and wildlife areas 
protects individual ecosystems that are the para-
digm of the extraordinary natural variety of 
which we are guardians. This is of vital im-
portance not only for present and future gener-
ations of Costa Ricans, but for all humanity. (12) 
Early "Parks" and Conservation Laws 
Similar to most countries in the world, conservation poli-
cies in Costa Rica were a mid- to late twentieth-century phenome-
non. While there were no actual national parks in Costa Rica un-
til 1970, there were some earlier measures that attempted to deal 
with preserving parts of the nation's natural heritage. One con-
cept of protecting areas goes back to 1863. It was then that the 
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ests that's left at all." 
government set aside a tract of forest on both sides of the Cam-
ino del Norte (Northern Road) to be excluded from cuts. In 1906 
the Legislative Assembly passed Law No. 36 which obligated the ex-
ecutive branch of government to recommend a general forest policy 
to the Assembly. Although there were some initiatives and orders 
made, the law was vague and no national policy was created. 
An influential person in early conservation policy making 
was Enrique Jimenez Nunez. Jiménez had earned his graduate de-
gree in engineering in Belgium but returned to Costa Rica where, 
according to one study, he "started to form a conscience about 
13 
environmental problems." Appointed to the office of State Sec-
retary of Development and Agriculture, Jiménez promoted a plan to 
diminish the burning of forests which resulted in Law No. 121 La 
Ley de Quemas (the Fire Law) of 1909. The law established guide-
lines for the use of fire to clear forested land. Jiménez under-
stood the connection between forest cover and water supply and 
wrote that burning mountainsides "destroys many of the principal 
sources of the public wealth, it disfavorably modifies the normal 
rates of rainfall . . . [and] has transformed the most prosperous 
14 
and rich countries into deserts." Unfortunately the Fire Law 
lacked any strong enforcement measures and did little to prevent 
deforestation in the decades to come. Jiménez also advocated a 
project that would have nationalized all of Costa Rica's water 
systems in 1910 (which did not culminate into law) and devised a 
plan to eliminate the dumping of coffee plantation byproduct 
waste into rivers in 1914. 
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Other conservation policies were enacted in the 1910s and 
20s. In 1913, for example, the government classified Poás Volca-
no as "protected" but provided no authority or enforcement to mon-
itor the mountain. In the same year the government declared a 
600 foot swath of forest inland from Costa Rica's coasts and an 
800 foot swath along river banks to become the first "national 
forests." Again, there was a lack of clarifying language and 
authority to enforce any protective measures. Two laws were 
passed om 1923 aimed at preserving water. The first was Law No. 
52 to prohibit the dumping of waste products from sewers, dair-
ies, and slaughterhouses into the nation's rivers and the second 
was Law No. 68 for the protection of watershed systems. 
The 1930s witnessed additional, albeit nominal, initiatives 
to protect the nation's forests. In 1930 a regulation was de-
creed to establish a system of forest guards (guardabosques) "who 
would have jurisdiction in the whole Republic to ensure the con-
servation and rational use of the forests." The enforcement of 
the act was placed in the office of the "Forestry Chief" of the 
15 
national agricultural department in 1933. Law No. 13 of January 
1939 went a bit further and established "preserves" around Poás 
and Irazu volcanoes and in the forests on both sides of the Cor-
dillera Central. The law, however, was really more like a philo-
sophical resolution because it included no exact delineations or 
enforcement clauses. Called the Ley General sobre Terrenos Bal-
díos (General Law regarding Vacant Lands), this measure declared 
that all vacant lands "that have no legitimate title for private 
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owners, have not been registered with the Public Register, [and] 
are not occupied by a public service" would belong to the state. 
The law also established the government's right to eminent 
16 
domain. 
There was limited interest in conservation measures in the 
1940s as well. Recognizing the international aspect of preserv-
ing nature, Costa Rican delegates signed the Western Hemisphere 
Convention on Nature Resources in Washington, D.C., in 1940.* In 
1943 when Costa Rica's segment of the Pan American Highway was 
constructed, biologists Charles Lankester and Mariano Montealegre 
proposed the idea of protecting as a "national park" a region on 
both sides of the road that they discovered was home to what they 
believed to be the world's largest oak trees. Law no. 197 of 
1945 designated 6,000 feet on both sides of the highway as a 
"national park" (the first time such a term was used in Costa Ri-
can legislation) and stipulated that no forest exploitation would 
occur in the area. Unfortunately, the law was never really put 
into effect, placed no one in charge of its administration, and 
therefore left the oak forests open for timber cutting. The law 
was abrogated in 1973, as former park service attorney Ana Maria 
17 
Tato explained, "because there was nothing left to protect." 
In 1948 a political upheaval ended in the revolution of Na-
tional Liberation that thrust José Figueres Ferrer into the pres-
idency of the Founding Junta of the "Second Republic" of Costa 
* It was not until 1966, however, that the Legislative Assembly 
ratified the convention. 
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Rica (1948-49). The revolution, however, did not disrupt plans 
for a Costa Rican delegation to attend and participate in the 
Inter-American Conference for the Conservation of Renewable 
Natural Resources that was held in September of 1948 in Denver, 
Colorado. The conference, which was promulgated at the Third 
Inter-American Agricultural Conference in Caracas three years 
earlier, was a forum designed to share ideas from the countries 
in the Western Hemisphere and to promote regional cooperation on 
conservation concerns. One of the Costa Rican participants, for 
example, presented a paper on the growing interest in forest 
protection in his country and how the State should be actively 
involved in overseeing conservation to guarantee "a land with 
19 
resources for the future. . . . " 
Jose Figueres and the government of the Second Republic 
placed emphasis on education and social services, abolished the 
military (an act that Costa Ricans often cite as vital for free-
ing government funds for such things as higher education and, 
later, conservation), and established the Instituto Costarricense 
de Electricidad (ICE)—the country's public utility corporation 
that supplies electricity. Understanding the importance of for-
est cover for ensuring the hydrologic needs of the ICE, the Fig-
ueres administration issued a decree in 1949 to establish a For-
est Council to inventory forest resources and to protect forested 
watersheds from diseases and fires. Although noble in theory, 
Luis Fournier later lamented that "in practice, this entity [the 
20 
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Council] was never put into action." It was eliminated four 
years later. Also in 1949, however, the agriculture and live-
stock ministry (MAG) added a "Forestry Section" division to its 
responsibilities. This proved to be a decisive move because the 
nation's forests remained under MAG jurisdiction until the mid-
1990's. 
The administration of President Otilio Ulate (1949-1953) sup-
ported other conservation minded ideas. In 1950 the govern-
ment established the National Week for the Conservation of Nat-
ural Resources. The event was organized by an interdisciplinary 
amalgam of government agencies (including the ministries of pub-
lic health, agriculture, industries, and education) and was 
designed to remind the citizens of Costa Rica of their duty to 
conserve soil and water for the long range benefit of the 
country. The commemorative week, always held in June, has been 
observed with celebrations, symposia, and special events every 
year since its inception. 
In 1953 the National Agricultural School initiated legisla-
tion that resulted in the passage of Law no. 1540, the Soil and 
Water Conservation Law that was signed by President Ulate. Spear-
headed by agricultural engineer Alvaro Rojas Espinoza, the law 
required that soil studies be conducted on agricultural areas to 
determine the rational use of the land. But it also contained 
language that authorized MAG to earmark areas to be protected as 
"reserves, parks, or national forests . . . for common use." De-
spite the fact that MAG never took advantage of this opportunity, 
the law helped fuel a growing conservation awareness in the 
nation and, as Luis Fournier notes, was "perhaps the most impor-
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tant [legislative] event of the time period." 
Other efforts that assisted conservation marked the second 
(non-contiguous) term of President Jose Figueres (1953-58). In 
late 1953, for example, Figueres named a study commission to de-
velop legislation for the creation of a national tourism council. 
Commission members visited Peru, Mexico, Argentina, and the Unit-
ed States to seek ways to develop a park system in Costa Rica. 
Their work culminated in the passage of Law no. 1917 which cre-
ated the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT) in 1955. Part 
of ICT's mission was to designate a 1.2 mile radius around each 
volcano crater in the nation as a "national park." But "without 
technical criteria for national park objectives at this time," 
reminisced a former park service official, "economic and ecologi-
22 
cal reasons impeded the execution of that dimension of the law." 
In 1958 an ICT study addressed where other national parks should 
be established, further emphasizing volcanoes and oak forests, 
but economic considerations once again thwarted implementation of 
the plan. 
Costa Rica's first wildlife legislation was also a product 
of the mid-1950's. The Wildlife Conservation Law (Law no. 2093 
of 1956 and its revised version, Law no. 2790 of 1961), defined 
wildlife as "those animals that are not domesticated or domesti-
cated animals that have turned wild" and went on to state that 
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all such creatures were "the property of the State." It declared 
that the wildlife were part of the "renewable natural resources 
of the country" and that the "conservation, restoration, and 
propagation of all wildlife useful to man" was of "fundamental 
interest" to the public. The law also spelled out hunting and 
fishing regulations but stated that they did "not apply to farm-
ers who [could] kill wild animals on their property because they 
23 
were threatening to destroy their crops." 
To oversee such policies the law established a wildlife 
office within the ministry of agriculture. It also created a 
five-member National Wildlife Protector Committee that would make 
recommendations to MAG, study MAG's abilities to regulate wild-
life, and serve as a general advisory board. The committee, 
however, seemed lopsided and padded; three members represented 
hunting and fishing organizations*, one was a government fiscal 
agent, and only one was a biologist from the University of Costa 
24 
Rica (UCR). 
As could be expected, the law prompted intensive lobbying 
and spirited debate on both sides of the issue. Hunting and 
sporting organizations argued for its support and humane society 
members lobbied against the law when it was being considered by 
the Legislative Assembly in 1961. Opponents argued that the 
Protector Committee was too much like the fox guarding the hen-
* The three sporting groups represented on the committee were 
the National Association of Hunters, the Amateur Fishing Club, 
and the National Federation of Hunting, Fishing, and Shooting. 
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house. Nonetheless, the bill became law and changed very little 
even with revisions in 1970 (Law no. 4551). 
Other attention was given to wildlife issues in the 1970's 
when the Costa Rican legislature endorsed international treaties 
regarding threatened or endangered species. Law no. 5605 of 1974 
ratified the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies (CITES) which established a system of trade sanctions and a 
worldwide reporting network to reduce the traffic in threatened 
wildlife. And two years later on a more regional level the Legis-
lative Assembly passed Law no. 3763 which ratified the Convention 
for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Places of Natural Scenic 
Beauty in the Countries of the Americas. That convention specif-
ically outlined how national parks and reserves should be estab-
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lished and guarded for wildlife protection. 
To evaluate the country's policies for the protection of 
native flora and fauna and eventually to recommend changes in the 
Wildlife Conservation Law, the government sponsored a week-long 
wildlife symposium in 1980. Called the First National Congress 
on Wildlife Conservation, the event was organized by the Biologi-
cal Studies Department of MAG and the National Wildlife Protector 
Committee. Presiding over the congress were Hernán Fonseca 
(MAG), Gerardo Budowski (CATIE), and Augustin Rodriguez (ICE). 
Participating organizations included the hunting and sporting 
clubs, CITES authorities from Costa Rica's U.N. office, the Assoc-
iation of Costa Rican Biologists, CATIE, several colleges and 
universities, the tourism council (ICT), and two environmental 
groups. President Rodrigo Carazo gave one of the opening ad-
dresses and speakers and presenters represented a virtual "who's 
who" in national conservation activism. Participants included 
Alexander Skutch, Gary Stiles, Archie Carr, Joseph Tosi, Mario 
Boza, and Alfonso Mata. Many of the presenters were leading pro-
ponents in the development of Costa Rica's national park system, 
among whom were Alexander Bonilla (a geographer and environmental 
activist), Roger Morales (a CATIE naturalist), Jose Maria Rodri-
guez (national parks director at the time), Sergio Salas (an ICT 
biologist), Carlos Valerio (a noted UCR zoologist), Murray Sil-
berman (President Carazo's environmental counsel), Christopher 
Vaughn (a professor of wildlife conservation at the National 
University), Eduardo Bravo (fisheries and wildlife director for 
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MAG), and many other biologists and conservation leaders. 
One of the outcomes of the symposium was the revised Wild-
life Conservation Law of 1983 (Law no. 6919, and further revised 
in 1990 and in 1992). The new policy eliminated much of the "pub-
lic utility" language of wildlife as a natural resource and con-
centrated more on protecting threatened species. Gone was the 
language allowing farmers to hunt at will and in its place were 
stronger hunting regulations. The National Wildlife Protector 
Committee was also modified to include only two representatives 
from sportsman organizations (one from hunting associations and 
one from sport fishing groups). And, most importantly, pro-
visions were built into the law to establish certain national 
89 
28 
wildlife refuges. 
Many conservationists in Costa Rica had come to understand 
all too well that protecting the nation's wildlife meant protect-
ing habitat and ecosystems. In the late 1950's, for example, for-
est ecologists Luis Fournier and Gerardo Budowski had begun refor-
estation research projects in the Central Pacific and Atlantic 
regions of the country. Their aim was to recuperate the tropical 
forest ecosystems by ways of natural regeneration. 
But at the same time, the forests were being increasingly 
threatened with the influx of squatter farmers and their families 
seeking new lands to clear and farm. Part of the reason this oc-
curred was because of the advance of large-scale coffee and bana-
na plantations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries which signalled a rapid change in the concentration of land 
ownership. James Rowles, an authority on Costa Rican agrarian 
reform, explains that 
According to popular mythology, Costa Rica is a 
country of small land-holders in which phenomena 
such as latifundismo amd minifundismo, so common 
in neighboring countries and the rest of Latin 
America, simply do not exist. . . . The facts, how-
ever, tell a different story. For while Costa 
Rica was originally made up of small farmers who 
dealt with each other on an egalitarian basis, 
patterns of land tenure have changed drastically 
since those early days. (29) 
Changes in land ownership and rises in population meant that thou-
sands of rural Costa Ricans sought out tierras baldías (vacant 
lands) that were owned by the State. Aware that the problem was 
getting out of hand as far back as 1942, the Legislative Assembly 
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passed the Squatter Law (Law No. 88, the Ley de Parásitos or Ley 
de Poseedores en Precario) which sought to halt squatter settle-
ments on government land. 
But the solution became part of the problem and actually 
exacerbated the exploitation of public lands. Professor Rowles 
notes that corruption and abuses of the Squatter Law resulted in 
how large landholders 
exchanged lands occupied by squatters (whom they 
often incited to invade) for virgin state lands. 
The abuse was in the appraisal of the lands that 
were exchanged, the original holding being over-
valued while the state lands were valued at a small 
fraction of their value. Huge latifundios were 
created as a result of the misapplication of this 
law. (30) 
The corruption illustrates how squatters were really more of a 
symptom of the larger problem of inequitable land distribution—a 
concern that did not go unnoticed by Jose Figueres and the revo-
lutionary movement of the Second Republic. In fact, as Rowles 
points out, Squatter Law abuses "had a great deal to do with [the 
Figueres junta's] desire to reform existing agrarian legisla-
tion" and became part of "the political ideology that guided the 
dominant Partido Nacional de Liberación (PLN) since the Revolu-
31 
tion." A key member of the early PLN was the junta's Minister 
of Agriculture, Bruce Masis, who was a strong proponent of agrar-
ian reform and conservation. Masis led the efforts to eliminate 
the Squatter Law and to replace it with a land reform bill. The 
junta thus named a commission to study the problem and to draft a 
new agrarian code. 
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But reform legislation was slow in the making. Jose Figuer-
es never made it a priority during the junta years (1948-49) and 
the special commission never even met. Reform plans moved slowly 
through the legislative process during the Otilio Ulate admini-
stration (1949-53), with a special commission again appointed to 
study the issue. Called the Committee on Agriculture and Colo-
nies, it finally drafted reform legislation in 1953—only to be 
interrupted by the national election which gave José Figueres a 
landslide victory and second term (1953-58). Figueres had prom-
ised that the government would create a special institute to deal 
with lands and colonizations and named yet another committee to 
draft such a law. Committee members included Bruce Masis, who 
had returned as Minister of Agriculture and had renewed his cam-
paign for agrarian reform, and Alvaro Rojas Espinoza, the agricul-
tural engineer who also had designed the Soil and Water Conserva-
tion Law that same year. The bill the committee drafted, how-
ever, was stalled by Figueres who had cooled on the initiative 
and who now was devoting his energies to establish the electrici-
ty commission (ICE) and a federal housing authority. 
By 1955, and only because of Masis' perseverence, the commis-
sion's proposal to establish a government institute for lands and 
colonizations finally made it to a committee of the Legislative 
Assembly. Testifying on behalf of the proposal which would elimi-
nate the Squatter Law and create the land reform institute, Masis 
argued that 
because of circumstances known by everyone [the 
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Squatter Law] did not fulfill its commitment to 
end the so-called problem of squatters in a .perma-
nent manner—and which on the contrary, served in 
many cases as the instrument in realizing scanda-
lous deals of collusion with obvious prejudice to 
the interests of the country. . . . [S]olutions 
have been sought for the different cases existing 
between owners and squatters. Payment shall be 
made to the owners in bonds and other securities 
of the State; but it shall no longer be made, as 
was done in the past, with virgin state lands, so 
that our National Reserves may thus be saved. (32) 
Political maneuvering by the opposition party which opposed 
the bill prevented its passage in the mid-1950's and delayed the 
law until 1961. But finally after years of executive commissions 
and legislative committees Law No. 2825, the Ley de Tierras y 
Colonizaciones (Law of Lands and Colonizations), was approved 
by the Assembly and signed by President Mario Echandi. It has 
been amended and revised eight times since but its purpose has 
remained the same: to administer agricultural colonization 
through its administrative agency ITCO (Institute of Land and 
Colonization). Whether this goal has been successfully achieved, 
however, remains to be seen. In its first ten years of imple-
mentation (1962-1972), 3.7 percent of rural families (n = 7,174) 
received ITCO benefits and they mainly in the form of attaining 
the legal rights to land they had already been occupying. Only 
1,525 families benefitted from the redistribution of 98,400 acres 
of land. Likewise, ITCO was only able to resolve forty-three 
percent of the squatter conflicts (involving 75,600 acres) pre-
sented to it during that decade. And in the 1970's and 80 Ts the 
incidence of squatting (or precarismo) accelerated beyond the 
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point that ITCO could properly keep up with. 
The law and its results are important to consider here for 
the effects they have had on conservation efforts in Costa Rica. 
First, the law was designed to "contribute to the more just dis-
tribution of wealth" in Costa Rica by "avoiding the concentra-
tion of national lands in the hands of those who would use them 
for specialization against the general interests of the nation." 
Its aim was to "guarantee the economic welfare, liberty, and dig-
nity" of the colonizing farmers which in turn would do the same 
or the nation as a whole. It provided for the development of 
agricultural cooperatives, the authority to parcel and distrib-
ute lands, the creation of regulations to curb conflicts between 
precaristas (squatters) and land owners, and the establishment of 
an agency to provide agricultural credit—especially to those Cos-
ta Ricans wanting to go into private farming for the first time 
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and who would practice "rational exploitation" of the land. Pub-
lic lands to be parcelled out for agricultural homesteading would 
first be carefully surveyed by Costa Rica's Geographic Institute. 
More importantly, the law delineated which areas of the coun-
try were not open for agricultural colonization. It established 
the authority "to determine what land should not be exploited by 
agricultural workers" and crystallized government policy to 
acquire and expropriate "those lands that were not fulfilling 
any social function" (read: being used for agriculture). Oddly, 
the bill named these lands "State Agricultural Properties" even 
though they consisted primarily of volcanoes and other lands un-
suitable for cultivation. Later amendments to the law added riv-
erways, islands, and watersheds vital for the nation's hydrologic 
needs. None of these "national reserves" could be colonized, 
fenced, plowed, be used for any construction, or be used to cut 
wood. And the law made very clear that any and all lands not 
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under title of private ownership legally belonged to the State. 
ITCO (whose name was later changed to the IDA, Instituto de 
Desarrollo Agrario [Institute of Agrarian Development]) monitored 
the regulation and enforcement of colonization policies. As a 
benefit to conservation efforts, the agency was staffed with per-
sonnel from MAG's Lands and Forestry Department including four 
engineers trained in forestry from CATIE. Likewise, it was en-
trusted with the designation and development of nature reserves. 
The first such reserve to be created was in 1965 at Cabo 
Blanco on the southernmost end of the Nicoya Peninsula in north-
west Costa Rica. But instead of being initiated by ITCO, Cabo 
Blanco was the unlikely result of the efforts of a Scandinavian 
couple who resided in the area. Olof Wessberg, a retired officer 
in the Swedish Air Force, and his Danish wife Karen Mogensen had 
moved to the Nicoya Peninsula in 1955 to live a simpler life and 
to raise a sustainable fruit orchard. Their story has been told 
in detail elsewhere but merits attention here as a vital compon-
36 
ent in Costa Rica's conservation history. 
Acting on a life-long dream to leave the cold of northern 
Europe and to live in tropical America, Wessberg and Mogensen 
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left Sweden to work on a farm in Ecuador. They later moved to 
Guatemala, California, and Mexico but never felt that those 
places satisfactorily suited them. Then, based largely on a 
dream Karen Mogensen had one night, they decided to move to Costa 
Rica. After visiting several parts of the country, they settled 
at Montezuma at the southern end of Nicoya, bought land overlook-
ing the gulf, and spent the next ten years raising over thirty 
varieties of fruits and coming intimately to know the flora and 
fauna of the region. Bill Weinberg, a journalist who became ac-
quainted with Mogensen in the late 1980!s, wrote that the couple 
"lived a life of vegetarianism and [had] a reverence for nature 
that bordered on the mystical, taking great joy in the company of 
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monkeys and coatimundis." 
The idyllic little world of Wessberg and Mogensen started 
to change very rapidly in the late 1950fs, however, when larger 
and larger patches of cleared areas started to appear in the for-
ests across the peninsula. They watched as hundreds of squat-
ters moved into the region, cleared land for crops, and then sold 
out to lumber and cattle companies when the tropical rains eroded 
the cropland. Worried that the last remnant of forest habitat 
of their beloved animal friends would completely disappear, Wess-
berg contacted some wealthy acquaintances of theirs in California 
and requested that they purchase the land to be protected as a 
wildlife refuge. The friends declined but told Wessberg that he 
should contact international conservation organizations which 
might take up the cause. Acting on a late-night impulse, then, 
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Wessberg wrote an appeal and sent it to various groups. He re-
lated how jaguars and tapirs were already extinct in the area 
and that rapid habitat loss was endangering the populations of 
ocelots, pumas, deer, peccaries, agoutis, coatimundis, and sever-
al species of monkeys on the peninsula. "When we settled here 
six years ago the mountain was always green," Wessberg lamented 
in his appeal, "today it has great brown patches, and in March 
and April it is shrouded in smoke, much of it on fire. . . . Two 
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years more, and the mountain will be dead." In 1961 his appeal 
appeared in the magazine of the World League Against Vivisection 
and for the Protection of Animals. 
Donations for the purchase of Cabo Blanco soon materialized. 
The British World League Against Vivisection contributed fifty-
one percent of the funds needed and other money came from the 
Sierra Club, The Nature Conservancy, the Friends of Nature, and 
the Philadelphia Conservation League. The environmental groups, 
however, preferred to give their contributions to a government 
agency responsible for the conservation of the area. But the 
only Costa Rican agency empowered to expropriate land for such 
purposes at this time was ITCO which had no experience in manag-
ing preserves. ITCO "was interested in helping farmers to get 
more land to clear—the opposite of what we wanted," complained 
Ms. Mogensen in an interview to David Rains Wallace, "they never 
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did understand what it was all about." 
Three years later and after over twenty trips made by Wess-
berg to San José to deal with government officials who would not 
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answer his letters, ITCO finally expropriated the land at Cabo 
Blanco and created a reserva biológica absoluta—the country' s 
first nature reserve. In that time, however, more colonizers 
had moved into the area, and, upon hearing that the land might be 
expropriated, cut down more trees to "improve" the land by making 
it more suitable for crops. Mogensen recalled that "a lot of 
people here really didn't understand what the land was being ex-
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propriated for." 
The next problem that Wessberg had to confront was in guard-
ing Cabo Blanco. ITCO hired only one warden to monitor the en-
tire reserve, who, according to Mogensen, "was a big drinker." 
He also attempted to make a little extra money on the side by kil-
ling the last ten grey spider monkeys—found nowhere else in the 
world—for the oil in their fat that supposedly had medicinal 
qualities. Wessberg had him fired. Another warden felled trees 
inside the reserve to plant crops. After a few more journeys 
to San Josa to complain about these problems, the government 
allowed Wessberg to develop his own questionnaire to screen pro-
spective wardens. The system he used proved so helpful that by 
the early 1970's (when a national park service had been estab-
lished), officials offered him an agency position there. He de-
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clined on the grounds that he had no desire to move to San José. 
Wessberg's last campaign for conservation in the Nicoya Pen-
insula came in the early 1970's when he lobbied for establishing 
an additional reserve around the town of Montezuma. He solicited 
funds ($500,000) from the International Union for the Conserva-
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tion of Nature (IUCN) in Switzerland. Gerardo Budowski of 
Costa Rica was the Director General of IUCN in those years but 
was forced to refuse Wessberg's request because it asked for "way 
too much money." He urged Wessberg to seek government approval 
and to have the University of Costa Rica and the OTS conduct feas-
ibility studies on the project before the IUCN could consider 
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such a request. The project never materialized. 
While Cabo Blanco became Costa Rica's first nature reserve 
in 1965, the next year marked the creation of the first national 
monument. The purpose in creating Santa Rosa National Monument, 
located on the Santa Elena Peninsula in the far northwestern cor-
ner of the country in Guanacaste province, however, was more as a 
means to preserve and tout the historical value of the area than 
as a measure to protect the tropical dry forest in which it was 
located. Santa Rosa had been a large working cattle ranch but it 
was also the place where a volunteer Costa Rican brigade had de-
feated William Walker and his invading band of American filibus-
ters in 1856. Walker, who entertained grandiose notions of estab-
lishing his own personal empire in Central America complete with 
slavery (which had been abolished in the region for over a hun-
dred years) and English (along with Spanish) as the official lan-
guage, was pushed back into Nicaragua never to set foot on Costa 
Rican soil again. Thus the Battle of Santa Rosa had become a 
source of national identity and pride (as well as an important 
national holiday) for many Costa Ricans and especially for Guan-
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acastecans. The large hacienda (la Casona) near where the battle 
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was staged survived as a monument to this important historic 
event. (See Figure 2.) 
But Santa Rosa was "invaded" again in the 1930's when Nicara-
guan strongman Anastasio Somoza Garcia bought the hacienda as a 
personal ranch and investment. Never popular with democratic 
Costa Ricans. Somozafs presence outraged Ticos who over the years 
pressured the government to oust the dictator from the area. But 
it was not until 1966 when the Legislative Assembly finally voted 
to expropriate three thousand acres of Somoza's land surrounding 
la Casona and directed ICT (the Costa Rican tourism institute) to 
manage it as a national monument. 
Seeing the historic and touristic value in preserving this 
part of Costa Rica' national heritage, ICT welcomed the opportune 
Figure 2: La Casona at Santa Rosa 
CASONA HISTÓRICA 
PARQU[ MACIONAl SANTA ROSA 
CUAXACASU. CUSÍA KICA 
(Source: National Archives, series: SPN, file no. 19) 
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ity and hired Kenton Miller, a CATIE parks planning specialist, 
as a consultant for the project. But Miller recognized that the 
tropical dry forest in which Santa Rosa was located (among the 
very last remnants of this ecosystem anywhere in the world) was 
being threatened by slash and burn agriculture and the expansion 
of livestock pastures. Thus the chance to extend protection over 
a larger area loomed very large for Miller and he recommended 
that the government buy thirty thousand acres of the fragile en-
vironment to be developed into a park. ICT backed the plan and 
the government eventually paid Somoza roughly $500,000 for the 
land. In 1971 the status of Santa Rosa changed from national 
monument to national park—making it one of Costa Rica's first 
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such designated areas. National park status, however, was only 
made possible by the passage of the Forestry Law of 1969, the 
history of which is vital for understanding the subsequent his-
tory of conservation in Costa Rica. 
Legislating Protection: The Ley Forestal 
Participants in, and students of, Costa Rican environmental 
policy making agree that the Forestry Law of 1969 was the key to 
future conservation successes. Called the "principal milestone," 
the "transcendental step," and the "turning point" in the coun-
try's conservation history, the Forestry Law's impact on the 
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rational use of forest resources cannot be underestimated. Yet 
missing in the literature is any explanation on the history and 
career of the law, the mechanics behind its enactment, public re-
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action to its passage, and the changes it has undergone in the 
late twentieth century. 
With the creation of Cabo Blanco Nature Reserve and Santa 
Rosa National Monument in the mid-1960's, concern developed in 
certain sectors of the government regarding the lack of compre-
hensive guidelines to administer protected areas and to conserve 
other forest resources. One official who was keenly aware of 
the problem and who worried about the impact of unregulated defor-
estation was Guillermo Yglesias, Minister of Agriculture and 
Livestock (MAG) in the administration of President Jose Joaquin 
Trejos (1966-1970). In 1967 Yglesias named an interdisciplinary 
committee to research the problem and to prepare a draft forestry 
legislation proposal. Heading the commission was stalwart con-
servationist Alvaro Rojas Espinoza who had had successful exper-
ience in organizing and seeing to fruition the 1953 Soil and 
Water Conservation Law and the 1961 Lands and Colonization Law. 
Representing government agencies on the commission were members 
from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the National Commit-
tee for the Conservation of Natural Resources (dominated by the 
hunting and fishing organizations as outlined in the 1961 Wild-
life Conservation Law), the electricity institute (ICE), and 
the Lands and Colonizations Institute (ITCO). From the private 
sector were representatives from the Agriculture and Stockgrowers 
Association and from the Wood Industries Association. And repre-
senting the University of Costa Rica was forest ecologist Luis 
Fournier whom Yglesias stated had "an enormous understanding of 
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forestry management." Professor Fournier later remembered, how-
ever, that he felt like "un golondrino solo" (a lone swallow) on 
the commission because of his more active position for environmen-
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tal protection. 
The special commission worked for nearly a year on the pro-
posal. During that time the members consulted the forestry laws 
of Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States and hired forestry 
consultant Nestor Altuve to help draft the legislation. Altuve 
was a Venezuelan forestry specialist who had helped pass protec-
tive legislation in his home country, had been chief of the Vene-
zuelan forestry service, and at this time was employed as a sylvi-
culturist with the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
in Rome. On 14 June 1968 Guillermo Yglesias sent the commis-
sion's proposal to the Legislative Assembly. In an accompanying 
letter, Yglesias explained that the proposed legislation was "for 
the defense, conservation, and safer exploitation of our renew-
able natural resources." He asserted that the country had "been 
waiting over seventy years" for such a policy and that ever since 
Law No. 36 of 1906 (which authorized the executive branch to 
create national forestry guidelines) there had been many initia-
tives and orders but nothing that had ever become a concrete 
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national law. 
What the commission's proposal called for, then, was the 
legal sanction for the State "to ensure the protection, conserva-
tion, . . . and development of the country's forest resources 
. . . ." To that end, the law would establish a General Forestry 
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Directorate (DGF) within the MAG to "administer the forest patri-
mony" and "to provide technical support to the wood products in-
dustry." Additional MAG duties would include creating protector 
zones, working to conserve wildlife, combatting soil erosion, 
controlling forest exploitation, and providing forestry educa-
tion. To advise on such issues, the law would create a Forestry 
Council with members selected from the various government agen-
cies involved with land and resource issues. The law would out-
line regulations for the felling, transporting, and marketing of 
timber from the country's forests and would establish penalties 
(stiff fines and jail terms) for policy infractions. It mandated 
that there be no livestock grazing on public lands without the 
approval (written permits) of the DGF. And, vital for the more 
organized designation and management of protected areas, the law 
would define and provide for the creation of a system of national 
parks to be administered by the DGF. Lands defined as national 
parks, forest reserves, and protector zones would be off limits 
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for agricultural colonizations. 
In trying to sell such a proposal to members of the Legisla-
tive Assembly, Yglesias stressed the economic benefits that would 
accrue from the bill's approval. After all, much of the bill's 
intent was directed toward the concept of "multiple use" and was 
similar in many ways to the public lands management language of 
U.S. conservation policy. Article One, for example, suggested 
that the law would be for protecting and conserving the forests, 
but also for their "exploitation . . . and development . . . in 
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accordance with the principle of multiple use of renewable nat-
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ural resources." Thus, Yglesias noted that the law would "assure 
the best exploitation of the forests for the benefit of a more 
dynamic economic development of the agricultural sector." He 
argued that because of Costa Rica's high rainfall and due to 
its mountainous topography, protecting the forests,and therefore 
the soils, would be "one of the most promising economic activi-
ties" that the nation could undertake. "The devastation of the 
forests," he continued, "has produced . . . serious and enduring 
harms that have restrained the economic development of [certain] 
communities." And protecting the forests would "stimulate the 
creation of a stable wood products industry." In conclusion, he 
reiterated how "the intervention of the State in the admini-
stration of the forests . . . would be a benefit for all 
Costa Ricans." The State could be a "powerful influence in 
stopping the massive destruction of the forests which harshly 
changes the meteorologic conditions with catastrophic results and 
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creates adverse conditions for the comfortable life of man." 
As per Costa Rican legislative procedure, the proposed law 
was sent to committee before being debated in the Assembly as a 
whole. It went to the Permanent Commission on Government and 
Administration where proceedings opened on 19 August 1968. 
Guillermo Yglesias was called on to introduce the proposal. 
"There has been a general anxiety among Costa Ricans," he began, 
"about putting order and regulation to the irrational exploita-
tion that our forests are undergoing at this time." He then as-
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serted that "in reality, if we continue in the steps we are now 
taking, within a few short years Costa Rica will not have any 
wood, we will not have any forests to exploit." He went on to 
point out that 
the principal goal of the law is to ensure rational 
exploitation. . . . [But] this is nothing new; the for-
ests of Canada and the United States have been exploited 
for hundreds of years and they have retained the same 
value that they had one hundred years ago. What would 
happen, for example, in countries like Finland where 
[the people] practically live from their forests, if 
this [Costa Rican] type of exploitation existed there? 
Well, the forests would have been eliminated. . . . 
Imagine that Law 36 of . . . 1906 obligated the Exec-
utive Power to send the Legislative Assembly a pro-
posed law—that is to say that as far back as 1906 
people were concerned [about the forests], and from 
then until now we still do not have a forestry law. 
It is frankly an inconceivable thing. (51) 
Yglesias stressed that supplying guards in the forests (a 
strong FAO recommendation) was one method to start counteracting 
abusive forest practices. He cited the example of a U.S. logging 
company in the Osa Peninsula of southern Costa Rica that "was ex-
ploiting the forest for one use only: permanent damage" and ex-
plained that with forest guards, the law "would regulate such 
abuse." And when one Commission member asked him why the Execu-
tive Office could not just authorize the appointment of forest 
guards without going through all the legislative process of pas-
sing a law, Yglesias responded that that was impossible without 
the legal authority of a law on the books, and that "while it 
s e e m s iik e a lie, Costa Rica is one of the few countries that has 
no such forestry policy." "I expect enormous reaction from the 
woodcutters," he admitted, "and from the people who are taking ad-
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vantage of the forests . . .[and] are making lots of money from 
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it, because this law will end that." 
When the legislative commission next met to consider the 
Forestry Law on 21 August, the members heard from Dr. Luis Four-
nier and others on the proposal team. Fournier minced no words: 
"You're becoming more aware of irrational forest exploitation. 
. . . [Even] a superficial land analysis of Costa Rica shows that 
only fifty percent [of the country] remains in forest." And he 
stressed how the inconsistent and rivalrous nature of having five 
or six government agencies involved with different aspects of 
land management was leading to the "atomization" and "anarchy" of 
conservation policy. The Commission chairman Carlos Jose Gutiér-
rez agreed with Fournier but asked him to explain how private 
lands could be acquired for State conservation efforts. Fournier 
replied that most of the land that would be ceded was not condu-
cive for agriculture or grazing and that there would be "good 
incentives" and "stimulants like tax reliefs" to encourage land-
owners to cooperate. Another member agreed with those ideas but 
argued that banks should bear some responsibility by providing 
loans for conservation areas just as they would for agricultural 
enterprises. Returning to the question of enforcement, Chairman 
Gutiérrez wondered how many forest guards would need to be 
hired. Fournier responded that his committee estimated that 300 
forest guards (guardabosques) and twenty-five support staff would 
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be needed. 
Written statements were also entered into the record during 
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the 21 August session and others that followed. A letter from 
the Costa Rican Attorney General's office gave notice that the 
proposal was within legal boundaries and that "it was simple, 
flexible, and long-lasting" and that it would become "the legal 
instrument to establish the basic objectives of the State's for-
est policy." Another document entered was a thirty-four page 
review of the proposal by internationally acclaimed agronomy engi-
neer and forestry specialist Arturo Trejos Nunez (a past consul-
tant on conservation issues in Mexico and Venezuela and author of 
over seventy articles on renewable natural resources). Proclaim-
ing that the "forest situation" in Costa Rica was "so grave and 
so alarming," Trejos warmly endorsed the proposal. "Nothing auth-
orizes us to destroy the natural heritage for future genera-
tions," he cautioned, therefore the country's resources "should 
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be administered with honor." 
In order to gauge regional reaction to the proposed bill, 
the legislative commission solicited responses from municipali-
ties around the country. Many municipal leaders and town coun-
cils mailed or wired in straw votes taken on the bill and most 
were favorable in nature. Typical of many was the response from 
the municipality of San Pablo Turrubares stating that the law 
would give nothing but benefits for future generations. 
It is an injection of fresh air in the continual fight 
for a better and more fertile Costa Rica. . . . The 
natural resources are a source of incalcuable value 
. . . [and are] an inmense treasure. (55) 
Statements of support also came in from the office of the 
Minister of Industry and Commerce and from international ex-
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perts in the conservation field. But much of the support came 
in the form of backing the proposal for its economic benefits. 
Dr. Herster Barres, a forestry official with the FAO, testified 
that Costa Rica's population was estimated to double by 1988 (it 
nearly did) and that well-managed forests would mean that more 
paper products and books would be available for the people. He 
also stressed that Costa Rica's economy would benefit from such 
paper-hungry giants as Europe and Japan as their demand for pulp 
would increase over the years. And even Arturo Trejos (in a tes-
timony preceding his lengthy written review) spoke at length 
about wood processing technologies and the benefits of keeping 
56 
the forests in MAG's domain as wood was a harvestable commodity. 
Likewise, there was strong opposition to the proposal. Con-
flict developed around the duties of the colonization institute 
(ITCO) and the tourism council (ICT) in distributing or managing 
government lands. The problem was in the identification and des-
ignation of "lands not suitable for agriculture" which ITCO was 
often in the habit of distributing and which conservationists 
believed should be protected. Under the new forestry law such 
lands could fall into preservation categories which officials at 
ITCO believed should only be in their jurisdiction to determine 
and officials at ICT believed should only be in their jurisdic-
tion to designate and manage. In a letter to the legislative com-
mission, ICT director Ricardo Castro wrote that his agency was 
"not in agreement" with the proposal's policy of shifting to the 
agriculture ministry (MAG) the responsibility to establish pro-
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tected areas. He argued that the law that created ICT in the mid-
1950' s "authorized [it] to declare which zones [would become] 
national parks" and that Santa Rosa National Monument was in its 
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"custody" and being managed just fine. 
And, as would be expected, opposition came from certain pri-
vate sectors who stood to lose from the forestry law. The Costa 
Rican Construction Association, for example, lobbied against the 
proposal. The association's president Luis Manuel Chacon wrote 
the legislative committee chairman explaining that while his 
group supported "the idea of permanent forest reserves . . . for 
the defense of our forest resources," it was in "absolute disa-
greement" with the tax the law would levy (6.33 colones) on every 
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cubic meter of wood cut. 
Opposition notwithstanding, the Permanent Commission on Gov-
ernment and Administration unanimously approved the proposed for-
estry law and sent it to the Legislative Assembly on 29 April 
1969. It had been in committee for ten months and lasted in the 
Assembly as a whole for seven more. During that time the legisla-
ture received an unprecedented outpouring of petitions, letters, 
and telegrams from various sectors of the country in support of a 
national conservation policy. A twenty-two page petition, for 
example, was sent from students of the Coto Brus and Osa Agricul-
tural College in southern Costa Rica urging members of the legis-
lature to pass the law. The students declared that they "could 
not continue celebrating the National Week for Natural Resources 
if the forests, waters, soils, wildlife, and places of scenic 
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beauty continue to be subjected to increasingly more intensive de-
struction. " And the president of the prestigious Association of 
Biologists (Colegio de Biólogos) of Costa Rica sent notice to the 
Assembly that his organization was in complete support of the 
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measure. 
School children across the country also sent many letters 
and telegrams to the Legislative Assembly urging members to vote 
for the proposal to protect forests and natural resources. Indic-
ative of many was a telegram from the high school students of 
the Liceo Rodrigo Fació who stated, "we desire a better future 
for us via a forestry law that will also raise the economy of 
our beloved Costa Rica." Others wrote in supporting the law as 
a means to preserve the woods, the animals, and the birds that 
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represented the country's natural heritage. 
The media had a less active role in supporting the cause but 
one large San José newspaper, La Prensa Libre, openly campaigned 
for its approval. In a long editorial published on the day the 
bill was to come up for a vote (25 November 1969), the paper en-
dorsed the law and urged Assembly members to support it. Prais-
ing the measure as "an important legal instrument" and "of major 
importance for the economy of the nation," the editorial pro-
tested the past "exploitation of the forests [that occurred] with-
out any controlling action" and stated that the new law would 
"protect the forest heritage for the people of Costa Rica." It 
argued that the law would be the only way "to stop the axe from 
continuing its destructive work" and the only hope "to save [our] 
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natural reources for future generations.'1 It mentioned that for-
est "production" should be considered on equal terms with the pro-
duction of rice, beans, and corn, and that forest protection was 
"indispensable" for maintaining potable water sources, construc-
tion materials, and other "extremely helpful" uses for humans. 
And finally the editorial called for strict enforcement and penal-
ties for infractions of the law "because to continue tolerating 
the irrational exploitation of our forests, like we have toler-
ated in the past . . . would nullify the law with visible damage 
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to the country." 
Opponents were against the law for a variety of reasons. 
ITCO sent word to the Assembly members that more time was needed 
for its attorneys to study the proposal as it applied to how 
it would affect land colonization efforts. Private citizens 
wrote against the measure on the grounds that the government 
had no business setting aside certain areas of land. Representa-
tive of these individuals was Rodrigo Salas Retana from Guadalupe 
who noted that 
it's not like Costa Rica is a big country like the 
United States. We do not have that much private land; 
we are not big enough for this, even though [many 
people] just see San Jose and think we're huge. . . . 
He went on to suggest that it was "risky" for the government to 
become involved in issues of land management, especially com-
pared to "us [land-owners] who have known and continue to know 
that in repeated periods they [the government agencies] have be-
come owners of thousands of hectares of our valuable, unculti-
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vated national lands/1 And he brought up important concerns like 
who the parks and forest guards would be, how they would be paid, 
whether they would be able to "complete their mission," and how 
they would be monitored, especially in light of how they might be 
"paid off" to abandon their guard. Important questions like 
those, he argued, were unaddressed in the proposal and caused him 
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to oppose it. 
Assembly members reflected such constituent concerns by rais-
sing similar questions in floor debates and by sponsoring many 
motions and amendments to the bill. The Assembly even named 
another committee to study some of these motions and how they 
could be incorporated into the law. Committee debates and 
dickering on legislative rules and procedures took up most of 
September and October, but finally on 21 October 1969 the propo-
sal returned to the plenary session. Most speeches presented 
there were in favor of the law. One diputado argued that the 
law would take nothing away from farmers but rather would protect 
lands for their children. "I'm voting for the law," he affirmed, 
to save our national resources from total destruction." Another 
member reiterated the arguable point that Costa Rica was the 
last Latin American nation without a forestry law and that there 
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should have been one on the books since 1906. 
The opposition by this time was concentrated on defending 
ITCO policies and land reform in general. Some members believed 
that ITCO was being "unfairly attacked" as the enemy of conserva-
tion. Others thought that land distribution could coincide with 
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conservation policies. Diputado Volio Jimenez pointed out that 
even delegates to the 1966 World Conference on Agrarian Reform in 
Rome concluded that conservation of natural resources should go 
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hand in hand with land reform. But the opposition was the minor-
ity opinion in the Assembly, and on 25 November 1969 the plenary 
session of the Legislative Assembly passed Law No. 4465 the Ley 
Forestal.* 
Public reaction to the creation of the framework that would 
protect Costa Rica's forests and establish national parks was 
modest at best. The forestry law came to a vote when the Assem-
bly found itself, as one newspaper put it, "in the biggest of 
squeezes"—when it had "never been in such a tight spot with so 
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much pending legislation." Perhaps that was part of the reason 
that the country's largest newspaper, La Nacidn, did not report 
the law at all on the day it passed and waited two days before 
ever mentioning it with a small article on page forty-four. The 
paper's "capitol hill"-style legislation column never did mention 
the Forestry Law. Bigger legislative news was the debate in the 
Assembly to finance a sport center in San José. Part of the 
reason also lies with the breaking news stories of the day with 
which the new conservation policy had to compete. Newspapers 
logically gave far more coverage to such national headline events 
as the tropical storm and flooding that caused a great deal of 
* Curiously, the Archives of the Legislative Assembly does not 
have the register of debate from the final few weeks of the law's 
consideration, the vote tally, or the register of how each 
diputado voted. 
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destruction in southern Costa Rica and to the José Figueres pres-
idential campaign. 
Likewise the media gave much attention to such internation-
al topics as the successful landing of Apollo XII, the unravel-
ling of the tragic events surrounding Lt. William Calley and the 
My Lai Massacre in Viet Nam, anti-war protests and hippies in the 
United States, the continuing saga of violence between Honduras 
and El Salvador, and a deal between Anastasio Somoza and Ari-
stotle Onassis regarding the "canalization" of Nicaragua. More 
surprising was the space given to such headline stories as the 
re-election of Kenyan president Jomo Kenyatta, the sixth anni-
versary of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Native Ameri-
can occupation of Alcatraz, and the news of Brazilian soccer 
great Pele's expulsion from a game one day after making his one 
hundredth goal—all of which received more coverage than the 
newly passed Forestry Law. Ironically, on the days surrounding 
the creation of a law to protect forests, La Nacicfn ran large 
display ads for Steyr Tractors that could "conquer the Costa Ri-
can countryside" and for Volvo logging trucks (called madereros) 
which were supposedly superior than their competitors for hauling 
huge logs in the rough mountainous terrain. And even campaign 
ads for José Figueres promised "land for everyone" and acknowl-
edged that "the demand for land exists" and that the government 
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had "only started to satisfy it." 
The only newspaper to report on the Forestry Law on the day 
of its approval by the Legislative Assembly was La República in 
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a short article on page thirteen. Declaring that the new law 
"constitutes the most modern and advanced" of policies, it went 
on to quote Guillermo Yglesias who said he was glad the country 
"finally had good forestry legislation that will allow us to ad-
vance in so many areas." It reported that President José" Trejos 
was planning to sanction the new law. When La Nacidn ran an arti-
cle concerning the law two days later, it quoted President Trejos 
at the signing ceremony. "The step that has been taken with this 
law," he began, "is transcendental for the progress of Costa 
Rica . . . [and] means a great deal for the rational exploitation 
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of forest resources." 
"Rational" is not always the word that can describe forest 
use since the passage of the Forestry Law in 1969. As explained 
earlier, deforestation has left its ugly mark on the Costa Rican 
landscape—much of which has occurred since the law went into 
effect. Colonization, or precarista squatting, increased in the 
1980's and only recently has slowed to some degree. Logging con-
tinues in restricted areas that are inadequately patrolled and 
the nation's forestry policies are still enforced with insuffic-
ient funds and fewer personnel than needed. A green ethic does 
not yet pervade the business community and is especially absent 
in the forest extractive industries. 
Yet comparatively, one must bear in mind the alternative and 
ask what directions land use might have followed without the For-
estry Law. In that light, then, it becomes easier to see how the 
law can be viewed as a success in other dimensions of conserva-
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tion. That it provided the vehicle to set aside areas as 
national parks and biological reserves has been its most success-
ful benchmark. It is to that dimension that we must turn next. 
But in understanding the career of the law—and it indeed has 
been a long and multifaceted one with revisions and reforms 
groaning through the legislative process in 1977, 1980, 1986, 
1990, and 1996 (the last of which will be discussed in Chapter 
7)—it is clear that it was the initial and most important step 
of the conservationist response to the environmental problems so 
besieging the nation by the end of the 1960's. 
Figure 3: President José Figueres Ferrer 
(source: Harold Bonilla, Los presidentes [San 
Editorial Texto, Ltda, 1985]) 
117 
CHAPTER 4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND OTHER PROTECTED AREAS 
The Costa Rican national park system gives some hope 
that the marvelously diverse communities of tropical 
organisms will be preserved for future generations to 
enjoy and for future scientists to study. 
- L.D. Gomez and J.M. Savage (1) 
f>A Thousand and One Tricks" 
The capstone of Costa Rican conservation policy and indeed 
the dimension of conservation most known to both Ticos and for-
eigners is the country's system of national parks and other pro-
tected areas. Chapter Six (articles seventy-four through seventy-
eight) of the 1969 Forestry Law outlined that "national parks" 
would be created not only for the conservation of flora and fauna 
(as had been the case with earlier park experiments), but also to 
offer opportunities for recreation, tourism, and scientific re-
search. Interestingly enough, the decision to designate such 
areas was granted to the president of the country upon the advice 
of a National Forestry Council (made up of delegates from sever-
al different government agencies and the University of Costa Ri-
ca [UCR]). But while many important parks were created this way, 
executive decree would be a proviso tainted with political under-
tones during some administrations. 
Chapter Six of the Forestry Law was also the instrument that 
provided for the establishment of a National Parks Department 
within the General Forestry Directorate (DGF)—a new agency 
created by the law that was a division of the Ministry of Agri-
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culture and Livestock (MAG)—to oversee the development and man-
2 
agement of parks and equivalent reserves. Funding for the DGF 
and its park service came via the Forestry Fund which the law es-
tablished to generate budgets and to channel donations to the 
proper agencies. The law stipulated that additional operating 
funds would be derived from the Costa Rican general revenue. One 
report that evaluated this program a number of years later con-
cluded that the system was designed to make "the State responsi-
ble for ensuring the protection, proper use, conservation, and 
development" of national parks and "to solve the problems of nat-
3 
ural resource misallocation and misuse." 
To head the new National Parks Department, the DGF hired 
Mario A. Boza—a UCR School of Agronomy graduate and recent recip-
ient of a Master's degree in forestry from the Inter-American In-
stitute (later called CATIE) in Turrialba. Boza, who had studied 
under Gerardo Budowski and Kenton R. Miller and had written his 
M.A. thesis on a development and management plan for a proposed 
Poás Volcano National Park, was already working in the planning 
office of MAG when the Forestry Law created the National Parks 
Department. The background on why and how Boza became so active-
ly involved in conservation issues and his enthusiasm for nation-
al park development made him the logical candidate to take charge 
of the new parks department. 
The origin of Boza's conservationism was his enrollment in 
Dr. Miller's national parks course in Turrialba. He was directed 
there by Professor Budowski who had sensed that Boza's initial 
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interest in teakwood production was being superseded by an in-
creasing personal commitment to biological preservation. Boza 
gained from Miller's course and especially from a field trip the 
class took to visit conservation areas in the United States in 
1967. Miller took his students to Florida and Tennessee to visit 
U.S. national forests and parks and when they arrived at the 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park, according to one source who 
met Boza shortly thereafter, "it was love at first sight; he de-
4 
voted every waking moment to learning about parks." Reminiscing 
about this baptismal experience later, Boza told another inter-
viewer that "[t]he first time I saw a whole park working was in 
the Smokies." "I saw the people going back and forth, using the 
facilities," he recalled, and on seeing "all the things that had 
grown up around the park because it was there . . . I thought 
Costa Rica was ready for that." Miller remembers the effect the 
visit had on Boza: "On a free day just outside Great Smoky Moun-
tains National Park, I asked if anyone wanted to go back into the 
park. . . . Boza did, and that evening he turned to me and said 
'Is there a possibility that I could change my thesis and study 
5 
how to develop a real national park for my country?'" 
In 1968 Boza attended a one-month international training 
course in national parks management in Aspen, Colorado. The semi-
nar, entitled the "International Short Course on the Administra-
tion of National Parks and Equivalent Reserves," was jointly 
sponsored by the University of Michigan's School of Natural Re-
sources, the U.S. National Park Service (USNPS), and the Washing-
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ton, D.C.-based Conservation Foundation. That experience further 
accelerated his interest in seeing parks established in Costa Ri-
ca and assisted him in creating ideas for his M.A. thesis. On 
Dr. Miller's recommendation, Boza wrote a master plan for Poas 
Volcano just north of San José. This was a logical place to 
start thinking about accessible national parks (the Cabo Blanco 
Nature Reserve had restricted public access) since it was close 
to a major city and had an all year road to the rim of the vol-
cano. Likewise it was an ideal location for protecting the spec-
tacular cloud forest that surrounded the volcano and that was 
prime habitat for the resplendent quetzal—an ever threatened 
species due to regional deforestation. Boza's plan called for 
facilities similar to ones he had seen in U.S. national parks 
including a visitor's center, nature trails, interpretive signs, 
6 
and access to view the crater. 
Boza also visited different parts of Costa Rica to become 
better acquainted with areas that could be considered for conser-
vation. In 1969 he travelled with a group of interested people 
to Tortuguero to view the marine turtle nesting areas that Archie 
Carr and his family had been working to protect since the mid-
1950 's. Tortuguero, on the Caribbean coast of northeastern Costa 
Rica, is surrounded by lush tropical lowlands and is difficult to 
get to (even today), thus the group journeyed by bus, train, 
boat, mule, and foot, having plenty of time to visit and become 
acquainted with each other in the process. This was an important 
point for Boza since among those in the party were former Presi-
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dent José Figueres and his family. Figueres was running for an 
unprecedented (nonconsecutive) third presidential term. (He won 
later that year and served in office from 1970 to 1974.) His 
wife, Karen Olsen de Figueres, was deeply interested in conserva-
tion issues and especially in national park development for Costa 
Rica. Also on the trip were Kenton Miller, Gerardo Budowski, and 
a UCR biology student and avid outdoors enthusiast named Alvaro 
Ugalde whom Boza had met earlier at a natural resources symposi-
um. Ugalde later returned to Tortuguero with the Figueres1s son 
José María (who twenty-five years later, in 1994, was elected 
President of Costa Rica!) to spend a month tagging green turtles 
with the Carrs. Needless to say, the connections forged on the 
7 
Tortuguero trip were of the utmost importance for all concerned. 
With a master's degree in hand and his position in planning 
secured at MAG, Boza next set out to generate public support for 
the benefits of national park development. In 1969 he wrote edi-
torials to San José newspapers extolling the economic value that 
tourism to national parks could offer and cited the boon tourism 
had been to East Africa's economy. Then with the passage of the 
Forestry Law later that year and when Boza was named chief of the 
new National Parks Department in 1970, the opportunity opened 
up to put into action many of the dreams and ideas he had 
been advocating. Understanding the gravity of his new work, he 
stated that it was the dangerous environmental brink at which Cos-
ta Rica had arrived that spurred the need to act quickly and de-
cisively: "[A] series of environmental problems like deforesta-
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tion, poaching, erosion and pollution seriously threatened the 
conservation of the cultural and natural heritage of the nation." 
The creation of the national parks system, he explained, was "to 
8 
preserve at least representations of this heritage." 
Boza's next step was to fortify his department by training 
others in park planning and management. He definitely needed the 
help. "The new department was given responsibility for all of 
Costa Rica's volcanoes, a nature reserve [Cabo Blanco], and the 
Santa Rosa National Monument," Boza later recalled, "[t]he prob-
lem was that it had no budget and only one employee—me." Thus, 
he contacted Alvaro Ugalde (still a student at UCR) and urged him 
to attend the one-month national parks training course in the 
United States. Via funds from Archie Carr's Caribbean Conserva-
tion Corporation, Ugalde attended the seminar and ended up stay-
ing an extra two months at a different training course held at 
Grand Canyon National Park in Arizona. When he returned to Costa 
Rica in 1970, Boza placed him in charge of Santa Rosa National 
Monument, and then left to complete the training course himself 
9 
in the United States. 
Ugalde recalled that those early years were slim for the new 
department and that "the Park Service didn't have the money to 
hire me." Santa Rosa had been "pretty much abandoned by ICT [the 
tourism institute] because the Forestry Law said it was to be man-
aged by the park system, and Cabo Blanco was still being managed 
by the Wessbergs, and that was it." He and Boza were confronted 
with a variety of needs—guards, construction materials, mainten-
123 
anee supplies, political support for their programs, etc.—and 
had very few means to attain them. Thus, they learned to be clev-
er. Boza explained how "the idea was to seize any favorable op-
portunities or circumstances that came up, even unexpectedly, to 
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invent a thousand and one tricks to get what we needed. . . . " 
One of the tricks that worked the best was to capitalize on 
the connections they had made. The value of knowing the right 
people and being able to seek their assistance became very clear 
in those early years. The literature is consistent in pointing 
to one individual in particular, however, as being the most in-
fluential for park support: the First Lady of Costa Rica, Karen 
Olsen de Figueres. Similar to many first ladies in the United 
States, Doña Karen (as she is affectionately known in Costa Rica) 
took on a special cause or avocation during her husband's term. 
The cause she chose was preserving the environment and establish-
ing national parks. Allen Young, an American naturalist who 
spent a great deal of time in Costa Rica during the embryonic 
stages of its park development, goes so far as to say that the 
national park system was "rooted" in the efforts of Mrs. Figuer-
es. Mario Boza has referred to her as "our fairy godmother of 
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conservation." In a presentation he gave at the World Confer-
ence on National Parks in 1972, Boza spoke at length regarding 
Doña Karen's important role: 
The best collaborator . . . a park program can have 
is the First Lady of the Republic. Costa Rica's 
First Lady Señora Karen de Figueres has not only 
given her full support to the theme of conserving 
the natural patrimony of the country, but has gone 
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much further by proposing a large scale program— 
now before the Legislative Assembly—for establish-
ing and funding a system . . . that would comprise 
no less than sixteen new parks. What was of partic-
ular importance to us is that [she] was in the po-
sition to give practical help in everything. Through 
the president, she can get proposals for new legis-
lation, . . . she can ensure the support of the 
agency heads and legislators belonging to heir par-
ty, seek certain kinds of international aid which 
can only be obtained by approach at the presiden-
tial level, etc. In short, it was only after Doña 
Karen began to help us directly that our park pro-
gram began to make rapid progress. (12) 
Likewise, she joined environmental groups and served as a member 
of several conservation commissions. 
What is not discussed in the literature, however, is why 
Mrs. Figueres became so personally involved. In an interview 
conducted for research on this study, Doña Karen explained that 
she became motivated to work on environmental issues out of a 
religious, ffconscious-oriented" calling. "Helping people be-
come conscious of what God has given us, of what brotherhood 
means . . . and of our responsibility as stewards of the land," 
she remarked, was "so essential to me." Continuing, she stated, 
"each person's value and responsibility [towards the land] brings 
unity and balance . . . and instills a conscience of who we are 
in Costa Rica." She also mentioned that her interest in the en-
vironment was an extension of her educational and professional 
background as a sociologist. This discipline had helped her 
understand how the "development [of a country] is not logical 
without considering long-range values," "Too much thinking 
today," she explained, "is short-term or for right now." Born 
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in Denmark, raised in the United States, but "one thousand per-
cent Costa Rican" most of her adult life, as she explains it. 
Doña Karen viewed her role as First Lady to be a catalyst for 
13 
national park protection. 
Other people also offered valuable assistance. Arthur "Tex" 
Hawkins, for example, volunteered much of his time to help Ugalde 
in Santa Rosa. Hawkins, a U.S. wildlife biologist-journalist who 
who had been a Peace Corps volunteer with Costa Rica's Fish and 
Wildlife Office, and Ugalde were aware that problems had started 
to mount in Santa Rosa while Boza was out of the country complet-
ing his training with the USNPS. They were concerned that forty 
families of squatters had moved into the Playa Naranjo area of 
Santa Rosa, had started to clear it of forest, and had proceeded 
to set up farms. Likewise, as Ugalde recollects, "one of the 
rancher neighbors up on the dry forest area of the volcanic 
plateau had stolen sixty hectares [approximately 150 acres]—just 
moved his fences sixty hectares into the park." The park had but 
one workman at the time (and he and other forestry officials were 
turning a blind eye to the damage), and so, as Ugalde relates, 
Tex and I decided to fight for Santa Rosa as volun-
teers. Mario [Boza] had left the keys of his apart-
ment in Santa Rosa with me, so Tex and I would meet 
and raise hell from there. We were the park service, 
and neither of us worked for it. It got very heated. (14) 
They also alerted Boza to the problems. When he returned to San 
José" he wrote the MAG minister about the destruction and sent 
copies of his letter to various newspapers to arouse public sup-
port. With headlines such as "Santa Rosa in Flames; National 
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Park Being Burned" (although it was not yet officially a national 
park), the government got the message and proceeded to remove the 
15 
ranchers and to relocate the squatters. 
Moving the squatters, however, was no easy task. The job 
fell on Ugalde (still an unpaid volunteer) who remembered that 
[i]t was very difficult at the beginning because even 
though I was supposed to be the authority, in reality 
they were. . . . They were very aggressive at first, 
with machetes and all that. But I went around the 
whole park by myself without a gun and started talk-
in to them. Pretty soon we were having coffee and 
trying to negotiate. They said, 'Well, if that's 
official, then we need to get paid for our improve-
ments, and we need land somewhere else, and we need 
transportation.' I told them I'd get them those 
things . . . [or] I'd resign. . . . I would have re-
signed but the government came through, and by July 
we were actually loading chickens and pigs in cars 
and taking them away. (16) 
The government issued bonds to buy out the squatters and to 
help finance future park development at Santa Rosa. But the 
troubles did not end when the squatters left. On the very day 
that the last family had been successfully removed. Boza and 
Ugalde learned that there was a bill in the Legislative Assembly 
aimed at taking Santa Rosa away from the new National Parks 
Department and returning it to the national tourism institute, 
ITC. The bill was sponsored by the president of the Assembly, 
Daniel Oduber, who was a powerful cattle rancher from Guanacaste 
and who was a friend of the Santa Rosa area rancher who had been 
illegally running livestock in the park. Oduber's bill, support-
ted by ICT personnel who had opposed the Forestry Law that trans-
ferred Santa Rosa out of their domain, would have opened up the 
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park to more grazing by other area ranchers. Ugalde was worried 
about the precedent such a bill would establish and was reported 
having said to Boza, "Mario, we [the parks department] are only 
17 
six months old, and already we are an endangered species." 
At that point Boza and Ugalde started a campaign against Odu-
ber's proposal. Noticing that the funding clause for the bill 
levied a new tax on liquor, the two men actively engaged the 
business community to lobby against the proposal. They also en-
listed the support of the Costa Rican Biologists1 Association 
(Colegio de Biólogos) whose members wrote letters in defense of 
the parks department and lobbied against the bill. But most im-
18 
portantly, as Boza put it, "we called on our fairy godmother." 
When told of the situation, Karen Olsen de Figueres talked 
with or wrote every member of the Legislative Assembly and out-
lined why Oduber's bill should be rejected. According to Boza, 
she also wrote a personal letter to Oduber requesting him to with-
draw the proposal. As the story goes, she showed "considerable 
political artistry . . . [and] asked her husband—without telling 
him the contents of the letter—if he would deliver it himself 
to Oduber." President Figueres handed him the message but Oduber 
refused to relent. Nonetheless, when the Assembly voted not one 
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diputado supported the measure. Its unanimous failure represent-
ed a victory for Boza and Ugalde and for the future of the nation-
al parks program. It also illustrated the significance of Dona 
Karen's attention to conservation concerns and was a hallmark for 
her continued involvement in national parks causes. Santa Rosa 128 
was officially changed to national park status in March of 1971 
and Ugalde was appointed its first salaried administrator two 
months later. "So the Park Service now had two people," he 
20 
stated, "or three, if you count Mario's secretary." 
A "Towering Responsibility:" The Early Years of Park Development 
The first task facing Mario Boza and the National Parks De-
partment was, as Boza put it, to decide "what type of parks . . . 
[to] create first." He decided to steer a practical course—to 
concentrate on one or two areas and to make them models for 
future park development. He related how the idea was "to create 
parks in areas of stunning beauty, on historic sites commemorat-
ing heroic exploits of the past, and in areas of demonstrated im-
portance for conservation." The goal was "to merge historical, 
scenic, and natural values so that no one could object, making it 
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easy to sell the public on the idea of conservation." 
Selling the idea of national parks to the public was no easy 
chore in 1970. Boza explained that at that particular moment in 
time Costa Rica was experiencing 
intensive deforestation to open new lands for agricul-
ture and cattle raising; chaotic land settlement by 
campesinos . . . , normally following the course of 
new highways; active trade in wild animal products; 
very weak environmental education; total indifference 
to environmental problems on the part of the general 
public and decision makers; and a lack of protected 
wild areas that could provide a model of how to con-
serve nature. (22) 
Working without a model, without any experience, without much fun-
ding, and with only "five guards and a vehicle," then, became a 
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daunting task. "We found ourselves faced with the towering re-
sponsibility of developing a system of national parks and equiva-
lent reserves," Boza remembered, and "we realized immediately how 
much we needed: staff for administration, protection, and tourist 
and visitor services; funds to purchase land, buildings, equip-
ment, supplies, uniforms, medicine, and fuel; training for staff; 
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and published materials for interpretation." 
But parks they did create. The first area officially to be 
protected under the new guidelines of the Forestry Law was Cahui-
ta National Monument in September of 1970. Cahuita, which was 
changed to a national park in 1980, is located on Costa Rica's ex-
treme southeast Caribbean coast and includes tropical forest, 
miles of pristine beaches, and a 1500 acre coral reef that is the 
only well-preserved reef on Costa Rica's Caribbean side. That 
same month a small part of what would in 1975 become Tortuguero 
National Park (up the coast from Cahuita) was declared protected 
for marine turtle nesting grounds. In January of 1971, Poás 
Volcano was declared a "pilot national park" and many parts of 
Boza's master plan that had been his M.A. thesis were converted 
into the working management plan for the park. Poás Volcano—a 
mountain that had been discussed, designated, and labelled with 
different forms of conservation tags and had been "managed" by 
several different government agencies since 1939—finally became 
Costa Rica's first official national park. Two months later, in 
March of 1971 which happened to be the 115th anniversary of the 
battle against William Walker and the filibusters, Santa Rosa's 
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status was changed from "national monument" to "national park" to 
24. 
become Costa Rica's second official national park. The executive 
decree to create the park was signed by President Jose Figueres. 
(See the map on page seventy-six for exact locations of these 
parks.) 
To celebrate the inauguration of Santa Rosa National Park 
and to honor the anniversary of the Filibuster War, the parks de-
partment decided to host an on-site ribbon cutting ceremony on 20 
March 1971—the same date as the famous battle in 1 856. Accord-
ing to newspaper accounts, eight thousand people attended the 
event, including a variety of government dignitaries, local offic-
ials, and school children from around Guanacaste province. MAG 
Minister Fernando Batalla signed the national park proclamation 
on the steps of the famous Casona. Vice Minister, Alvaro Rojas 
Espinoza (who had been so instrumental in passing conservation 
legislation in the 1950's and 60's), read the first articles of 
the decree to the audience. President Figueres was unable to 
attend, but his wife Dona Karen assisted with the ribbon cutting 
and gave a brief speech. After requesting a moment of silence 
for the Costa Ricans who had lost their lives in the 1856 battle, 
Mrs. Figueres asserted that Santa Rosa represented a "symbol for 
the homeland, a symbol for the future development of Guanacaste, 
and a symbol for the integration of the entire Costa Rican family 
because it is here that one finds the past, the present, and the 
25 
future." 
Daniel Oduber, the president of the Legislative Assembly who 
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had unsuccessfully tried to remove Santa Rosa from the parks de-
partment a year earlier, was also on hand to deliver a speech. 
Making an abrupt about face, Oduber now spoke glowingly about San-
ta Rosa and directed his remarks to the school children in the 
audience. He exhorted them to preserve Santa Rosa against "con-
temporary filibusters." "To you we hand over a united and peace-
ful country," he began, "assured of the fact that you will defend 
this sacred land, tree for tree and palm for palm." He also chal-
lenged them "to show the world that here in Costa Rica we defend 
natural resources and the beauty of nature, and that we know how 
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to respect religiously . . . the nature that God has given us." 
The United States offered official congratulations to the 
government of Costa Rica. President Richard Nixon sent a cable 
to President Figueres saying: 
I am pleased to congratulate you and the citizens of 
Costa Rica on the occasion of the inauguration of 
Santa Rosa National Park. In an era in which we 
face great dangers it is particularly opportune that 
this date . . . of the glorious battle in the defense 
of your country, also marks the efforts to preserve 
the rich heritage and resources of your country. 
We in the United States feel very encouraged by 
your example. (27) 
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C.B. Morton was unable to make 
the event but he sent USNPS representative Myron Sutton. At the 
ceremony, Sutton read a letter from Morton who wrote that Santa 
Rosa's designation was of "immense importance" to the citizens of 
Costa Rica. "Not only has it saved an historic heritage," he 
stated, "but it also has rescued from extinction a natural area 
of inestimable value." In his own words, Sutton told the crowd 
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that "the great battle of 1856" could be compared with "the great 
battle of our days—the conservation of the environment and of 
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the national heritage." Also in attendance were FAO representa-
tives Richard Wilder and Kenton Miller—assuredly gratified at 
the conservation successes of his former student, Mario Boza. 
But while the creation of these initial national parks can 
be seen as a success, Boza's first year as Parks Department chief 
was filled with challenges and setbacks. Soon into his position 
he wrote Gerardo Budowski (then a director at the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature [IUCN]) that "I have hun-
29 
dreds of problems that I would like to discuss with you." At 
Cahuita, for example, land acquisition had been a problem. A 
former park service attorney explained that "the legal mandate to 
acquire lands could not be carried out because the Cahuitenos 
were very obstinate in those days . . . and the community viewed 
the creation of the park with distrust." "The government," she 
continued, finally "reached an agreement with the residents of 
Cahuita saying that the State would not proceed with any land ex-
30 
propriations until they were satisfied" with the arrangements. 
Trouble was also brewing once again in politically besieged 
Santa Rosa. Official park designation, the act of having a full-
time administrator (Alvaro Ugalde) on site, and a dignitary-laden 
inauguration ceremony all could not prevent scandal number three 
from hitting the newly created park. In June of 1971, just three 
months after the grand opening ceremony, the National Youth Move-
ment and the Biologists' Association complained to San Jose news-133 
papers that Santa Rosa was being overrun by livestock. Trails 
and picnic areas that the youth organization had helped to build 
were being severely damaged by cattle grazing in the park. The 
Colegio de Biólogos estimated that several thousand head of cat-
tle in Santa Rosa had converted the national park into fla virtual 
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ranch.11 
Worse, it soon became known that the minister of MAG himself 
(who also was over the National Parks Department) was involved in 
running cattle in Santa Rosa and had abetted fellow ranchers in 
the region to graze their cattle there. Complicating matters was 
the fact that Mario Boza and Alvaro Ugalde knew that their boss 
was the policy violator and that they were frustrated about not 
knowing how to handle the scandal. Non-governmental conservation 
activists like Alexander Bonilla also knew what was going on and 
were equally perplexed. Just who does one approach to report the 
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agency head's misdeeds? 
Enter once again Karen Olsen de Figueres. "This incensed 
me!," Doña Karen recalled, "and it became the turning point for 
me to get involved" in this and other environmental causes. "It 
gave me the green light" to try to make a difference, she stated, 
and hopefully "gave the green light to like-minded people to get 
involved." The problem was that MAG director Fernando Batalla 
was appointed by her husband and claimed that the scandal was the 
work of a biased, liberal press. He argued (mistakenly) that 
grazing cattle was part of the management plan of the park. It 
was not; in fact it was a direct violation of Article 81 of the 
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Forestry Law. Thus, she lobbied her husband to act on the 
violation and worked to expose the problem, even though, as she 
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admitted, "I was conscious it would bring trouble at home." 
The courts eventually had the violators remove the live-
stock. Some of the cattle, however, had to be killed by park em-
ployees who distributed the meat to hospitals. When asked about 
the political ramifications of denouncing this scandal, Mrs. 
Figueres replied that she "was born to serve . . . [and that] 
political positions do not belong to us, they are only loaned— 
they are not fulfilled just by getting votes." From that time 
on, Doña Karen lobbied for national parks, funding, and inter-
national assistance on ecological issues. In 1972, for example, 
she used her position to solicit funds from UNESCO on behalf of 
the National Parks Department and the Caribbean Conservation 
Corporation for the on-going marine turtle protection program at 
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Tortuguero. 
Twenty years later, Karen Olsen de Figueres was still in-
volved in environmental issues. Her husband's death in 1990 did 
not deter her from running for an at-large seat in the Legisla-
tive Assembly (which she won) and where she continued to be 
active in environmental policy making. She identified her work 
there as an effort to attain "consistent" government attention to 
rational and sustainable use of the country's natural resources, 
legislation she was working to pass in 1992 concerned preventing 
the Isla del Coco (Coco Island off the Pacific Coast) from tar-
nishing its national park status by becoming a casino island for 
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which many people with "right now" attitudes and "short-term 
economic hopes" were pushing. She introduced legislation banning 
the importation of foreign toxic waste to be dumped in Costa Ri-
ca, supported the idea of a Western Hemisphere "green belt" corri-
dor to run from Canada to Chile (which would "cause a political 
and environmental unity" across the Americas), and advocated that 
San Lucas Island become a marine research station for the Uni-
versity of Costa Rica. In the administration of her son. Presi-
dent José" Maria Figueres (1994-98), Dona Karen retains the office 
of "itinerant ambassador and counselor" to the president. She 
remains involved in a variety of social, environmental, and inter-
national issues. (35) 
Mario Boza and Alvaro Ugalde did not enter the political 
fray that rocked Santa Rosa with the 1971 cattle crisis and in 
which Karen Olsen de Figueres was so personally involved. Since 
one of the perpetrators was their supervisor they logically 
stayed their distance. Not so, however, when scandal number four 
hit Santa Rosa one year later. Because a severe drought was ad-
versely affecting agriculture in Guanacaste in the late spring of 
1972, the director of MAG decided to allow area farmers and ranch-
ers to cut hay in the park's savanna grasslands. The area had 
been protected from fires and hunters for two years by the fledg-
ling park staff and Peace Corps volunteers who were enraged at 
the ministry's decision. 
Harvesting in the park was more than Santa Rosa administra-
tor Ugalde could take and this time he decided to oppose very 
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actively the agriculture minister's decision. The result was 
that the minister was going to fire Ugalde from Santa Rosa. But 
Boza did not give him the chance; he transferred Ugalde to Poás 
Volcano and moved the director of that national park, Vernon 
Cruz, to Santa Rosa. The switch seemed to mollify the ministry 
because Cruz was not as vociferous against the government as 
Ugalde. The hay cutting experiment did not turn out to be very 
3 6 
successful and the ministry never tried it again. 
Larger problems loomed, however, in funding the national 
parks once they were created. Boza recalled, 
[t]he biggest challenge we faced was breaking out of 
the vicious cycle between the need to develop a sys-
tem of national parks and the lack of resources for 
doing so. We had no track record and nothing to 
show, so unless we could create an obvious need, we 
would never obtain working funds. ( 3 7 ) 
The Forestry Law outlined how the DGF and its parks department 
would be funded from both regular and special budget allocations 
from the Legislative Assembly. Boza remembered, however, that 
[i]t was always a terrible fight to have our funding 
needs included in the general budget, because we had 
to compete with programs for building highways, schools, 
airports, and other public works, and even with other 
departments in the same ministry. Those were very 
hard times; our arguments were weak because we lacked 
experience, and we did not have public opinion on our 
side. We survived more by luck and determination than 
anything else. ( 3 8 ) 
Much of Boza's determination and hard work was directed at 
looking for funds outside of government sources. He started to 
make appeals to international assistance agencies and to conserva-
tion foundations. The World Wildlife Fund was the first organi-
1 3 7 
zation to respond in December of 1971 with a check for five thou-
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sand dollars to help with the protection of Tortuguero. Boza 
undertook a far more ambitious fundraising project the same year. 
He wrote a "project proposal" entitled "Pilot Study of Potential 
Park Sites and Reserve Areas throughout Costa Rica" and sent it 
to his friend and mentor Gerardo Budowski at the IUCN in Switzer-
land. Boza wrote in the introduction of the grant proposal that 
the nation was 
entering a period of economic and environmental tran-
sition. . . . Costa Rica's brand new parks program 
is trying hard to keep ahead of the tourism-outdoor 
recreation boom in order to preserve and protect the 
country's natural resource endowment while at the 
same time providing guidance in sound resource de-
velopment. The park program's success is important 
internationally because of Costa Rica's spectacular, 
and as yet largely unspoiled ecological diversity. 
. . . A primary responsibility of the Costa Rican 
National Parks Department is to preserve diverse ex-
amples of Costa Rica's natural areas and to demon-
strate their importance to as many people as possi-
ble. (40) 
Boza went on to describe the four units that had been established 
that year and described other areas that were under consideration 
for protective status by his department. He noted that a Tropi-
cal Science Center (TSC) team of experts "with intimate familiari-
ty with natural areas throughout Costa Rica . . . and recognition 
in the field of natural resource conservation" had offered to con-
duct the "badly-needed pilot study of potential park site(s)" if 
funding could be obtained. Personnel on the team included such 
conservation minded stalwarts as Alexander Skutch to perform 
the ornithological research, Leslie Holdridge to document tree 
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speciation and ecological community structures, Joseph Tosi to 
consult on other ecological interpretations, Robert Wilson (a 
botanist with a specialty in the study of bromeliads) to inven-
tory flowering plants, and Olof Wessberg (from Cabo Blanco) to 
research the mammals of the areas under study. Steve Harrel, a 
specialist in forest recreation planning, would lead the team 
and prepare the final program for the IUCN's consideration. Boza 
estimated that the study would take six months and cost $25,300— 
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the amount he was requesting from the IUCN. 
To illustrate his funding concerns, Boza wrote Myron Sutton 
at the USNPS regarding how it took approximately $200,000 to get 
Santa Rosa refurbished and set up as a national park. He solici-
ted help from his American friend to make some contacts for him 
at the offices of international conservation organizations and 
to help him plan a fundraising visit to the United States. Sut-
ton obliged and helped Boza to arrange interviews at the Conserva-
tion Foundation, the National Geographic Society, the Nature Con-
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servancy, and the Ford Foundation. Boza travelled to the United 
States in the summer of 1971 and was successful in marketing his 
country's conservation needs to the different organizations. The 
trip was the start of a long and warm relationship between the 
administration of the Costa Rican park system and the internation-
al philanthropic community. 
One of the areas for which funding was so desparately needed 
and what became one of Boza's greatest challenges was in staffing 
the new national parks. As one National Parks Department report 
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put it, "getting professional personnel—guides, guards, labor-
ers, cooks, and others—[was] one of the major problems of the 
park service" and was a "principal preoccupation of [its] direc-
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tor" in those early years. Starting with the original five 
guards (who were paid seventy five dollars a month) and a small 
office staff, Boza learned to be creative in accomplishing goals 
and paying for projects. He used funds donated by international 
organizations to pay overtime wages to staff members from other 
government agencies, especially from the Ministry of Public 
Works, to construct roads and firebreaks in conservation areas. 
He procured labor and guard duty from different local branches of 
the Rural and Civil Guards (Costa Rica's national police force). 
He utilized volunteers from the National Youth Movement (esti-
mated by one report to be worth $8,000 in free labor), the Costa 
Rican Boy Scouts, and a variety of different local youth groups 
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to help construct paths and maintain other park services. 
In 1971 Boza wanted to send two other promising conservation-
ists to study in the parks program in the United States. He con-
tacted Myron Sutton, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Inter-
national Affairs in the USNPS (with whom he had become acquainted 
at the park courses), to see about the possibility of arranging 
courses and park visits for Sergio Salas and Ernesto Crawford. 
But this time Boza wanted the Costa Ricans to observe how park 
programs functioned in tropical settings. He sent Salas and 
Crawford to the Caribbean National Forest in Puerto Rico, to a 
national park in the U.S. Virgin Islands, and to the Everglades 
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National Park in Florida. They also attended the ten-week "Intro-
duction to Park Operations" course that the USNPS held at its fa-
cility in Harper's Ferry, West Virginia. Crawford returned home 
but Salas extended his trip to include visits to national parks 
in the American West and, upon Sutton's suggestion, even to the 
volcano national park in Hawaii. He retuned to Costa Rica via 
stops in Mexico and Tikal, Guatemala, to further enrich his under-
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standing of tropical conservation. 
Boza also relied on other people to help with various nation-
al parks projects. He received the able assistance of scientists 
at the Organization of Tropical Studies (OTS), the Tropical Sci-
ence Center (TSC), and CATIE to help with the research and plan-
ning of different national parks. Another individual, Tex Haw-
kins, who had helped Alvaro Ugalde during the Santa Rosa crises, 
offered his journalism skills to Boza to help develop a public 
relations program for the new parks department. Boza obviously 
had few funds with which to pay Hawkins so he solicited help from 
the IUCN. He noted that Hawkins had agreed to work for park 
guard wages if he could be supplemented by a $250.00 grant—the 
amount Boza was requesting from the IUCN. Boza wrote that "a 
comprehensive natural areas public program . . . could help our 
new national parks office provide Costa Rica with a badly-needed 
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environmental information/education function." 
Hawkins, originally a Peace Corps volunteer, paved the way 
for many other workers from that organization to help with conser-
vation efforts in Costa Rica. In 1971 the Peace Corps decided to 
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send twenty volunteers to Costa Rica, but increased the number 
when many of its workers were expelled from Bolivia due to a pol-
itical crisis there. One hundred of those volunteers (not all in 
the field of conservation or ecological sciences) were diverted 
to Costa Rica—a move supported by President José Figueres and 
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U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica Walter Ploeser. For Boza and the 
parks department, the assistance came at an incredibly opportune 
time—when funding and experience were scarce and needs were 
great. According to an agency report, the Peace Corps "was one 
of the most important sources for bringing in workers who could 
complete a diverse range of tasks—technical as well as admini-
strative." So great was their assistance, Boza later wrote, that 
"at one point we had eighteen Peace Corps volunteers and only 
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twelve national staff." 
Peace Corps workers were put to work in a variety of differ-
ent positions. Alan Moore, for example, helped in park admini-
stration and was instrumental in developing plans for the conser-
vation and management of volcanic areas. He solicited ideas from 
the director of Hawaii Volcanoes National Park in the United 
States who was only too glad to send letters and photographs of 
ideas that worked well for signs and other visitor services. 
Steve Cornelius was a herpetologist who not only assisted in the 
study of marine turtles but was also used by Boza to help draft 
legislation for the protection of the giant reptiles. And Chris-
topher Vaughn was a wildlife biologist among whose early duties 
in Costa Rica was to research the trade in endangered species. 
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In a letter regarding his project, he summed up the significance 
of what he and his fellow enthusiastic volunteers were doing: 
Costa Rica is entering a new epoch of awareness of 
the value of preserving it[s] natural resources (a 
last stand if you want to be precise). . . . Recent-
ly the staff [at the National Parks Department] was 
inundated by a group of sixteen young, aware, and 
eager wildlife biologists, architects, and foresters 
from the United States Peace Corps who will spend 
at least two years working in many areas for 
specific wildlife studies. . . . (49) 
Vaughn, like Hawkins, stayed a long time after his two-year 
stint in the Peace Corps. He ended up making Costa Rica his 
home, wrote the management plan for Corcovado National Park, and 
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today is a professor at the National University. 
Vaughn's project on the marketing of Costa Rican threatened 
species is indicative of the emphasis Boza placed on creating 
parks for their importance in protecting biological diversity— 
even at the relatively early date of 1971. In a grant request 
to the IUCN for his project, Vaughn explained that he would be 
investigating the "volume and diversity of wildlife which leaves 
this country anual1y bound for international markets." He re-
lated how quetzals, "innumerable" parrots, sloths, ocelots, 
tanagers ("shipped sixty in a box"), and green turtles (for their 
meat and shells) all commanded high dollars on the black market. 
To illustrate the size of the problem, Boza wrote the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service explaining how an American company was kil-
ling one hundred of the giant marine turtles a day and shipping 
the meat to U.S. markets. (Boza inquired as to what U.S. laws 
would pertain and could be enforced to halt the slaughter.) Part 
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of Vaughn's mission was to use wildlife photography exhibits and 
other media to produce "educational programs aimed to 'turn on 1 
the general public to the treasures they possess and stress the 
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necessity of preserving it." 
Boza took full advantage of this type of public relations 
opportunity that the Peace Corps workers provided. He used them 
to write newspaper press releases to keep the media up to date 
with conservation news and park developments. Jaime Socash was a 
a Corps volunteer in graphic arts who was put to work to design 
pamphlets, exhibits, signs, and color schemes for the National 
Parks Department. And Kirk Koepsel was a volunteer in Costa Rica 
in the early 1980's who along with trail construction, mainten-
ance, and staff-training duties, also had essential public rela-
tions responsibilities. He lobbied for support and organized 
trips into protected areas for residents who lived near them as a 
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way to acquaint the people with the benefits of conservation. 
Many Peace Corps units have worked on conservation issues 
in Costa Rica since those first years of the national parks de-
velopment. By the early 1980's the park service came to rely on 
these volunteers but became more selective in choosing who would 
be accepted. In 1983 the service issued a list of "academic 
requisites" expected from Peace Corps volunteers in four differ-
ent fields: alternative energy sources, regulation of fishing, 
fire control/management, and reproduction of wild animals. The 
park service now expected workers to have degrees in mechanical 
engineering, hydrology, natural resource management, marine or 
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aquatic biology, forestry, range management, zoology, and wild-
life conservation among other degrees in those respective fields. 
Course work on "recovery of damaged ecosystems" or "forest regen-
eration" as well as field experience were highly recommended. As 
needs continued and the department became more professional, 
these criteria reflected the trend to develop more sophisticated 
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conservation policy. 
Fundraising and staffing were among Boza's larger problems 
in the early years of the National Parks Department, but he also 
had to tackle other administrative and conservation concerns. 
Night poaching in protected areas was an on-going problem that 
Boza had to address and that he had to keep his few park guards 
ever aware of. Acquiring equipment, supplies, machinery, and con-
struction materials for the parks became a difficult and expen-
sive chore. Again Boza had to rely on international contribu-
tions for many of the day-to-day equipment needs of the parks. 
He had to find funding and materials to restore the Casona and 
other buildings in Santa Rosa. And he had to work on keeping a 
proposed jet-port out of Santa Rosa. He again solicited help 
from Gerardo Budowski on this matter and asked him to send Pres-
ident Figueres a letter explaining why an airport in Santa Rosa 
would be harmful to the park. Budowski sent the letter; the 
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jet-port was not constructed. 
Setbacks and challenges, however, were matched by conserva-
tion successes. Costa Rica's first two national parks, Poás 
Volcano and Santa Rosa, were functioning well and gaining in 
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popularity in the early 1970's. Seventy thousand people visited 
Poás Volcano and 15,000 visitors went to Santa Rosa between 1971 
and 1972. The first foreign tourists to Santa Rosa, Californians 
travelling south down the Pan American highway in two pickup 
trucks in January 1971, found the park by accident and were pleas-
antly surprised with all the monkeys and other wildlife they were 
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able to observe. 
Establishing the parks for the combination of conserving 
environmental qualities and preserving historical value was a 
route that helped the parks department achieve support from the 
public. Boza actively sought such support by preparing materials 
for magazines and newspapers and he wrote his own brochures that 
appealed to the patriotism of the readers. His pamphlet on Santa 
Rosa, for example, was entitled "Santa Rosa: Cuna de nuestra sob-
eranía" (Cradle of our Sovereignty). He made sure one was sent 
to every member of the Legislative Assembly. He also personally 
invited every Assembly member to the opening ceremony of the new 
visitor's center at Poás Volcano National Park in August 1972. 
Many attended. Boza also persuaded high schools to include 
national park information in their science curriculum, and spon-
sored student trips to the parks. The National Youth Movement 
also hosted weekend trips and work camps to the parks. Community 
development associations, local Rotary and Lions Clubs, and even 
the Folklore Dancing Club all became active supporters of the 
national parks cause. The strategy was applauded by Luis Four-
nier who wrote that "it resulted in an adequate decision with a 
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double function: to protect the cultural and natural heritage of 
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the nation as well as to provide public recreational services.'1 
These early successes did not go unnoticed by the inter-
national conservationist community. The IUCN invited Boza to 
speak at its Second World Conference on National Parks to be held 
in 1972 in Jackson, Wyoming. The conference was to be held near 
Yellowstone—the world's first national park—and was to be part 
of the one hundredth anniversary of that park's creation. Boza 
responded that "it was a great honor to be invited to write a 
paper" for the conference and that he would accept "with great 
enthusiasm" the chance to attend the event. He wondered, how-
ever, if such a new program as that of Costa Rica's—only two 
years old at the time—could be of much service or example to 
international conservationist delegates. Frank Nicholls, the 
deputy director general of the IUCN, replied that Costa Rica's 
new parks program and recent successes made for an even better 
reason to have Boza speak and would serve as a stimulus for other 
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small, developing nations. 
In his presentation, "Costa Rica: A Case Study of Strategy 
in the Setting up of National Parks in a Developing Country," 
Boza told fellow delegates at the conference about his plans for 
establishing and managing Poás Volcano and Santa Rosa. "The 
common feature of these two parks," he began, "is that they are 
attractive both to the people of the country and to visitors from 
abroad, are of easy access, and have great national significance, 
conditions which made their establishment possible without oppo-
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sition from anyone." While this optimism obviously .downplayed 
the opposition of local stockgrowers in and around Santa Rosa; it 
did represent a majority of sentiment for park creation in those 
years. One newspaper reporter related how Boza, "in his quiet, 
studious manner," told of how Costa Rica's park development did 
not have "the explorer's drama that surrounded the start of 
America's national parks at Yellowstone a century ago," but how 
it was "an idea whose seed must be carefully planted and nur-
tured to obtain public support that will allow it to compete 
with the nation's other demands." Boza also spelled out in his 
presentation how the strategy of Costa Rica's park service was to 
start small and protect well what was designated rather than to 
have too many parks to manage all at once. Success in early park 
development would hopefully set off a chain reaction of public 
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support to conserve other areas in the country. 
It worked. Other national parks and reserves were created 
in the early 1970's: Manuel Antonio National Park on the Pacific 
Coast (1972); Rincón de la Vieja National Park—an active volcano 
in Guanacaste that is home to hot springs, fumaroles, hidden 
waterfalls, and mixed dry and evergreen forests (1973); Guayabo 
and Negritos Biological Reserve—rocky islands in the Gulf of 
Nicoya that are a haven for shore bird rookeries and tropical 
dry forests (1973); Guayabo National Monument (coincidentally 
with the same name as the island reserve but actually inland 
near Turrialba)—Costa Rica's largest archaeological zone with 
pre-Columbian Indian ruins dating back to 800 A.D. (1973); and 
Barra Honda National Park—a series of steep caverns on the 
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Nicoya Peninusla that were not "discovered" until 1967 (1974). 
Each of these new parks has its own story on how it was 
selected, planned, and eventually designated and managed by the 
National Parks Department. Newspaper articles gave attention 
to each area and advocated their protection. Manuel Antonio 
National Park (named after a Spanish conquistador who is buried 
there), however, was an area not originally sought after by 
Boza and the parks department. That park was the product of lo-
cal initiative—a drive by residents there who, so unlike locals 
near other areas such as Cahuita and Santa Rosa, actively cam-
paigned to conserve the area as a national park. 
Manuel Antonio had at one time been owned by the United 
Fruit Company (the result of a land trade by the government of 
Costa Rica). Due to its terrain, however, the firm never cleared 
it for banana production and thus later sold it to other private 
interests. Boza, who had never been to the Manuel Antonio 
beaches and forests on the Pacific Coast and who was busy dealing 
with crises in other parks, was reluctant to take on another 
project in late 1971 and early 1972. Vernon Cruz, the one time 
director of Poás Volcano and Santa Rosa national parks, however 
urged that he look into the possibility. Cruz had spent personal 
time at Manuel Antonio and was familiar with why residents of 
Quepos (a town near the park area) and others were fighting to 
save the land: not just for the beauty of the mixed tropical 
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forest that meets the Pacific with pristine white-sand beaches, 
but also because they were opposed to the foreign capitalist 
developers who were trying to build luxury resorts there. Quepos 
had a history of avid syndicalist activity since the 1930's and 
had elected Communist Party members to the Legislative Assembly. 
The people there were just not ready to have outside capitalists 
come in with disregard to local feelings. A variety of groups, 
including a small farmers' association, the high school student 
council, a chapter of the local National Youth Movement, and a 
prominent leftist family all became involved in working to keep 
the developers out. Some people even resorted to "monkeywrench-
ing" tactics like cutting down fences and threatening to bomb the 
gate of a construction site. Thus, Cruz convinced Boza of the 
bright opportunity that existed for park expansion, and the two 
of them, along with Peace Corps volunteer Christopher Vaughn, 
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flew down to the area and surveyed it as a potential park site. 
Boza must have been impressed with what he saw. When he re-
turned to San José he drafted a bill to declare Manuel Antonio a 
national park and got a Quepos diputado to sponsor it in the Leg-
islative Assembly. A delegation from the Assembly toured the 
area, saw the destruction started by the construction firm, and 
rallied for the bill's approval. President Figueres signed it 
into law and a bond was levied to buy back what had originally 
been government property and to pay for its development as a pro-
tected area. Today, Manuel Antonio is the smallest but one of 
the most visited of Costa Rica's national parks—averaging about 
150 
62 
151 
200,000 visitors a year. 
Manuel Antonio and the other new parks were designated dur-
ing the 1970-1974 administration of President Jose' Figueres. 
While it was Figueres' pen that signed the parks into law, their 
creation and successful operation did not come without the deter-
mination, hard work, and support of various individuals inside 
and outside of the government. Mario Boza spearheaded the work, 
but he had the welcome support of many fellow biologists, geogra-
phers, and social scientists at Costa Rican universities. Accord-
ing to Alexander Bonilla, one such avid supporter, professional 
associations as well as mountain climbing and caving clubs, envir-
onmental groups, garden societies, and youth groups all "played 
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very important roles in the development of these wild areas." In-
ternational organizations like the IUCN, World Wildlife Fund, Na-
ture Conservancy, Sierra Club, and various European environmental 
groups all continued their financial and technical assistance. 
Moral support also came in from overseas sources. French conser-
vationist Jean-Paul Harray wrote Boza to congratulate him on his 
efforts for park creation and conservation and especially for the 
opening of Santa Rosa National Park. Prince Bernard of the Neth-
erlands and Prince Philip of England were two specifically influ-
ential people involved with international conservation concerns 
who Boza remembers as being "very pleased to lend themselves to 
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our cause." 
One organization that was extremely helpful in technical 
assistance and moral support was the U.S. National Park Service. 
Boza had struck up a friendship with Julio Marrero of the USNPS 
in Puerto Rico and often corresponded with him on matters of trop-
ical conservation. Myron Sutton, the Assistant Chief of the 
USNPS Division of International Affairs who had spoken at the 
ceremony inaugurating Santa Rosa National Park, continued to keep 
in touch with Boza and to offer ideas and support. Sutton sent 
Douglas Cuillard, a naturalist at Everglades National Park, down 
down to Costa Rica several times to consult on various projects. 
One that Cuillard assisted in was helping to develop a network 
of paths that would survive the high rainfall and moist con-
ditions at Poas Volcano. Cuillard sought the advice of the 
director of Olympic National Park in Washington state who was 
used to similar weather patterns and found out from him that a 
gravel and wood-chip combination withstood the Pacific North-
west's rainy conditions better than other path-building mater-
ials. Othello Wallis from the USNPS regional office in San Fran-
cisco provided advice on developing marine national parks and 
Arthur Hewitt, the acting superintendent of Hawaii Volcanoes 
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National Park, was consulted on protecting volcanic areas. 
Boza and his small staff also received assistance and moral 
support from international agencies. Gerardo Budowski from the 
IUCN and Kenton Miller, then at the FAO's forestry division in 
Rome, often offered encouragement and assistance. John Moseley, 
a park planner with the FAO, provided help with a long-range plan-
ning process for the National Parks Department in 1972. John 
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Milton, the director of international programs for the Conserva-
tion Foundation in Washington, D.C., took special interest in the 
Costa Rican early parks experience and got his organization to 
help fund projects. The Costa Rican government applied for and 
received a $1.8 million loan from the Central American Develop-
ment Bank for the development of Poas Volcano National Park. And 
the Peace Corps, the British Volunteer Services Organisation, and 
the Caribbean Conservation Corporation continued to send much-
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needed volunteer workers throughout the seventies and eighties. 
The early years of the development of national parks in Cos-
ta Rica bear the very heavy imprint of Mario Boza and Alvaro 
Ugalde. Indeed, Boza has written that he and Ugalde and others 
67 
"launched the conservation movement in Costa Rica." While this 
is not too much of an overstatement, David Rains Wallace, in his 
authoritative study of the Costa Rican national parks, places the 
role of the two men in its proper perspective: 
Many writers have called Boza and Ugalde the founders 
of the Costa Rican park system. In a sense, this is 
an exaggeration: It was the Costa Rican leadership 
that founded the parks, the politicians and civil ser-
vants who drafted and passed the park decrees, and the 
scientists and conservationists who helped and pushed 
them to do so. Yet in another sense, it is quite 
true, because both men have shown an extraordinary 
dedication to the system. They not only helped start 
it, but kept working for it throughout their careers, 
sometimes at considerable personal cost. (68) 
One of the people who helped them in those early years was Ver-
non Cruz. After his stints as director of Poas Volcano and Santa 
Rosa, Boza created an administrative job for him back at park 
headquarters in San Jose". He became a "floating administrator" 
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to visit potential park sites, to present slide programs regard-
ing the park system, and to visit with communities that might 
be affected by park development. He remembers very well how hard 
he, Boza, and Ugalde worked in those early years and why they 
kept it up: 
We really never stopped working, although we were sup-
posed to get a week off every twenty-two days. Some-
times we'd work through the night at Boza's house. He 
was always working all the time with lots of projects. 
He kept us busy with all his ideas. It wasn't really 
working. We liked the problems, the feeling of respon-
sibility for the nation's resources. The support of 
the workers was the strong base of the parks from the 
beginning. The conditions were poor and hard, but all 
anybody thought about was how fantastic nature was, 
and how important it was to protect it for everybody. (69) 
Interestingly, for as much as Boza and Ugalde worked togeth-
er, they have been described as having quite opposite personali-
ties. The "reticent, scholarly" Boza and the "outgoing, com-
bative" Ugalde seemed to balance each other out. Likewise, they 
were members of rival political parties; Boza to the more conser-
vative Christian Unity Party (dominated by the Calderón family), 
and Ugalde to the more liberal National Liberation Party (of the 
Figueres legacy). One study in the 1970's reported that "some 
people surmise that the two friends maintain affiliations with 
opposing parties so that no matter which side wins an election, 
70 
the parks will have an advocate with connections." 
Connections or not, Boza learned that he was going to be 
transferred out of his position in 1974. José Figueres' presiden-
tial term had expired and the winner of that year's election was 
none other than Guanacaste rancher/lawyer and president of the 
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Legislative Assembly, Daniel Oduber Quirds. Although Boza was 
not of Figueres' political party (the PLN), he nonetheless had 
retained his position as head of the National Parks Department. 
Oduber was also of the PLN but replaced Figueres' minister of MAG 
with Rodolfo Quirds who was over the parks department and evident-
ly wanted political unity within his ministry. Boza left to help 
develop a school of environmental sciences at Universidad Estatal 
a Distancia (National Open University) but cleverly maneuvered to 
get Ugalde (who was PLN) appointed his successor at the parks de-
71 
partment. 
Thus a new chapter of Costa Rica's conservation history 
opens with Alvaro Ugalde as director of national parks. Mario 
Boza remained active in conservation efforts throughout the next 
decade, albeit in different venues of the private and public 
sectors. Most importantly, a system was now in place to con-
serve the nation's natural heritage, it was functioning with 
responsible personnel, and conservation in general was gaining in 
popularity with Costa Ricans. The system was soon to be tested 
by the challenges that lay ahead. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSERVATION CONTINUED: THE ODUBER ADMINISTRATION 
I believe nature's beauty is for everyone to enjoy, 
not just a few. . . . [T]his small country, just 100 
miles wide by 400 miles long, has a diversity of 
climates and species that makes it important from 
the scientific point of view. That's why we want 
to keep as much of our territory as possible in a 
condition to be studied and enjoyed by people. 
- Daniel Oduber Quirds (1) 
"The Greatest Friend the National Parks Ever Had" 
After Alvaro Ugalde's transfer from Santa Rosa to Poás Vol-
cano and after he had worked as director of that park for about 
a year, he decided it was time to consider getting a Master's of 
Science degree. He took a one year leave from the parks depart-
ment in 1973 to study at the University of Michigan's School of 
Natural Resources on an OAS (Organization of American States) 
Figure 1: President Daniel Oduber Quirds 
(source: Harold H. Bonilla, Los presidentes [San José: 
Editorial Texto, Ltda., 1985)] 
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scholarship. Upon his return to San José in 1974 he learned that 
he had been appointed director of the National Parks Department 
2 
in the new administration of President Daniel Oduber. 
That Ugalde and Oduber were of the same political affilia-
tion, and that Mario Boza had assisted in the nomination process, 
were assuredly factors in Ugalde1 s appointment. But the move was 
surprising in some ways since Ugalde had locked horns with Oduber 
on the Santa Rosa controversy of 1970. Several years later Ugal-
de mentioned in an interview for a report on the park system that 
he tried to stay out of Oduber fs sight the first few months he 
was in office: 
But one day I ran plunk into the President coming out 
a building. 'Ah, Ugalde! Where are you now?' the 
President asked. 'In the parks department,' I replied. 
'Come see me,' he said. My heart sank. But I was sur-
prised. Instead of Oduber being revengeful, he became 
the greatest friend the national parks ever had. (3) 
President Oduber's interest in national parks stemmed large-
ly from his belief that the parks could be an economic boon for 
tourism. This was actually an insightful stance since the term 
"ecotourism" was hardly in use in the mid-1970's and Central 
America was hardly a popular destination for foreign tourists. 
But Oduber saw the value of national parks for use by local 
Costa Ricans as well. Early in his term he proposed spending 
$3.5 million to create a series of small urban parks within a 
half hour's drive of San Jose in second growth forest and farm 
lands of the Central Valley. This "great recreational reserve" 
idea never materialized but Oduber was successful in dramatical-
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ly increasing the size of the Costa Rican park system that did 
4 
open the door to thousands of Tico and foreign tourists. In 
their book on Costa Rican national parks, Mario Boza and Ro-
lando Mendoza wrote that Oduber and Rodolfo Quirtís, the new direc-
tor of the agricultural ministry (MAG), gave priority to programs 
dedicated "to the conservation of nature and renewable resources 
as a way of contributing to the country's socio-economic develop-
5 
ment." 
For tourism or conservation, then, expansion of the national 
park system continued at a rapid pace during Oduber's term in 
office (1974-78). More importantly, conservation successes oc-
curred without the controversies that had marked the earlier 
years of park development. "Fights during the Oduber administra-
tion were almost non-existent," Alvaro Ugalde later recalled, 
"[t]he president was supporting everything." Naturalist Allen 
Young, who conducted research in Costa Rican national parks dur-
ing this time period, wrote that Oduber "nurtured and developed" 
6 
the park system. 
The praise is well deserved. By presidential decree Oduber 
created the large national parks of Tortuguero (previously protec-
ted as a nature reserve only), Corcovado (a remote tropical wet 
forest on the Osa Peninsula in Southeastern Costa Rica—one of 
the most species-rich areas in the entire country), Chirripd 
(Costa Rica's highest mountain at 12, 500 feet and home to one of 
the only Andean páramo life zones in all of Central America), and 
Braulio Carillo (a tropical wilderness area of steep, forested 
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mountains just north of San José). He also approved measures to 
amplify Santa Rosa National Park, to provide more developed 
services at Rincón de la Vieja National Park, to establish the 
Dr. Rafael Lucas Rodriguez and Palo Verde national wildlife 
refuges and the Isla del Cano, Hitoy-Cerere, and Carara biologi-
7 
cal reserves. (See map, page seventy-ffte.) 
All totaled, national park and equivalent reserve acreage 
nearly doubled during the Oduber presidency. The country's per-
centage of territory designated as protected jumped from 2.5 per-
8 
cent in 1974 to 4.5 percent in 1978. Likewise, the creation of 
each of the new parks or reserves reflected a growing conserva-
tion ethic in Costa Rica in the mid- to late 1970's. And like 
the earlier parks, each of the protected areas had its own partic-
ular genesis story. The origins of Chirripó, Corcovado, and Brau-
lio Carrillo especially exemplify the links between a nascent but 
growing environmental movement and the development of national 
parks and protected areas. 
Chirripó' (sometimes referred to as Macizo del Chirripó" or 
Cerro del Chirripó) in the Talamanca range in south central Cos-
ta Rica was promoted by the mountain climbing club of the Univer-
sity of Costa Rica. Club members had started lobbying for the 
mountain's protection and designation as a national park in 1972 
and their efforts finally paid off when President Oduber declared 
it such in August 1975. But leaders in the club valued the 
peak for more than just climbing and hiking; they understood how 
conservation would help to preserve the mountain's variety of eco-
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systems. The park is approximately 109,000 acres that includes 
not only Chirippo's peak, páramo grasses and shrublands, and gla-
ciated valleys, but also thousands of acres of rare high altitude 
oak forests that originally were to have been protected (but 
never really were) in the 1940's as a "national park" along the 
Pan American Highway. These forests are a vital part of a net-
work of watersheds that provides hydrological power to generate 
electricity to tens of thousands of Costa Ricans. The benefit of 
conserving Chirripd and its environs for its ability to produce 
electrical power, then, helped the mountain climbers sell the 
9 
idea of converting the area into a national park. 
Chirripd National Park is testimony to the work and success 
of Costa Rica's budding conservation movement. UCR mountain 
climbing club members Adalaida Chaverri, Alfonso Mata, Jorge 
Moya, and others who led the lobbying effort for Chirripd, became 
active participants in the Costa Rican environmentalist communi-
ty. Adelaida Cheverri later served as one of the Costa Rican 
delegates to the Central American Meeting on Management of Natu-
ral and Cultural Resources in 1974 and went on to write her Mas-
ter's thesis on the importance of private biological reserves. 
Alfonso Mata was also involved in the Central American conference 
and became an ecologist at the University of Costa Rica and the 
Tropical Science Center and has been an authority on environmen-
tal pollution and water quality. He has conducted exhaustive 
research and written many articles on the ecological impact of 
contaminants in water systems, especially pollution from chemical 
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insecticide run off, and was a key figure in the First National 
10 
Symposium on Environmental Pollution held in San José in 1980. 
The history of Corcovado National Park—100,000 acres of 
rare and endangered Pacific Coast rainforest—also begins with 
individuals in the scientific community who lobbied for its 
protection. The reason so many people were concerned is that 
the forests of the Osa Peninsula represent a unique ecosystem in 
Central America that was quickly being threatened. Christopher 
Vaughn, the Peace Corps volunteer who wrote the management plan 
for the park, asserts that Corcovado is the only remaining Pacif-
ic Coast tropical wet rainforest in the region and possibly in 
11 
all of Latin America. Tropical botanist Gary Hartshorn, who 
started visiting the Osa Peninsula in the mid-19601s, agrees and 
explains that Corcovadofs forests, complete with over 500 species 
of trees, 
are the only wet forests still extant on the Pacif-
ic side of Central America. The abundant rainfall 
coupled with a short, three-month dry season seems 
ideal for tree growth, for these forests are by far 
the most exuberant in Central America. In fact, 
the Corcovado forests are just as impressive . . . 
as the best forests I have seen in the Amazon Basin 
or . . . [in] Malaysia and Indonesia. (12) 
Such a place also represents the home to the largest populations 
of Baird's tapirs and jaguars in all of Central America and is 
habitat for hundreds of bird, reptile, and amphibian species. 
The problem was that such an impressive forest was drawing 
the attention of logging companies and the rivers and hills of 
the Osa Peninsula were attracting mineral prospectors. Unbe-
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knownst to colonial conquistadors or explorers, the peninsula was 
laden with gold. Prospectors did not start mining there, howev-
er, until the 1930's and more and more people trickled into the 
area by the 1960's. Timber companies cut trees, speculators sold 
land, and squatters followed to set up farms on cleared land or 
commenced panning for gold. To obtain legal title, the precaris-
tas (squatters) needed only to occupy the land for three years. 
Many aggressively defended their territory with guns, creating 
a truly violent mid-twentieth century "frontier" atmosphere on 
the Osa Peninsula. 
By 1972 the situation was dire enough to draw the attention 
of biologists and conservationists. Some environmental studies 
had previously been conducted on the peninsula, but none had rec-
ommended creating a national park. Forest ecologists Leslie Hold-
ridge and Joseph Tosi from the Tropical Science Center (TSC), for 
example, had been hired by a large timber firm in the mid-1950!s 
to develop forest management plans for the area. While they did 
not specifically recommend protected status for the Corcovado re-
gion at the time (there was no forestry law or national park ser-
vice in existence yet), they did see the area's value for tropic-
al research. They opened a TSC biological field station on land 
leased from the timber company in 1964 and shared the facility 
13 
with students from the Organization for Tropical Studies (OTS). 
Others continued investigating the Osa's tropical forests. 
On the recommendation of Christopher Vaughn, who visited the 
area with a group of hikers in 1972, Mario Boza and Alvaro Ugal-
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de from the parks department flew over the peninsula to consider 
it for park status. Ugalde supported the idea, but Boza was not 
in favor due to the population of precaristas living in the re-
gion. But as time moved along, economic interest in Corcovadofs 
trees and land increased. A Japanese firm was looking into log-
ging the area and a U.S. firm was interested in converting the 
subsequently cleared land into citrus groves. Many letters from 
conservationists around the country in support of Corcovado be-
coming a nationally protected area started pouring in to the 
national parks office. When Ugalde assumed the directorship of 
the parks department in the Oduber administration, then, he re-
kindled the idea of a national park in the Osa Peninsula. He 
sent Olof Wessberg (the Swedish orchard farmer who had worked so 
hard to establish the Cabo Blanco Absolute Nature Reserve) on an 
14 
initial park feasibility study. 
Wessberg and his wife Karen Mogensen had been intrigued with 
the Osa Peninsula by the reports they had heard of its tapir pop-
lation and exotic plant species. Mogensen first visited Corcova-
do in June of 1975 and related how beautiful and pristine it was. 
Her husband went later the next month, as Mogensen recalled in an 
interview with David Rains Wallace, overtly to look for a differ-
rent species of avocado tree to add to his orchard at home in the 
Nicoya Peninsula. In an interview with Bill Weinberg, however, 
she admitted that Wessberg was actually on a mission from the 
parks department to survey the area. Either way, Wessberg never 
returned. He was killed by a machete blow to the head by a local 
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man who had accompanied him into the rainforest. The murder was 
shrouded in mystery; the man admitted to the killing, then re-
canted and blamed his father, then later admitted it was he who 
was the murderer. Was it a conspiracy? Mogensen, crushed by the 
news, raced to Corcovado to search for the body and found it. 
She later told Weinberg that the police investigation was inade-
quate and that she believed the murderer was paid to commit the 
crime. She continues to live in a modest home in Montezuma near 
Cabo Blanco where she can commune with the monkeys and coatimun-
dis who she believes "are so much happier than we are . . . [and] 
are much more intelligent." "They can live on the land for thou-
sands of years and leave it beautiful," she philosophized, "[w]e 
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humans come in and in twenty years it is destroyed." 
Less than a month after Wessberg's assassination, President 
Oduber announced his decision to support the creation of a Corco-
vado National Park. "The foreigner who died to defend natural 
resources deserves a monument," Oduber told a La República news-
paper reporter. He compared the crime to the violence in the 
Middle East but suggested that "here we kill people for defend-
16 
ing a tree, an animal, a plant . . . [tjhis is very serious." 
Two months later, to the dismay and disgust of some of his 
cabinet members, President Oduber declared Corcovado a national 
park. Most of the land was government property and the rest was 
acquired from a timber company through a land swap. Oduber prom-
ised full support and funding for the park's development and oper-
ation and offered a start-up grant of over $100,000 from his 
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presidential discretionary fund. The parks department also re-
ceived $10,000 from both the World Wildlife Fund and the Rare 
Animal Relief Effort to be used for Corcovado. Nine guard po-
sitions were created and eleven members of the Rural Guard were 
17 
posted in the newly designated park. 
The problem was that Alvaro Ugalde had estimated that only 
forty-five families would need to be removed from the park and 
that the total cost involved, including he park start-up expen-
ses, would be around $175,000. He soon learned, however, that 
there were more than fifteen hundred precaristas with hundreds of 
head of livestock. Some families had been living in the area for 
over twenty-five years and all squatters, by Costa Rican law, 
had to be reimbursed for "improvements" to the land. And because 
there were no roads into the park, all families and livestock 
would have to be moved by boat or airplane—further increasing 
18 
the cost of the relocation effort. 
Ugalde had to approach President Oduber with the new informa-
tion and that the cost would be more like $1.2 million (ten mil-
lion Costa Rican colones). "I was sure I'd be fired the day I 
had to tell the news to the President," Ugalde said in an inter-
view to two U.S. reporters, "[b]ut he took it calmly, telling me: 
'It may cost ten million colones now, but how much more would it 
19 
cost fifty years from now? We will do it." Ugalde was delight-
ed. "Corcovado has been a real exciting experience," he wrote a 
friend at the U.S. National Park Service a few months after the 
park was declared, "[w]ith the president backing us, we have been 
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able to get from the government two million dollars in six months 
and the old dream is now a reality. . . . I am as optimistic as 
20 
ever.,f 
Braulio Carrillo National Park in the Cordillera Central 
north of San Josa was also the result of a spirited lobbying cam-
paign by members of Costa Rica's scientific and conservationist 
community. Understanding the history of its creation, however, 
requires a brief review of the background involved. The park was 
named after the country's third president from the 18301s who 
worked to create national unity and dreamt of uniting the Carib-
bean and Pacific ports by roads with the population centers in 
the Central Valley. His efforts eventually resulted in a road 
from San José to Puntarenas on the Pacific Coast, but the steep, 
densely forested mountains of the Cordillera Central that sepa-
rate San Jose from the Caribbean lowlands prevented much of a 
road from ever being built there. Transportation for nearly one 
hundred years was limited to a railroad that had been constructed 
in 1882 by a division of the United Fruit Company or an extremely 
slow, curvy road going south from San José to the port town of 
Limdn via Cartage and Turrialba.* 
* Braulio Carrillo first became president when his predecessor, 
José Gallegos, resigned in 1835. He returned to power in 1838, 
declared himself dictator for life, and announced that Costa 
Rica would separate from the United Provinces of Central Ameri-
ca. Four years later he was forced to flee the country and was 
assassinated in El Salvador. While Costa Ricans normally deplore 
dictators, the national park was named in his honor because of 
his efforts to end national isolation by building roads from 
coast to coast. 
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For over a century, then, the need had been great to con-
struct an improved road from the capital to the Caribbean. It 
was not until 1973, however, that serious plans and financing 
materialized for the project. As a part of an effort to bring 
modernized transportation and communications to Costa Rica to 
assist in its economic development in the early to mid-1970's, 
the World Bank agreed to finance a modern highway that would run 
north out of San José and then over the tropical mountain range 
to connect with the town of Guápiles in the Caribbean lowlands. 
But when the Bank hired the Tropical Science Center to conduct 
an environmental impact study on the project's feasibility in 
1975, it learned that a modern road through the mountains could 
open the area to agricultural colonization, cause massive defores-
tation, and severely threaten the variety of ecosystems that are 
found in the region. The study was conducted by Leslie Holdridge 
and Joseph Tosi who also found that massive deforestation in the 
Cordillera Central would result in heavy flooding with disastrous 
effects on the people and their economy in the Caribbean lowlands 
and would destroy the very highway being built. The TSC study, 
then, only approved the highway project with the condition that a 
conservation unit be declared to protect the forest surrounding 
21 
the proposed road. 
With Alvaro Ugalde as its director in those years, the park 
service lobbied to declare a region far greater than just the 
area surrounding the highway to become what is today Braulio 
Carrillo National Park. Ugalde and his department received the 
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welcome support of conservation groups around the country. One 
of the groups that was the most active on the issue and that 
worked to make sure conservation measures were implemented during 
the road's construction was the Colegio de Biólogos (Biologists' 
Association). UCR biologist Pedro Ledn, a member of that organi-
zation who was particularly involved on the cause, claimed that 
Braulio Carrillo was "a classic example" of a successful "compro-
mise." He remembered that "there was a lot of concern and orga-
nized pressure from all sorts of groups about the road." He 
wrote letters to government officials on behalf of the Associ-
ation saying that "unless a park was created along the road, 
there wasn't going to be a road—that erosion would destroy it." 
President Daniel Oduber agreed and signed an executive decree 
to declare the area a national park in 1977. The Legislative 
Assembly approved the measure a year later (with some modifica-
tions), and thus created an 80,000 acre park, most of which is 
non-accessible wilderness. Gerardo Budowski once said that 
"Braulio Carrillo may be one of the most interesting parks in 
the world, totally unknown even though a half hour away from a 
big city." The park had nearly 4,000 visitors its first year 
of operation. The San Jose-Guapiles Highway was completed in 
22 
1987—nine years after the park declaration. 
To assist in such an expanded parks program Oduber worked 
to increase the parks department budget from $600,000 in 1976 to 
$1,750,000 in 1978. The department's staff tripled (it doubled 
in 1977 alone) and included four hundred employees by the end of 
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Oduber fs term. The president assisted conservation efforts in 
other ways also. He declared 1977 as the "Year of Natural Re-
sources." He issued decrees providing legal protection to many 
endangered species including quetzals, macaws, manatees, tapirs, 
jaguars, ocelots, and other felids, birds, and reptiles. He 
assisted in acquiring international financial assistance for con-
servation projects. The U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), for example, loaned the government of Costa Rica $1.2 
million for a five year management plan for Braulio Carrillo 
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National Park. Smaller amounts came in from Philadelphia Conser-
vationists, Inc. (on whose board Theodore Roosevelt III was an in-
fluential member), The Nature Conservancy, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC), and the Rockefeller Foundation. The 
NRDC's funds were to be used specifically for researching sus-
tainable development and deforestation issues. The University of 
Michigan School of Natural Resources donated money to the Nation-
al Parks Fund and the London-based World Pheasant Association was 
interested in protecting currasow and chachalaca habitat in Cor-
24 
covado. 
Alvaro Ugalde learned that not all of the international con-
servation groups' funds came easily. The Nature Conservancy's 
international office, for example, sent a representative to Costa 
Rica in 1 977 who expected five-star service. In a letter to Ugal-
de after her visit, Sandee Garihan wrote that "there should have 
been a well-organized itinerary for me to see most of the country 
as possible." She went on to complain that she had to find even-
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ing entertainment and the theatre by herself in San José. And 
she advocated keeping an airstrip in Corcovado (a decision that 
Ugalde and the parks department had been struggling with) so that 
people like her on tight international schedules could enjoy a 
visit to even the remotest of areas. 
In a most telling letter of response, Ugalde not only ad-
dressed Garihan's concerns, but provided a rare glimpse into his 
insights that were compounded by the hectic schedule he was 
forced to keep. He opened the letter by apologizing for the de-
lay of his response—"due to the amount of work and lack of 
help" and continued: 
lately I have had hardly any time of my own . . . Some-
times I feel very tired, but unless I have been brain-
washed, I believe we don't have much time in this mad 
race against destruction. There are not many more indi-
viduals in Costa Rica working in this field, therefore I 
cannot just simply send everything to hell . . . Although 
we make a lot of mistakes, I just hope that what I am 
doing is the right thing and not just a waste of time. 
Several months later Garihan replied to Ugalde's heartfelt mes-
sage, apologizing that it took her so long to write, but that 
after her trip to Costa Rica she had to take a one week vacation 
in Tampa (where she "loved the theatre") to recuperate from Costa 
Rica and that she had just returned from "a six week jaunt on the 
French-Italian Riviera." (25) 
The SPN 
One of the most important changes that occurred during the 
Oduber years was in the status of the National Parks Department. 
First, in 1975 the department within the General Forestry Direc-
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torate (DGF) was elevated from its "subdirectorate" to a "general 
directorate" with greater individual autonomy. Then in 1977 
with the Legislative Assembly's approval of the National Parks 
Act, it was completely separated from the DGF and became the 
National Park Service (Servicio de Parques Nacionales, SPN)—its 
own division within the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG). The 
change of status was more than just bureaucratic shuffling; it 
established the legal framework for the SPN's work and provided 
the freedom for the SPN to expropriate land for parks. The Act 
specifically made it illegal for any part of a national park to 
be removed from park status except by legislative decree. It 
allowed the SPN to set entrance fees, to make recommendations for 
new parks, to define park regulations, and generally to expand 
26 
its services with fewer hierarchical hurdles to surpass. It was 
a change that Mario Boza and Alvaro Ugalde (who retained his job 
as head of the newly named SPN) had been advocating for over five 
years and one that took a great deal of hard work to pass. 
Lobbying for a more autonomous parks department within MAG 
began in 1972 when Mario Boza sent a draft "Creacio'n del Servicio 
Nacional de Parques" proposal to the Legislative Assembly. The 
introduction of the draft legislation outlined how a separate 
parks service with its own budget could better promote recreation 
and tourism, the conservation of nature, scientific research, 
public education, the preservation of historic and archaeological 
areas, and the protection of watersheds and indigenous reserves. 
The proposal was sent to committee, specifically the Commission 
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on Social Affairs, where it was bantered around until 1977. 
Edwin Muñoz Mora, chairman of the Commission on Social Af-
fairs, contacted Mario Boza in the summer of 1972 and requested 
more information on why the parks department wanted to be a 
separate entity. Boza responded in a letter that detailed simi-
lar reasons that were outlined in the draft proposal's introduc-
tion and explained that meeting the demands of the public as well 
as those of the urgency of conservation could be better met with 
an autonomous department. He also lobbied other members of the 
Assembly by sending them brochures about national parks and made 
sure each member was personally invited to the grand opening of 
Poás Volcano in August of 1972 so that they could witness first-
28 
hand the work of the new program. 
Lobbying both for and against the proposal occurred during 
the early 1970's when the bill was in committee. The Associa-
tion of Costa Rican Industries opposed the measure, explaining 
in a letter to Diputado Muñoz that a separate national parks 
division would be "too ambitious for Costa Rica" and would be 
too expensive. Members of that organization saw the proposal as 
a new way to levy unnecessary taxes on businesses and considered 
Costa Rica's ratification of the International Convention for the 
Protection of Flora and Fauna to be sufficient for wildlife con-
servation. Groups in support of the measure included the Associ-
ation of Biology Students who wrote Munoz urging his committee to 
approve the bill and send it to the Assembly as a whole. "The 
richness of our wildlife/' one letter from the group began, "is 
converting itself into a myth." It went on to suggest that a 
more powerful parks division would be able to conserve more effic-
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iently the country's natural resources. 
One of the most important proponents of the National Parks 
Act was none other than Karen Olsen de Figueres whose husband was 
still President of Costa Rica when the bill was first under con-
sideration. In fact, as Mario Boza explained in a testimony to 
the Commission on Social Affairs in November of 1973, it was Mrs. 
Figueres who was one of the project's originators. She had sup-
ported Boza and his proposal from the beginning and worked to 
lobby various diputados for its approval. Boza also explained to 
the commission that such problems as night poaching and an insuf-
ficient number of park guards were reasons that Doña Karen and 
others saw the need for granting the parks service more legal au-
30 
thority and funds with which to protect the parks and reserves. 
The legal authority of the new act, according to former park 
service attorney Ana María Tato, was one of its most important 
features. "The importance of all of [the act's] jurisdictional 
regulations," Tato wrote, is that "present and future genera-
tions will obtain an incalcuable benefit." The act made very 
clear fifteen prohibitions for visitors and property owners in 
and around the parks that would serve as the legal base for park 
acquisition and land expropriations. All of the property and ex-
propriation guidelines, she explained, advance the "national park 
objectives" and represent a legal "necessity" as opposed to arbi-
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trary decisions [made by different] administrations." 
In late 1974 the commission studying the proposal amended it 
to move the SPN out of MAG and into the Ministry of Culture, 
Youth, and Sports. Members evidently felt like there would be 
less competition for management of natural resources if the parks 
division were transferred to an entirely different ministry. The 
new version of the proposal was eventually sent to the Assembly 
as a whole, but it did not come up for a vote for two more years. 
The amended bill named the parks service the Directorate of 
National Parks and Monuments under the Ministry of Culture and 
did not give it the status it would have had as a separate divis-
ion of the Ministry of Agriculture. It passed the Legislative 
Assembly in late 1976 but was vetoed by President Oduber. The 
Assembly sent the bill back to committee. In May of 1977 the 
Commission on Social Affairs called on parks director Alvaro 
Ugalde to testify. In his statement, Ugalde recited why he 
agreed with Oduber's veto (it would not have given the SPN the 
funds, independence, or legal authority it needed) and urged the 
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members to restore the bill to its original wording. 
After little debate back in committee, the Commission acted 
on Ugalde's request and sent a revised bill to the Assembly. Op-
position there continued to center on the fear that the new direc-
torate would increase taxes. But it did finally win approval in 
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August of 1977 and President Oduber signed it into law. The new 
SPN seemed to function better on its own accord within MAG and 
lasted there for nine years. In 1986 it was transferred to a 
newly-created Ministry of Natural Resources (MIRENEM) but re-
tained its "directorate" status. In 1994 MIRENEM was changed to 
the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) and the SPN was 
dissolved. In its place is the National System of Conservation 
Areas (SINAC) which manages national forests, parks, monuments, 
and biological reserves. 
Designating new parks and having the active support of the 
President for a more independent and better financed park ser-
vice, however, did not solve all of Ugalde's problems. In 1975, 
for example, trouble brewed when the parks department announced 
plans to expand Cahuita National Monument on Costa Rica's south-
ernmost Caribbean coast. Residents there were upset to learn 
that the government was planning to expropriate more land in the 
area to develop Cahuita into a national park. They thought that 
"national park" designation would convert their small town into 
an Acapulco-style beach resort and hotel complex and bring with 
it the attendant social problems caused by tourist zones. Local 
farmers and fishermen opposed the plan thinking it would infringe 
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on their livelihoods. 
Opposition to the parks department culminated at a public 
hearing held in the town of Cahuita. Ugalde attended the meeting 
to represent his department and argue for the development of the 
national park, but, as he later related to reporters Robert and 
Patricia Cahn, "it seemed like I was the only defender." Because 
residents of this part of Costa Rica are mainly black, English-
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speaking caribeños, however, Ugalde switched to English during 
his presentation which greatly aided his cause. "[Ajfter I ex-
plained to [the] Cahuitans that the real threat came from the 
land developers and wealthy people from San Josa who wanted 
beach-front vacation homes or land for speculation," Ugalde re-
called, "the local people realized that the park would give the 
best protection to their way of life." When the people at the 
town meeting voted, the result was a near unanimous decision to 
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support the park. 
News of Costa Rica's park creations and expansions started 
attracting foreign visitors in the mid- to late 1970's. In 1978 
(President Oduber's last year in office) over 34,000 foreigners 
visited the national parks and reserves. While that figure repre-
sents only slightly less than ten percent of the total park visi-
tation numbers (n = 357,000), it does signal the start of a 
trend. Many foreigners, especially those from the United States, 
wrote (amazingly!) directly to park service chief Alvaro Ugalde 
to request information and maps of different protected areas. A 
thick file of such letters exists from 1976-77 in SPN records at 
the National Archives. Most of the requests (paraphrased here) 
began with "I have recently read (or heard) that . . . . Can you 
please send . . . ." Many even asked what type of gear they 
should bring for certain areas of the country for different times 
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of the year. Ugalde responded to every request. 
Mario Boza, Alvaro Ugalde, President Oduber, and other park 
proponents of course were pushing tourism as an economic benefit 
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of national park development, but sometimes foreigners got the 
wrong idea about conservation in Costa Rica. An article written 
by Doris Deakin for The Washingtonian in early 1977, for exam-
ple, praised Costa Rica as "a great escape to go hunting." When 
Ugalde saw a copy of the article he was enraged. He penned a 
no-nonsense, strongly worded letter to the paper's editor-in-
chief explaining how the park service was having enough trouble 
as it was with poaching and trying to restore populations of 
endangered species without that paper blabbing that the country 
was a haven for hunters. He related how conservation areas in 
Costa Rica were intended for the free transfer of biological 
properties and were to be used for scientific research or to be 
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enjoyed for their scenic and natural values. 
In fact, other relations with the United States started to 
sour somewhat in the mid-1970's. Although Mario Boza had enjoyed 
a strong working relationship with the U.S. National Park Ser-
vice's Division of International Affairs during his time as parks 
chief, Ugalde's experience with the USNPS was less productive, 
gain without mincing words, Ugalde wrote one staff member of 
that division in the spring of 1976 that "it would be important 
to see some more interest in Latin America from the U.S. Nation-
nal Park Service; up to now, relations have been rather cool." 
He did not specify exactly what he wanted from the USNPS in that 
particular letter, but three months later he reiterated his con-
cern directly to the head of the Division of International Af-
fairs, Robert C. Milne, saying, "I look forward to warmer rela-
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tions between us." 
Ugalde was frustrated in those years because despite the des-
ignation of more national parks in Costa Rica, deforestation in 
unprotected areas was causing grave environmental dangers. In a 
report to the Legislative Assembly in early 1976 he warned that 
the "situation is extremely critical"—that Costa Rica was in a 
"state of true ecological catastrophe." He explained that "enor-
mous clear-cuts" were damaging "important watersheds" and that ex-
tensive forest fires were occurring on a daily basis. He pointed 
out that although forest destruction threatened the survival of 
wildlife, it also created severe problems for humans by decreas-
ing hydropower potential. To stem this tide, the government con-
ducted studies to establish more forest reserves (apart from na-
tional parks). Two hundred twenty-five thousand acres were set 
aside as reserves, but, as Luis Fournier has written, "the majori-
ty of these in reality were not legal or physically consolidated" 
and thus were not protected from cuts by loggers or farmers. 
Mario Boza explained in an interview with David Rains Wallace 
that the problem was that the forest reserves were managed by 
different guidelines. "It's a big mistake to try to manage a 
forest that doesn't belong to you," he said, "[p]arks have worked 
b e c a u s e we [SPN] own them, and because the Park Service has a 
clear mandate to protect land, while the Forest Service has a lot 
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of other responsibilites." 
In another attempt to address the forestry crisis Costa Rica 
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hosted a variety of conferences and symposia during the Oduber 
years to seek ideas and solutions to the problem. In April of 
1974 the Ministry of Agriculture sponsored the First National Con-
gress on the Conservation of Renewable Natural Resourcs. Budding 
conservationists like Adelaida Chaverri, Alfonso Mata, and Sergio 
Salas (whom Mario Boza had sent on the national parks tour of the 
United States a few years earlier) were active participants. Mem-
bers of the Congress resolved, among other things, that increased 
education and distribution of information on the harms of forest 
(and other natural resources) abuse would be the most effective 
cure to the environmental problem. 
On a regional, international level two other important con-
servation conferences took place in Costa Rica in 1974. The 
first was promoted by the United Nations to involve Costa Rica in 
the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere (MAB) Program as a way of pre-
serving forest resources. A committee of dedicated conservation-
ists including Mario Boza, Gerardo Budowski, Luis Fournier, Rodri-
go Zeledón, Rolando Mendoza, and others formed to consider Costa 
Rica's role in the UNESCO program. Their work culminated in the 
early 1980's and 90 !s with the creation of La Amistad Inter-
national Park (connected with Panama) and the designation of an 
amplified extention of Braulio Carrillo National Park as MAB re-
serves. In December of 1974 Costa Rica hosted the Central Ameri-
can Meeting on Management of Natural and Cultural Resources. Cos-
ta Rica's delegates included Gerardo Budowski, Adelaida Chaverri, 
and Christopher Vaughn. A variety of national and international 
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conservation organizations participated at the event and dis-
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cussed ways to curb deforestation and protect natural resources. 
A more significant conference convened in November of 1976 
that looked broadly ahead at a variety of important cultural and 
social issues—including the Costa Rican environment. The event, 
the Symposium on Costa Rica in the Year 2000, was sponsored by 
the government's Office of Planning and Economic Policy to gather 
leaders together to present papers and to have round table discus-
sions. President Daniel Oduber addressed the forum and empha-
sized the need to protect natural resources for future genera-
tions. In a presentation entitled "Natural Resources," Jorge 
Manuel Dengo, a former Vice President of Costa Rica, argued that 
Ticos were "living for the day and without much worry for what's 
coming . . . we show very little concern for the future conse-
quences of our present actions." He complained that legislation 
regarding mining, forests, water resources, wildlife, and other 
environmental matters was "disperse" and "passive" and did not 
"follow a direct policy that linked exploitation of natural re-
sources with the processes of economic development . . . for the 
potential wealth of the country." He concluded that "the impacts 
that have been caused to the biosphere and to human societies" 
could only be corrected by a "well directed policy to balance 
economic development with the rational management of resources in 
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one ecological-environmental-social system." 
While Dengo's stance was an obvious voice for strong, cen-
tralized authority for natural resource protection and was overt-
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ly cloaked in a utilitarian, multiple-use philosophy, other par-
ticipants at a round table discussion on environmental concerns 
expressed the need for more scientific knowledge on the subject 
and the need for stronger conservation measures. Rodrigo Zele-
ddn (a noted parasitologist and conservationist) argued that more 
investment be put into human resources for ecological investiga-
tions. Anthropologist Maria Eugenia Bozzoli asserted that the 
expanding cattle industry was thwarting conservation measures and 
that any national economic benefits gained from export oriented 
livestock production would soon be surpassed by the ecological 
disadvantages it caused. Mario Boza agreed and forecast that the 
only forested areas existing in the nation by the year 2000 would 
be those in national parks. He spoke very strongly in favor of 
increased environmental education as a way to sidestep the other-
wise imminent scenario. Luis Fournier approached the dilemma by 
suggesting that balance could be achieved between conservation 
and economic development but not without a good deal more re-
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search on the interconnections first. 
It was also in 1976 that the Consultative Commission on Natu-
ral Resources was formed to study conservation issues and to for-
mulate a plan of action for the long range welfare of Costa 
Rica's forests. Composed of Alvaro Ugalde (who took a six month 
leave of absence as head of the national parks office to be the 
commission's technical coordinator), Mario Boza (an advisor to 
Ugalde and the commission), Rodrigo Zeleddh and Pedro Lec5n (biolo-
gists from the University of Costa Rica), Oscar Arias (an econo-
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mist and future President of Costa Rica), and others, the commis-
sion proposed establishing the Instituto de Recursos Naturales y 
Conservación Ambiental (INDERENA). In a 129-page bill prepared 
for the Legislative Assembly, the commission granted INDERENA a 
broad range of duties and powers that would centralize the gov-
ernment's authority in preserving forests. The document outlined 
how INDERENA would have the power to formulate national policy on 
natural resources and environmental conservation, supervise 
policy enforcements, plan specific national forestry programs, 
promote the study and research of conservation issues, create and 
execute a National Plan for the Protection of the Environment, 
and continue to propose laws to the Legislative Assembly among 
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other responsibilities. 
President Oduber supported INDERENA but it was Alvaro Ugal-
de 's job to promote it to the Legislative Assembly. In a report 
to the diputados urging their approval, Ugalde wrote that Costa 
Rica was suffering from "galloping deforestation." "The work we 
have in front of us is titanic," Ugalde admitted, and suggested 
that INDERENA would be "the best solution for the environmental 
problems of the country." And as if anticipating that the legis-
lators would question why yet another government agency was need-
ed, Ugalde explained that although the current institutions were 
good, their work was not enough to meet the current environmental 
crises. The General Forestry Directorate (DGF) within the Minis-
try of Agriculture, for instance, was "unable to complete its 
functions," Ugalde contended in his usual manner of not beating 
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around the bush, because it lacked "resources, organization, and 
power." Therefore, because the DGF was "a very small organiza-
tion for a very large task," it was necessary to create "a su-
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perior institution"—or, if you will, to do the INDERENA. 
Despite Ugalde's persuasive ways and President Oduber's en-
dorsement, INDERENA did not survive the Legislative Assembly. 
Finances, disagreement on the necessity of establishing a new 
agency, and perhaps the diputados' lack of sensing the gravity 
of deforestation problems in the mid-1970's, defeated the pro-
posed bill. In a letter to a USNPS official in the United 
States, Ugalde expressed his disappointment and related how 
"the [INDERENA] commission, as it was expected, never met again." 
Ugalde returned to his post at the national parks headquarters 
"to give the battle for Corcovado, the familiar new national park 
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in the Osa Peninsula" and to deal with other park concerns. For-
est reserves (or national forests) remained in the domain of the 
DGF until the agency reorganizations of the mid-1990's (SINAC). 
For his part in vitally assisting conservation efforts and 
specifically for his determination to decree Corcovado National 
Park in the face of so many odds, President Daniel Oduber re-
ceived the coveted Albert Schweitzer Award from the World Wild-
life Fund in 1976. A letter to Oduber from Rhena Schweitzer 
Miller announced his selection for the award and many people and 
conservation groups from all over the world sent letters of con-
gratulations. He also was the recipient of the New York Botani-
1 Garden's 1977 Green World Award for his "outstanding leader-
ca 
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ship in preservation and protection of the natural environment." 
In presenting the award to him, Howard Irwin, president of that 
organization, said that Oduber had "displayed great courage" in 
working to create Corcovado National Park and that "his bold 
action is not only to the credit of Costa Rica, but should serve 
to inspire leaders of other countries to follow suit." While in 
New York accepting the honor, Oduber also addressed the United 
Nations and spoke against international military spending, the 
absence of which in Costa Rica helped to ensure funds for conser-
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vation and social programs. 
Nine new protected areas (nearly 350,000 acres of land) were 
added to the Costa Rican national park system during Oduber's 
term in office. In a 1986 interview with Andrew Reding, the 
former president reminisced about his role in conservation: 
As a socialist (I am a social democrat), I believe 
nature's beauty is for everyone to enjoy, not just 
a few. I have emphasized conservation in order to 
afford future generations of Costa Ricans the pleas-
ure of enjoying the nature I enjoyed as a child and 
adolescent. To this end, I labored to set aside not 
only national parks but also forest preserves and 
wildlife refuges all across the country. . . . It is 
of global interest to defend all the treasures we 
have. . . . So mine is a global conception of the 
role of Costa Rica in the world. We're very small, 
but we can be an example, like Switzerland, Austria, 
and the Scandinavian countries, of a society that 
struggles for peace, justice, and beauty. (47) 
Alvaro Ugalde perhaps best summed up the President's support when 
he said that Oduber "became aware that conservation could be a 
very good political issue." "He never said stupid things about 
conservation," Ugalde continued," [y]ou heard other politicians 
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say things that didn't make sense, but Oduber always made sense." 
When Oduberfs term of office was over in 1978, however, many 
people wondered if harmony between conservationists and the of-
fice of the President would be a thing of the past. The new 
President, Rodrigo Carazo Odio who represented a coalition of 
opposition political parties, survived a vicious election cam-
paign and was soon to face an economic crisis that would test 
conservation policy and other social services to their very core. 
But, as we shall see, environmentalists' worries about his admini-
stration would be ill-conceived. David Rains Wallace goes so far 
as to suggest (wrongly) that Carazo "didn't share Oduber's en-
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thusiasm for conservation." How in fact conservation measures 
dramatically increased during a time of severe economic crisis 
during the Carazo years warrants attention here. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONSERVATION THROUGH CRISIS 
No la vimos como una tragedia; la vimos como un desafio. 
(We didn't see it as a tragedy; we saw it as a challenge.) 
- Alvaro Ugalde (1) 
"Obstacles Became Opportunities:" The Economic Crisis and the 
Carazo Administration 
The Costa Rican national park system was in its first decade 
of existence when it faced serious cutbacks and restrictions due 
to the severe economic crisis that hit the country in 1979. Char-
acteristic of most of the Latin American world, Costa Rica went 
into deep financial debt as a result of overextended loans from 
international banks. Unable to service the notes, Costa Rica 
soon became one of the seventeen most highly indebted nations of 
2 
the world and had the highest per capita debt in Latin America. 
Much of the problem had to do with factors outside of Costa Rica 
due to the international economic recession of 1979 that was par-
tially a result of dramatic increases in oil prices. The reces-
sion spurred high interest rates in the world capital market and 
a decrease in prices for traditional products that Costa Rica had 
to offer. One study explained this scenario as "low aggregate 
value of national agricultural exports in contrast to high aggre-
gate value of imported products." The wars in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador during this same time period weakened the Central Ameri-
3 
can Common Market which further hurt Costa Rican trade. 
By 1985 the external debt amounted to $3.8 billion (equal to 
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$1,500 per person in Costa Rica) and was the largest per capita 
debt in the developing world. For Costa Ricans this translated 
into spiralling inflation—hovering around forty-eight percent in 
1980-82, a doubling of unemployment—from 4.3 percent in 1979 to 
8.7 percent in 1982, austerity measures, and federal spending 
cuts. Especially hard hit were the budgets of environmental 
management agencies like the General Forestry Directorate (DGF) 
4 
and the National Park Service (SPN). 
Despite budget cutbacks, however, these years were also 
marked by a significant increase in conservation efforts and 
national park and equivalent reserve designations. From 1978 
to 1982, the years of the administration of President Rodrigo 
Carazo, the amount of land protected by law in Costa Rica in-
creased by nearly 583,000 acres or 4.7 percent. At the beginning 
of Carazo's term there were aproximately 451,000 acres of land 
designated as conservation areas (or 3.5 percent of the country's 
land mass) and by the end of the term there were approximately 
5 
1,033,000 acres (or 8.3 percent of the country). Some of the 
new areas designated included Palo Verde, Isla del Coco, and 
La Amistad national parks, and Isla Bolaños National Wildlife 
Refuge. Significant expansions of Guayabo, Corcovado, Manuel 
Antonio, Santa Rosa, Tortuguero, and Braulio Carrillo national 
6 
parks also were decreed by President Carazo. 
"Keeping a clear vision . . . and a conception of priori-
ties" was how the former President described his role in conser-
vation through crisis in an interview conducted for research on 
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this chapter. These priorities originated early in his life when 
he was raised for much of his childhood in a rural, agricultural 
setting in the mountainous area near Turrialba. It was there 
that Carazo gained an early appreciation for the land and nature, 
as he has written in his memoirs, M[t]he rural environment shaped 
my vocation, my love for family, for the Homeland, and for a 
great interest in the values of that Costa Rica . . . for all of 
my life.11 Likewise he has maintained a religious belief in the 
proper stewardship of the land: 
Insofar as our faith teaches us that man was made 
in the image and likeness of God, we know that the 
Creator gave us an important responsibility: to take 
Figure 1: President Rodrigo Carazo Odio 
(source: Rodrigo Carazo, Tiempo v marcha [San José: 
Editorial UNED, 1989]) 
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care of that environment so wisely prepared as our 
home. Therefore, man's attitude toward nature should 
be characterized by respect towards all forms of life 
and the balance between them. (8) 
In his term as President during the economic crisis, then, 
Carazo acted on the values he had learned earlier in life. "I 
had the fortune that my childhood and youth took place in an en-
vironment of hard work, poverty, and austerity," he reflected in 
his memoirs, conditions that "forged habits in my years as a 
child that I still appreciate and want to conserve." He also 
claimed that his interest in conserving forests stemmed from an 
Arbor Day experience he had as a college student at the Universi-
ty of Costa Rica. For Carazo, saving as many of Costa Rica's 
natural resources as possible was a means to promote a long-range 
economic savings for the country. Thus, dealing with the economy 
(he was an economist by profession) but wanting to continue the 
government's active commitment to conservation (by then only a 
ten-year old program), meant taking strong leadership in promot-
ing new parks and making thoughtful appointments to key conserva-
tion positions. To the surprise and delight of those who won-
dered if Carazo would continue the conservation momentum of the 
Oduber administration, Carazo named Mario Boza his Advisor on 
Natural Resources and retained Alvaro Ugalde as head of the 
National Parks Service. He also appointed Hernán Fonseca as 
Minister of Agriculture who generally supported the parks pro-
gram. Promoting conservation during the economic crisis also 
meant working closely with private conservation organizations 
189 
(f,the environmental groups greatly aided my work"), and recruit-
9 
ing financial assistance. 
Finances in Costa Rica were definitely short. Carazo was 
the first Latin American president to suspend payments on inter-
national loans. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) thereupon 
imposed strict austerity measures on Costa Rica and urged quick 
development of non-traditional crops to market abroad. Choosing 
"to defend the honor of Costa Rica" and not wanting to impoverish 
the citizens of his country, as one former staffer put it, Carazo 
kicked the IMF out of Costa Rica and promised not to devaluate 
the colon.* In his own words, Carazo emphasized that "there is 
no internal problem or crisis that should serve as an excuse for 
a government to submit to impositions made from abroad . . . 
[and] for this we broke with the IMF and decided to stop all pay-
ments on interests and amortizations of the external debt." 
Fighting for "the respect of our national sovereignty," Carazo 
10 
was the only president to boot the IMF from his or her country. 
But although exports were higher during the Carazo years than 
those of his predecessor (Daniel Oduber)—accounted for by such 
new crops as pineapples which enjoyed robust external demand; and 
personal savings, exports, and GNP were all higher than the years 
of his successor (Luis Alberto Monge)—the country did suffer 
from a weak economy. Internationally renowned tropical biologist 
Thomas Lovejoy (who worked with Costa Rican conservationists dur-
* Holding out for more than a year, he was forced to devaluate 
in 1980. 
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ing the crisis), however, compared this period to the Great De-
pression in the United States, not only for its financial stress, 
11 
but also for "recognizing the urgency of conservation projects." 
The national park system had its work cut out for it. James 
Barborak, a national parks planning consultant from the United 
States who was hired by the SPN to work in Costa Rica in the 
late 1970's and early 80's, posited that the country's economic 
crisis presented the SPN's greatest challenge to date: "justify-
ing before the public and the legislative powers that more ex-
penses were necessary for acquiring, managing, and administering 
the areas in its care." José Rafael Mora, the director of Funda-
ción Parques Nacionales (the National Parks Foundation) which was 
created to help raise and distribute conservation funds, agreed 
and wrote in a letter to one potential donor that "effective man-
agement of existing areas is sometimes as tough a problem as the 
creation of new ones." And Alvaro Ugalde mentioned in an inter-
view that it was fortunate that many parks were already in exis-
tence before the crisis, but to manage them and create new ones 
12 
during this period was to "transform crisis into opportunity." 
The Carazo government did what it could to continue funding 
the parks program. But while the administration's "enthusiastic 
support for financing the SNP" was immeasurably helpful, as Luis 
Fournier noted, inflation reduced the purchasing power of the al-
ready cut budgets. One park official recalled that 
we lost eighty percent of the buying power of the 
rest of the budget between 1980 and 1986. After 
1980 the first new car that the Park Service was 
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able to buy was in 1989. . . . There wasn't money 
even to keep up the old cars, and if they were 
running, there was no money for fuel, and if "there 
was fuel, there was no money to pay a per diem 
for the driver to go anywhere. It was really 
hard to do anything. The Park Service went back 
to the policies of the first years, trying to 
offer basic protection to the parks. . . . Some 
relatively sophisticated public use programs, 
especially at Poás Volcano, just were abandoned. 
There was no way the Park Service could keep the 
same level of attention to visitors. . . . The 
increase in responsibility was also qualitative 
because under more severe economic conditions 
there was more pressure on the parks. (13) 
The opportunity that came, then, according to Ugalde, was 
14 
"to look for money in other places." A fundraising campaign the 
likes of which the Costa Rican conservationist community had 
never before witnessed was launched. Nationally, members of 
Costa Rican environmental groups solicited contributions, donated 
time, and did volunteer work in the parks. Internationally, many 
different governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) 
were tapped for funds and support. A 1979 loan for $5.5 million 
from U.S. AID, for example, was an instrumental source of funds 
that was targeted to be used for environmental education, soil 
conservation, reforestation projects, and for forestry and other 
natural resources management. Similar aid programs in other 
countries, i.e. CIDA in Canada, SIDA in Sweden, FINNIDA in Fin-
land, DANIDA in Denmark, NORAD in Norway, GTZ in Germany, and 
ODA in Great Britain have worked with Costa Rica and made loans 
15 
earmarked for conservation causes. 
Responses to grant requests from NGO's were equally success-
ful and helpful. Twenty-six organizations from around the world, 
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including ones from the United States, Great Britain, Switzer-
land, and Austria, helped with financial and technical assis-
tance. Groups such as the Sierra Club, Rare Animal Relief Effort 
(RARE), Caribbean Conservation Corporation, New York Zoological 
Society, Philadelphia Conservationsts Inc., World Wildlife Fund, 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
The Nature Conservancy, and others all financially supported the 
parks program in Costa Rica during the crisis years. And grant 
supporting organizations like the Tinker Foundation and the 
16. 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund made generous contributions. 
As a legal way to monitor these loans and contributions, 
Mario Boza, soon into his new position as presidential advisor on 
natural resources, believed that a non-profit organization was 
needed. With the help of government attorneys, he established 
Fundación Parques Nacionales (FPN) in 1979 as a "private entity 
with public utility" making it a quasi-governmental body to be 
funded by contributions and corporate grants. The FPNf s bylaws 
describe the organization's objectives: "to promote the creation, 
protection, and general development of national parks and equiva-
lent reserves, as well as to promote and develop activities in 
the field of environmental education and scientific research as 
it applies to conservation." It also set out to seek grants and 
to solicit and channel major contributions (corporate or pri-
vate) for specific conservation causes. Its first board of trus-
tees included Boza (president), Alvaro Ugalde, SPN Assistant 
Director Jose Maria Rodriguez, and UCR biologists Luis Diego 
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Gdmez (vice president) and Pedro Leon. The board hired José 
Rafael "Rafa" Mora as its first executive director and, by 1982, 
four other employees. (It had grown to have a staff of twenty-
five by 1986.) The first donation came in 1981 from the Carib-
17 
bean Conservation Corporation for 300,000 colones ($6,200). 
The FPN board members learned to be quite creative, direct, 
and specific in their fundraising appeals. The Animal Research 
and Conservation Center of the Bronx Zoo, for example, contrib-
uted $30,000 to help the FPN purchase photographic equipment for 
an environmental education project in early 1982. A letter from 
that organization mentioned that "we had quite a visit with Mario 
[Boza] last week. . . . [He's] quite an ambassador." In an FPN 
update in June of the same year, Rafa Mora reported that the 
World Wildlife Fund had donated over $1,100 for the construction 
of a new guard station on the east side of Corcovado National 
Park, the Caribbean Conservation Corporation had given $9,000 
for Santa Rosa National Park, a private donor had sent $4,125 
for vehicle restoration and various projects at Tortuguero, and 
even the Minnesota Nature Conservancy had contributed $150 for 
1 8 
miscellaneous office equipment. 
Mora had learned that requesting funds for specific causes 
seemed to be a successful strategy in professional fundraising. 
In early 1982 he wrote to the World Wildlife Fund in Washington, 
D.C., asking specifically for a $12,000 grant to help "start up" 
the newly-designated La Amistad National Park (building materi-
als, etc.) and $5,000 for "urgent equipment needs" in other 
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parks. In a grant proposal to NORAD (the government of Norway's 
aid assistance organization), Mora detailed exact needs and 
listed specific characteristics of each of the parks for which 
he was requesting assistance. Corcovado, he wrote, was "the 
largest piece of tropical rainforest under protection in the West-
ern Hemisphere;" Braulio Carrillo was "one of the areas of great-
est endemism in Central America;" Tortuguero was "the only area 
south of Florida protected for breeding manatee populations (and 
the only [such] area in Costa Rica;" and Palo Verde was "the only 
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area known in Costa Rica with freshwater sponges." 
The FPN board also implemented other innovative ideas to 
raise funds. They sold brochures, books, and t-shirts at nation-
al park visitor centers—especially at the most visited park, 
Poás Volcano. They cleared a profit of over 74,000 colones (ap-
proximately $1,525) from such sales in 1981. They also consid-
ered the idea of creating an "Honorary Members" category for the 
FPN as a way of honoring individuals who had played such a strong 
and helpful role in conservation and as a way to show a broader 
range of support. People on the list included Daniel Oduber, 
Karen Olsen de Figueres, Gerardo Budowski, Kenton R. Miller, 
Leslie Holdridge, Archie Carr, Alexander Skutch, Thomas Lovejoy, 
Dan Janzen, Rodrigo Zeledón, and Jaques Cousteau and other promi-
20 
nent leaders of international conservation organizations. 
What the fundraising was eventually going for, of course, 
was the maintenance, upgrading, and expansion of the national 
park system. President Carazo had made clear that "one of the 
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principal objectives of this administration was the completion 
and consolidation of the wilderness [sic] areas of Costa Rica." 
To Donald Stone, the director of the Organization for Tropical 
Studies (OTS), he explained that his work to expand the park sys-
tem would "give one more step to the best possible conservation 
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of our living resources." His first move as President to begin 
accomplishing these goals was to decree Isla del Coco National 
Park in June of 1978. The park consists of the entire 6,000 acre 
Isla del Coco—an isolated volcanic island in the Pacific Ocean 
three hundred miles off of Costa Rica's west coast. It is in 
many ways similar to Ecuador's Galápagos Islands (and often is 
called Costa Rica's Galapagos) in that it is far from the main-
land country, is home to 140 endemic species of flora and fauna 
that evolved in isolation, is noted for its rather tame animal 
life due to an absence of natural predators, and is difficult and 
expensive to get to. It is also characterized by lush premontane 
rainforests and palm groves* and is an important rookery for 
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dozens of shorebird species. Coral reefs grace its shores. 
Carazo mentioned in an interview that he was particularly 
happy to have been able to assist in protecting Isla del Coco. 
He even made a personal trip to the island to dedicate it as a 
park**—becoming the first Costa Rican president to visit a 
* One of the endemic plants on the island is the Roosevelt palm 
(Rooseveltia frankliniana) which was named after the U.S. presi-
dent who visited Isla del Coco four times between 1934 and 1940. 
** David Rains Wallace (in Quetzal and Macaw, p. 89) relates how 
Carazo's trip to Isla del Coco was far from a luxurious jaunt: 
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". . . President Carazo and his entourage of 180 dignitaries and 
journalists had to hire a Panamanian ship to take them to Coco 
Island. The ship never materialized, so eighty of the most 
favored or persistent pilgrims crowded into a tuna boat and two 
coast guard patrol boats for the eighteen hour voyage. . . . 
On the island, according to a Tico Times article, Carazo unveiled 
a plaque, raised the Costa Rican flag (thus emphasizing sover-
eignty at a time when war with Nicaragua seemed possible), heard 
a special mass, and was impressed by the tameness of the birds." 
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national park while in office. There was reason to rejoice in 
its designation; the island has not been without its fair share 
of troubles over the years. First referred to on a map in 1541, 
Isla del Coco became a haven for pirates in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. By 1793 pirates had introduced pigs and 
other domesticated animals to run loose on the island. Its sup-
ply of fresh water, coconuts, and meat (pigs that thrived there 
for centuries) made it a favorite stop-over for whalers and 
pirates who are thought to have hidden valuable treasures in 
its forests. The pirates Benito "Bloody Sword" Bonito and James 
Thompson were rumored to have buried large stashes there. Mario 
Boza has written that "it is believed that more pirate treasures 
have been buried on this island than anywhere else in the entire 
world." The government of Costa Rica claimed Isla del Coco in 
1832 after it authorized rescuing a crew of shipwrecked Chileans 
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from the area. 
A century and a half later, evidence of environmental degra-
dation from these past experiences still exists. Joseph Franke 
writes that "pigs, cats, goats, and white-tailed deer have all 
done considerable damage." Pigs, "probably the worst offen-
ders, M he explains, "loosen so much soil in the process of 
rooting for food that they have been implicated in causing the 
death of coral on some of the reefs" (due to erosive run off). 
Cats are also a problem ("they kill and eat anything that moves") 
and introduced flora such as coffee plants and guava trees "re-
place the less aggressive native understory plants." Franke also 
cites how illegal fishing has been a problem, "depriving nest-
ing seabirds of food and causing other disruptions to the marine 
ecosystem." Likewise, trumped up stories of hidden riches 
brought in treasure hunters from different parts of the world 
which further threatened the overall ecological integrity of the 
island. According to Boza, over 5 00 such treasure hunts have 
been conducted—meeting with very little success; "only a few 
doubloons have been found to date." And "compounding all of 
this," Franke writes, "is the lack of money for enforcement 
(there are currently [in 1992] no guards on the island) and the 
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difficulty of doing even cursory patrols from the mainland." 
Carazo and the Park Service were well aware of these limita-
tions. Not long after the park was declared, Jorge Astacio, the 
executive director of ASCONA (Asociación para la Conservación de 
la Naturaleza)—Costa Rica's largest environmental group in the 
1970's and early 80's, wrote to the SPN saying that Isla del Coco 
"offers a series of interesting situations for those persons who 
are lovers of nature and especially for those who have non-
destructive research interests." Therefore, ASCONA recommended 
"a very controlled and limited number of visitors to the island" 
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to maintain its pristine environment. The SPN agreed and created 
such guidelines, but the budget cuts caused by the economic 
crisis forced the government to replace its park guards on the 
island (who were needed in parks on the mainland) with Public 
Security guards (paid out of a different budget). This change 
did not go over well with the leading tourist company in the 
country (Adventures in Costa Rica) which planned well-regulated, 
guided tour experiences of the island. Its president, Michael 
Kaye, wrote directly to President Carazo complaining that when 
Isla del Coco was guarded by SPN personnel they were "great— 
clean, welcoming, etc." Now with the Public Security guards his 
clients were met with "dirty, inattentive, unwelcoming, and un-
caring" employees which caused Kaye to wonder if they were respon-
sible to enforce the important island regulations for the fragile 
environment. Carazo responded indicating that he had turned the 
matter over to both the Minister of MAG and to the Minister of 
Public Security expecting action to be taken and for the problem 
to be resolved. Carazo also received a letter from Luis Diego 
Gdmez at Fundación Parques Nacionales expressing his appreciation 
to the President for the way in which he had handled "the deli-
cate situation." And Carazo was obliged to turn an earlier Isla 
del Coco concern over to the SPN when he received a letter from 
an elderly European man (he did not list his country) named 
Erdal Osturk who had requested to live his final days and die on 
the island. The request was denied by the Park Service, citing 
27 
200 
national park statutes which disallowed such park use. 
The question of treasure hunting, however, has not been as 
easy to dismiss. In the summer of 1 982 the SPN received an es-
pecially convincing request for an exploratory expedition to the 
island from a San José businessman named Fernando Fonseca Calvo. 
Fonseca explained that a Spanish galleon carrying a cargo of gold 
that was shipwrecked off the island in 1882 was buried by a dyna-
mite explosion in an earlier attempt to uncover it in 1945. He 
estimated his "retroexcavatory" project would take from thirty to 
forty-five days and would be conducted "conforming to all require-
ments and controls . . . with the goal of protecting the ecologi-
cal conditions of the place." As per Civil Code, Fonseca prom-
ised to fork over fifty percent of what was found to the Costa 
Rican government, and, rather obsequiously, offered to donate 
five percent to the SPN because "without any doubt the national 
parks constitute the future of the country in many aspects." He 
concluded by stressing that he was "completely sure of the lo-
cation of the treasure from which the nation and the [Park] Ser-
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vice will derive enormous economic benefits.'' He, like all the 
others, found no treasure. 
Despite that fact, ten years after Fonseca's project a weal-
thy American treasure hunter received permission to proceed with 
a multimillion dollar search using sonar and ultralight air-
planes. The agreement was that not a single tree would be cut or 
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any other disturbances incurred on the island or its coral reef. 
From the start, however, the expedition was shrouded in controver-
sy. The year was 1992, after the SPN had since been moved to the 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines (MIRENEM). The 
problem was that the treasure hunting concession was being sup-
ported by the MIRENEM minister himself, Herna'n Bravo (appointed 
by then President Rafael Calderdh). According to Jorge Cortés, 
a University of Costa Rica marine biologist who was involved with 
this particular issue, there was internal conflict within the 
ministry (Mario Boza was the Vice Minister) and Bravo wanted the 
approval process expedited. Thus, he sent SPN director Alvaro 
Ugalde (back at the helm after being in and out of that office) 
to meet directly with the Americans at Isla del Coco. Amazed and 
flustered by Bravo's temerity, Ugalde called on Cortes, whose 
specialty is in the study of coral reefs, to look over the pro-
posal and assess its environmental impact. In an interview for 
this chapter, Cortés recalled that meeting with the treasure 
hunters "was like meeting with the mafia." "These big guys in 
suits came out," he said, "and literally asked me 'How much do 
you want."' Cortas opposed the plan and other biologists became 
involved with negotiating the agreement. The result was that 
the enterprise was to have paid $100,000 for the concession to 
search for treasure. Cortes, however, does not believe that that 
amount was ever paid, despite Bravo's claim that it was in an 
appearance he made on television to answer questions about the 
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controversy. The Americans never found any treasure. 
As if that was not enough controversy for one little island 
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in one year, there was also a proposal for Isla del Coco to be-
come more of a developed tourist attraction in 1992.' Plans were 
for a large casino complex to open on the island that would in-
clude hotels, swimming pools, and beach access. Karen Olsen de 
Figueres vigorously opposed such a proposal when she was an at-
large diputada in the Legislative Assembly that year and spon-
sored legislation against it. She was opposed to the "right now 
attitude" to get rich quick that was behind the plan and ques-
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tioned "how much it [would] cost in the long term." The casino 
plan failed and access to the island today remains very limited 
(there is no air service). Camping is not allowed—overnight 
visitors are required to stay on their boat. Thus, Isla del Coco 
is a remote, pristine national park that Rodrigo Carazo said he 
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was glad to have had a hand in protecting as a "gift to mankind." 
President Carazo also had a personal interest in designating 
another piece of land—the El Murciélago ranch in northwest Guana-
caste province. By presidential decree on 13 September 1978 he 
declared the 28,600 acre ranch to be an extension of Santa Rosa 
National Park. El Murciélago (Spanish for "bat") had been the 
vacation hacienda of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
who would be ousted from his country in the Revolution of 1979. 
The land, near where Somoza's father had owned land before it was 
expropriated in 1966 to become Santa Rosa National Park, was a 
sore point for many anti-somocista Costa Ricans, including Pres-
ident Carazo who sided with the Sandinistas in the Nicaraguan 
conflict. Thus, many legislators, newspaper editors, and other 
202 
Ticos applauded Carazo's move to expropriate the Somoza hacienda. 
In his words, Carazo explained that he and many" other Costa 
Ricans had resented Somoza's "growing investments" in their 
country and had worried it could lead to an armed invasion from a 
base at El Murciélago. They had reason to worry. Earlier in 
1978 Somoza's troops had crossed into Costa Rica to raid Nicara-
guan guerrilla camps and had killed several Costa Ricans in the 
melee. At that, Carazo broke relations with Nicaragua and called 
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Somoza "a disgrace to Central America." He also upped the number 
of police patrolling the border to 6,000 members and borrowed 500 
Venezuelan rifles, as the Washington Post reported, "to fend off 
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Nicaraguan incursions." Likewise, Somoza had already been using 
his ranch for "periodic vacations," Carazo wrote in his memoirs, 
"and had been travelling there by air from Nicaragua—before our 
administration—without completing any form of official immigra-
tion authorization." Thus, Carazo continued, "I decided to ex-
propriate his ranch and surrounding lands . . . ; he didn't de-
serve to be an owner of one square centimeter of our soil." In 
May of 1979 the Legislative Assembly approved the take-over and 
later that year, with Carazo's blessing, divided the El Murciéla-
go sector into two parts: a majority of the area would become 
part of Santa Rosa, and an adjoining part would be directed by 
ITCO (the land colonization authority) for the benefit of small 
farmers to settle. Regarding the Santa Rosa extension, Carazo 
wrote that El Murciélago would "contribute in a great way to the 
country's conservation of ecological riches for Humanity, and at 
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the same time protect resources for an ever closer future- . . ." 
Some inherent problems lurked in this official park exten-
sion. For one, as José Rafael Mora at the Fundacidn Parques Na-
cionales pointed out, "it is physically separated from the main 
body of the park." And while he lauded it as an area that "pro-
tects the superb northern coast of the Santa Elena Peninsula, 
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. . . [t]ransportation for park patrols is extremely difficult." 
Likewise, Alvaro Ugalde and others at the SPN believed that Ca-
razo' s expropriation had a hidden agenda outside of conservation 
goals. Ugalde and Pedro Ledn explained in one interview that El 
Murciélago actually had been divided up three ways—with the 
third, smallest part to be utilized by the Ministry of Public 
Security as a training base for Nicaraguan Sandinistas. Ledn 
added, "they [supposedly the Public Security officials] trained 
the Sandinistas there and when they decided they didn't like 
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the Sandinistas, they trained the Contras there." 
Actually, this scenario fueled a growing discomfort for 
Ugalde as head of the Park Service in the new Carazo administra-
tion. Relations had not started well very early into the term. 
First, the previous administration had assigned the SPN a new 
responsibility toward the end of Daniel Oduber's term in office 
that ended up causing Ugalde a great deal of grief: management 
of the National Zoo (which, but for a few exceptions, is de-
signed to showcase Costa Rican fauna) located in the historic 
Amón district of San José. The problem was that a free-roaming 
population of whitetail deer (it lived in the zoo's tropical park-
like setting and was a popular feature with visitors) got a bit 
out of control and began grazing on rare plants cultivated by 
botanists who were planning to move a botanical garden into the 
park. Ugalde was ordered to do something about the problem and 
when trapping the deer failed he finally ordered them to be 
shot. Zoo workers killed fourteen deer just days after Carazo 
was elected. The press sensationalized the story, some animal-
rights attorneys took the Park Service to court, and Ugalde was 
indicted for destruction of government property. But while the 
jury in the trial that followed found Ugalde not guilty, the zoo 
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case boded badly for starting work with a new administration. 
Second, and more significantly, the Public Security forces 
training Sandinistas on part of the old El Murciélago grounds had 
crossed into Santa Rosa National Park. Ugalde strongly disap-
proved. "They were using park fences and trees as targets for 
practice with heavy weapons," he recalled later, "I got the feel-
ing we were losing the park." Frustrated that it would prove to 
be a bad precedent and that the situation was growing worse ("the 
authority of the Park Service had deteriorated to the point that 
even the park superintendent needed permission from the police to 
move around the park"), Ugalde wired the Minister of Public Secur-
ity with a typically succinct message: "Your soldiers are destroy-
ing Santa Rosa National Park. The area is under the responsibili-
ty of the National Park Service and I ask that you get them out 
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of the park." 
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The telegram caused rockets to fly at President Carazo's Cab-
inet meeting that, unbeknownst to Ugalde, took place that very af-
ternoon. "I was later informed that I was accused of being unpat-
riotic, or some sort of traitor, and that I should be fired from 
the Park Service," Ugalde told David Carr in an interview in 
1981, "what saved my skin was that . . . the minister of agri-
culture, was very supportive of his staff . . . [and] told the 
Cabinet that even though he didn't approve of my words in the 
telegram—imagine using the word 'soldiers' in Costa Rica—he 
knew that I was only doing my job of defending the park system." 
Fortunately for Santa Rosa, the Public Security personnel and the 
Sandinistas left the park, but it was at the expense of frayed re-
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lations between Ugalde and Carazo. And once again, Santa Rosa 
was at the heart of controversial policy-making (the fifth in a 
series of scandals if we are keeping track from Chapter Four, see 
also Appendix 3 ) . The turmoil was enough to make Ugalde think it 
was time for a change. Soon thereafter, he took leave of his po-
sition to begin doctoral studies at the University of Michigan. 
The new acting director of SPN was a very capable José María Rod-
ríguez de la Guardia, an architect by profession, who had been 
the Assistant Director of SPN for two years under Ugalde. Around 
the time he left, Ugalde voiced his frustrations in a letter to a 
friend at The Nature Conservancy lamenting that "it seems not 
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much could be accomplished during this administration." 
For the record, quite a bit continued to be accomplished on 
the conservation front in the next two years of Carazo's term. 
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The year 1980, for example, marked the tenth anniversary of the 
Costa Rican parks program. To commemorate the occasion, on Feb-
ruary 5 Carazo hosted an anniversary ceremony at the Casa Presi-
dencial . Guests included Dona Karen Olsen de Figueres, former 
President José Joaquín Trejos, former Minister of Agriculture 
Guillermo Yglesias (who had been so instrumental in promulgating 
the Ley Forestal), and other officials and members of the public 
and press. More importantly, Carazo's commemoration of the an-
niversary included an executive decree that expanded Guayabo, 
Manuel Antonio, Corcovado, and Tortuguero national parks—adding 
approximately 37,000 acres to the park system. Each expansion 
added vital wildlife habitat, fragile ecosystems, and important 
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watersheds to be protected under national park guidelines. 
Toward the end of his term in office, Carazo also signed a 
proclamation that would greatly increase the size of Braulio 
Carrillo National Park. With the San José-Guápiles road project 
under way through the mountains of Braulio Carrillo, some conser-
vationists were dissatisfied with the amount of land that was to 
be protected and began lobbying for its expansion. The Organi-
zation for Tropical Studies (OTS) entered the campaign as a way 
to create a biological corridor from Braulio Carrillo to its La 
Selva research station just north of the park. To do this, the 
government would have to buy out several landholders' properties. 
But with few funds readily available, and with the urgency of 
protecting the area as quickly as possible looming over him, 
Carazo used a different approach to achieve the end result. 
207 
Recognizing the need "out of an intimate sympathy with the 
cause/' as a Carazo staffer later put it, the president de-
clared the area in question a zona protectora (a temporary legal 
status protecting the area against any property changes or de-
velopment schemes) until the OTS could start a fundraising drive 
for the corridor. The OTS had been working with UNESCO to desig-
nate the region a World Biosphere Reserve and, as Carazo ex-
plained in a note to his Minister of Agriculture, Hernán Fonseca, 
the "zona protectora" status would freeze the area until those 
details and finances were worked out. He also solicited the 
assistance of his Minister of Justice, Elizabeth Odio Benito. 
"Given the urgency for immediately and adequately protecting this 
important zone that has a treasure of natural resources," he 
wrote in a memorandum to her, "I'm asking for your maximum co-
operation in preparing all of the legal documents necessary for 
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this project." 
The MacArthur Foundation came up with a one million dollar 
matching grant which was met by a combination of sources that 
included the OTS, World Wildlife Fund, Fundación Parques Nacion-
ales, The Nature Conservancy, and the Costa Rican government. By 
the last six months of Carazo's term, as Luis Gomez of the FPN 
reported to the president, the challenge had been met and the ex-
pansion of Braulio Carrillo was made possible. David Clark, the 
director of the OTS, hailed the campaign as the "largest inter-
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national conservation program in Costa Rica up to that date." 
In June of 1980 Carazo designated 23,400 acres of lowlands 
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along the Tempisque River in southern Guanacaste as Palo Verde 
National Park. Abutting the Rafael Lucas Rodriguez National 
Wildlife Refuge that had been declared by President Oduber, Palo 
Verde was a unique park in Costa Rica in that it represented the 
largest, and most threatened, system of seasonal wetlands in the 
country. It is home to over 250 species of birds, has one of the 
highest concentrations of wintering waterfowl in the region, and 
supports populations of rare storks, ibises, and spoonbills. In 
his decree protecting the area, Carazo listed four principal ob-
jectives of the park: 1. To conserve the increasingly scarce trop-
ical dry forest of Guanacaste; 2. To preserve "a place of partic-
ular importance for the conservation of migratory and resident 
birds . . . one of the richest areas of avifauna in the country;" 
3. To protect the area "diverse in its wildlife and one of the 
last refuges for animals that still exists in the province of 
Guanacaste;" and 4. To represent the various ecosystems of great 
floristic diversity . . . and the forests of the palo verde tree" 
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after which the park was named. 
By the end of Carazo's term, Palo Verde National Park was to 
be clouded in a regrettable presidential controversy, as will be 
discussed in detail below. But before his term expired, the pres-
ident worked to leave a final conservation hallmark of his admini-
stration: the creation of the International Park of Friendship, 
La Amistad. The expansion of existing parks and the creation of 
new parks like Palo Verde, important as they are for their signif-
icance in working to protect vital ecosystems, pale in comparison 
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to the size and importance of Carazo1s last park project. The 
creation of La Amistad, approximately 500,000 acres of tropical 
wilderness in the Talamanca Mountain Range of south central Costa 
Rica (see map, p. 7 S ) , nearly doubled the size of the entire 
national park system. It was established in April of 1982 (soon 
after Luis Alberto Monge had been elected president but while Ca-
razo was still in office) as an "international park" with Panama 
on whose border it adjoins. It was the first such park in Cen-
tral America and the first area to be declared a World Biosphere 
Reserve by UNESCO (Man and the Biosphere Program) in the Central 
American and Caribbean region. Calling it the "pride of the na-
tion," Carazo was pleased to play a role in this historic under-
taking and remarked in his memoirs that "Costa Rica had brought 
forward, with great effort, a fundamental wealth for preserving 
the planet and humanity . . . and assumed the position to chal-
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lenge other nations of the world to conserve the human habitat." 
La Amistad*s official designation was a long time in the 
making. The idea of having a World Biosphere Reserve in Costa 
Rica originated in 1974 when a representative of UNESCO visited 
the country and met with a committee made up of Luis Fournier, 
Mario Boza, Rodrigo Zeleddn, Gerardo Budowski and others to con-
sider the proposal. The plan continued to evolve with the idea 
of making it a bi-national friendship park later that year at the 
Central American Meeting on the Management of Cultural and Natu-
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ral Resources. For the next four years, however, the plan lay 
dormant. "I don't know why it took us so long to create it," 
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Alvaro Ugalde later remarked, "I guess we were just too busy with 
Corcovado and other things." James Barborak, the American parks 
consultant who was hired by the SPN in 1979 and was instrumental 
in working with different leaders on La Amistad, suggested that 
part of the delay was due to the environment itself of the Tala-
manca Mountains—the rugged terrain, the lack of roads and maps, 
the difficult conditions for planners to work in. "We went into 
areas so rough that we had to use horses to help get the jeeps 
in," he remembered, "[i]t was the only place where I've seen 
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swamps on hillsides." 
Nonetheless, in late 1978 President Carazo met with a water 
users association in southern Costa Rica to discuss ways of pro-
tecting the Talamancas' important watersheds and rekindled the 
idea of creating an international park as a way to help accom-
plish that goal. Soon he was meeting with various officials 
from the Republic of Panama to start hammering out the details. 
Barborak recalled that it was exactly at this same time, however, 
that "all those coups and changes in government began in Panama." 
Carazo (who Barborak described as someone who "liked the idea of 
these border parks—he's a very peace-oriented man"), was not 
deterred and ended up signing similar agreements with three dif-
ferent governments in a short period of time. By March of 1979, 
Carazo and Panamanian President Aristides Royo signed the final 
agreement. It proclaimed (rather loftily, as diplomatic agree-
ments tend to do) La Amistad Park to be "a symbolic gesture of 
the excellent relations of friendship and fraternity between the 
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two peoples and governments, of the high scientific and ecologi-
cal value of the region, and of the necessity of conserving and 
preserving the flora and fauna . . . to maintain the area's eco-
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logical balance . . . and hydrologic resources." 
The next step was in organizing a series of meetings and 
workshops to develop a scheme for the development of the park. 
Mario Boza, as President Carazo's natural resources advisor, 
was a key figure involved. He met with officials from the SPN, 
OFIPLAN (Oficina de Planificación)—the government's financial 
planning office, and with representatives of the Panamanian pres-
ident's office and the Panamanian Institute of Natural Renewable 
Resources. Next, the Tropical Science Center (TSC) was tapped to 
survey park boundaries and to conduct research on the flora, 
fauna, and ecosystems of the entire region. CATIE (Tropical 
Agronomic Research and Education Center) was contracted to study 
the planning of park services and instalations. The TSC and 
CATIE studies were Completed by September 1981 and were financed 
by OFIPLAN. However, because of the economic crisis and the de-
valuation of the colón right at the time this research was per-
formed, OFIPLAN had only about one fifth the funds that original-
ly were to have gone to the La Amistad project. But once again, 
the problem was seen as a challenge. The opportunity opened up 
for university students to help with the work that needed to be 
done and to earn college credit for it. According to Barborak, 
the park planners "got a whole team of university professors and 
students to do the field component of many of their basic biology 
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courses in [La] Amistad." 
They could not have chosen a better place for hands-on eco-
logical experience- The Talamanca Mountains embody eight of the 
twelve Holdridge life zones. They are home to 215 species of 
mammals, 250 species of amphibians and reptiles, 115 species of 
fishes, and 560 species of birds. They represent one of the most 
species-diverse and species-rich places in Central America for 
vascular plants. What the area is not good for, however, is any 
form of crop cultivation. There are just too many steep slopes 
and too much inadequate soil to support agriculture—facts 
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readily advanced by park proponents and planners. 
Another component to the research on both sides of the bor-
der was concerning the indigenous peoples who lived in that part 
of the Talamancas that was soon to be declared a park. The moun-
tainous area is where Costa Rica's largest number (over 10,000) 
of native peoples, including Guaymis, Brunkas, Cabecares, and 
Bribris, live and work—many still in traditional ways. Subsis-
tence agriculture, hunting, and gathering are mixed with small-
farming ventures in the lower lands outside of the mountains by 
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the majority of these Indians. Barborak stated that the park 
researchers depended on the Indians to guide them to uncharted 
areas in the mountains where they needed to survey and collect 
ecological data. What they often found, surprisingly, were non-
indigenous squatter settlements in remote areas—adding to the 
problems they had to confront to create the park. The govern-
merit, with the cooperation of the native peoples, established a 
series of indigenous reserves around the perimeter of La Amistad, 
but as Barborak pointed out, "they made a bad mistake by not talk-
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ing to the non-Indians in the area too." 
The end product of all the research was a forty-nine page in-
ventory of La Amistad 1s natural and cultural resources, socio-
economic characteristics, and a proposed management and develop-
ment plan to make the area into a national park. Problems ad-
dressed in the study included intense deforestation, accelerated 
colonization in areas inappropriate for agriculture, increasingly 
worse erosion, and environmental pollution. A host of different 
government agencies (i.e. ITCO, OFIPLAN, SPN, DGF, ICE [elec-
tricity commission], and CONAI [commission on indigenous issues] 
in Costa Rica, and the National Cultural Institute and RENARE 
[General Directorate of Renewable Natural Resources] in Panama) 
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all had a hand in finalizing the study. Financing the develop-
ment of the park would be the next chore. Part of the responsi-
bility for seeking funds again fell on the Fundación Parques Na-
cionales since government money was really not available. A 
letter to the World Wildlife Fund from FPN director José Rafael 
Mora illustrates quite well the degree of need at the new park: 
The National Park Service is sending two employees to-
gether with two from the General Forestry Directorate. 
. . . Since there are now no facilities, everything 
from tents and sleeping bags to medicines and horses 
will be needed. The rangers will have to build lodg-
ing, cut trails, and literally create the park from 
the ground up. . . . We believe the WWF can make an 
extraordinary difference now. (55) 
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Finally on 4 April 1982 President Carazo signed the execu-
tive decree that officially inaugurated La Amistad International 
Park (the section in Panama is simply called Amistad National 
Park). The presidential decree stated that the park was located 
in one of the "richest areas in the country for flora, fauna, and 
potential hydroelectric power." Carazo hosted a press conference 
to mark the occasion and had various dignitaries speak. Murray 
Silberman (who had replaced Mario Boza as the President's natural 
resources advisor) shared that "the precipitous, uninhabited, un-
claimed area has been expropriated at no cost to Costa Ricans." 
He went on to suggest that the park was home to "many plant and 
animal species in the area that have never been identified, and 
could well be of great use to man" and that the park could be 
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"a tourist draw on a par with Kenya." But the fact that the park 
overlapped into Panama caused reporters to question the president 
more on the political situation of their neighbor to the south 
than they did on conservation in the Talamancas. Gerardo Budow-
ski recalled that Carazo ended the press conference "by begging 
them to ask him something about [La Amistad] after a half-hour of 
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answering questions about Manuel Noriega." 
Soon thereafter, Carazo and a bevy of officials and report-
ers made a trip to La Amistad to visit the area and, similar to 
the presidential visit to Isla del Coco, conduct a brief on-site 
ceremony. Helicopters and jeeps were used to transport the 
roughly one hundred guests to the remote national park. While 
there, Carazo met with Guaymi caciques and viewed first hand 
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the terrain and landscape of the newly-designated park. 
The international conservationist community rejoiced at the 
news of La Amistad*s inauguration. Letters of congratulations 
poured into the Costa Rican government from all over the world. 
A list of such correspondences in SPN files shows letters were 
sent from Prince Philip of the United Kingdom, U.S. Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig, the chief of the United Nations Environmen-
mental Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi, the Director of the U.S. 
National Park Service, the head of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the Assistant Director of the U.S. Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, the Director of the Smithsonian Institution, a national 
director of the Sierra Club, the President of the Audubon Socie-
ty, a variety of internationally renowned scientists like Kenton 
Miller (then at the IUCN) and Peter Raven (of the Missouri Botani-
cal Garden), U.S. Senators Mark Hatfield, Frank Murkowski, Alan 
Cranston, and John Chaffee, and many other persons interested in 
tropical conservation. Michael S. Kaye, the president of Adven-
tures in Costa Rica, wrote Carazo personally saying that "La Amis-
tad, I am sure, will be recognized by the world as one of the 
most important protected areas on the planet." And in terms of 
what it meant for Costa Rica, as Murray Silberman wrote to a col-
league in a similar position in New Zealand, because La Amistad 
"more than doubled the total area of national parks here, we are 
now, if not number one in the world in this regard, then pretty 
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damn close!" 
And thus did La Amistad not only close out the term of Rodri-
go Carazo but it also heralded the end of an era in Costa Rican 
conservation history. Only a few national parks and reserves 
would be designated in what was left of the 1980's and in the 
1990 fs. In an interview for the Tico Times, Mario Boza stated 
that "we are moving out of the decade of declaration and into a 
period of consolidation and refined management of the parks." 
SPN director José María Rodriguez explained that 
Before us there remains the great task of consolidat-
ing the work carried out in the different parks. It 
is necessary to conclude payment for land purchases 
and there are still a lot of ground services which 
have to be built. But the main preoccupation is the 
training of our park officials who are directly re-
sponsible for the management of these areas. . . . 
[And] there is a gap in our set of laws which re-
quires an important effort. . . . This is the global 
planning of the country's wilderness, including all 
the categories of management . . . no matter which 
organism be in charge of its administration. (60) 
To help with these goals, Mario Boza created an instruction 
manual for the management and administration of areas within the 
SPN's jurisdiction. In fact, it was also at this time that the 
whole way parks were being managed changed directions. Early 
parks were managed under the guidelines of a "master plan" but, 
as James Barborak has written, they seemed inflexible to the 
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changing needs of the park. By the end of Carazo's term, then, 
the SPN required that a "management plan," an individual strategy 
or planning system, be written for each protected area. The 
plans began with a philosophical statement on park objectives, 
detailed the park's resources and how they would be permitted for 
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public use, and showed how resources would be conserved for long 
range protection. They had to include resource inventories, man-
agement programs for "integrated development," zoning and border 
delineations, mechanisms to evaluate and revise plans when neces-
sary, and be printed and distributed for public access. Peace 
Corps volunteers and officials on loan from the FAO and UNESCO 
all wrote or assisted in the writing of various park management 
plans during the low-budget and short-staff years of the economic 
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crisis. SPN Assistant Director Jose" Antonio Salazar further ex-
plained the benefits of the new system. In a memo labelled 
"'crazy ideas' (ideas locas) for exploring new routes for pro-
tected areas under our care" that he sent to his boss Jose Maria 
Rodriguez in late 1980, Salazar urged that management plans be 
set up for "development in stages." "In the specific case of Cos-
ta Rica where development conditions are so difficult," he con-
tinued, "a slow but sure progress" worked better for park plan-
ning. The creation of the plans also produced the beneficial 
side advantage of getting the employees out in the field more 
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so that they could better familiarize themselves with the area. 
In addition to these advances in park creation and manage-
ment, the Carazo administration was characterized by a variety 
of other successful projects on the conservation front. In 1979 
it backed legislation that provided tax incentives for planting 
trees and for not cutting timber on certain private lands as a 
way to discourage deforestation. In April of that year, Costa 
Rica hosted the two-week, fifty-nation Convention on Internation-
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al Trade in Endangered Flora and Fauna. Speaking there, World 
Wildlife Fund President Russell Train asserted that "Costa Rica 
has done more for conservation than any other Latin American 
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country." 
President Carazo also became concerned that year about re-
ports of pesticide-tainted run off from banana plantations that 
was draining into the Caribbean at Cahuita and was starting to 
destroy the coral reefs. Carazo sent a letter to Standard Fruit 
requesting that the company reduce the run off. But when the 
superintendent of Cahuita National Park approached the Standard 
Fruit manager to follow up on the President's letter, the manager 
is reported to have said, "Do you know what I think of this?," 
and without waiting for a reply tore up Carazo's letter. It was 
then that marine biologist Jorge Cortés became involved with the 
coral reef issue, wrote his Master's thesis about it, and worked 
"to create a consciousness among the public" about Standard's 
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poor stewardship and the ills of environmental contamination. 
Also in 1979 Carazo took a personal interest in forming a 
network of biological research stations in the national parks 
and reserves. In a letter to his Minister of Treasury, he out-
lined how the research stations could be used by Costa Rican 
university students and foreign researchers. They would also 
increase the country's prestige abroad among philanthropic or-
ganizations with the hope of attracting major conservation 
donations. According to Carazo, the stations would be "a form 
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of non-extractive natural resource exportation." An important 
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event that SPN sponsored that year was a research project on 
environmental education. The goal of the project was to form 
ways to use the national parks as tools in the "development of 
an environmental ethic M among Costa Rica's general public. The 
project's report maintained that hands-on experience in natural 
settings would lead to "a better understanding of the relation 
between humans and the total environment and their responsibili-
ty in not degrading it." It was hoped that such a program would 
steer potential students in the direction of ecological research 
and would have the long range benefit of a more environmentally 
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sound republic. 
One of the events of 1979 that made national and internation-
nal conservationists the most happy, however, was Carazo's veto 
of a proposed law that would have endangered marine turtles at 
Tortuguero. The law would have reduced the Caribbean's protec-
tive zone off the beaches from twelve miles to three. What this 
meant was that sea turtle hunters would have been allowed to har-
vest turtles in unpatrolled waters in areas where the female rep-
tiles rest during the day after ovipositing on shore. According 
to conservation writer George Reiger, people from around the 
world petitioned Carazo to veto the bill. And, as he continued, 
Whereas many other political leaders would have 
been inclined to sign the bill precisely because 
of all the outside (especially American) agitation, 
President Carazo recognized the dire ramifications 
of the legislation and vetoed it. Turtle aficio-
nados sighed with relief. (68) 
In 1980, the year of the park program's tenth anniversary, 
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the government sponsored the First Symposium on National Parks 
and Equivalent Reserves. The three-day conference was a way to 
bring together many of the people who had been involved with 
Costa Rican conservation issues and a was forum to assess the 
direction in which the national park program was headed. Presi-
dent Carazo spoke at the symposium's opening ceremony and other 
speakers included Estrella Guier (the director of environmental 
education at the National Open University), James Barborak (who 
spoke on park planning), Douglas Cuillard (from the USNPS, who 
spoke on the role of interpretive services at national parks), 
Guillermo Porras (from the DGF, who spoke on forestry manage-
ment), Murray Silberman (who made predictions on parks in the 
twenty first century), Thomas Lovejoy (from the World Wildlife 
Fund), Gerardo Budowski, and Dan Janzen among other presenters 
and participants. It was also in 1980 that Carazo inaugurated 
the Centro de Información y Documentación Ambientales (the Cen-
ter for Environmental Information and Documentation, CIDA). CIDA 
was a joint project of the SPN and the National Open University 
whose principal function is the gathering and documenting of in-
formation regarding Costa Rica's natural resources and the en-
vironment in general. It provides a data collecting and storing 
service which is used for environmental assessments, industrial 
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planning, and research for educational projects. 
The year 1981 began with President Carazo and the director of 
OFIPLAN signing a declaration for the creation of a National Coun-
cil for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment. The 
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decree stated that it was the policy of the government to attend 
to the environment's protection for the "collective welfare" of 
the Costa Rican people. Thus, the council would be a coordinat-
ing and consultative organ" of the government to be made up of 
representatives of the ministries of housing, agriculture, cul-
ture, public works, education, and health, as well as members 
from the waters users' association and the environmental group 
ASCONA. The council would then "revise, integrate, and coordi-
nate" national policy on the environment, make priorities, and 
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analyze legislation. 
Other programs that year included a plan to increase coopera-
tion between the SPN and DGF. Activities to be coordinated in-
cluded publication of brochures, park guard and general labor 
projects, forestry research, acquisition of lands, and environmen-
tal education. The conservation departments also increased their 
involvement with Costa Rica's universities. Many different work-
shops, programs, presentations, and discussion sessions took 
place in the early 1980's. And on a regional level, Costa Rica 
hosted the Mesoamerican Workshop on Interpretation and Environ-
mental Education in September 1981. The three-week conference, 
organized by SPN and CATIE, was held at Manuel Antonio National 
Park and was designed to help conservationists from around Cen-
tral America learn how to create national park management plans 
and guidelines. It also served to promote ways of encouraging 
the development of environmental education and on-site interpre-
tive facilities. Workshop presenters included Mario Boza, James 
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Barborak, Adelaida Chaverri, Dennis Glick (from the University of 
Michigan's School of Natural Resources), Tex Hawkins (then work-
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ing for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), and other SPN staff. 
Given the Carazo administration's record for national park 
designations and expansions and its emphasis on other conserva-
tion goals as listed here, it is surprising to read that Alvaro 
Ugalde told David Rains Wallace for research on his book The Quet-
zal and the Macaw: The Story of Costa Rica's National Parks that 
"In the Carazo years, we [the SPN] didn't do much, we didn't get 
much political support, and we had a lot of trouble. . . .The 
strong political support of Oduber was over." Conversely, Mario 
Boza and Rolando Mendoza have written in The National Parks of 
Costa Rica that "Currently [1981] the National Park Service has 
very wide support from the government of the Republic . . . 
[which] is demonstrated by many diverse programs, many of which 
are ideas of the very President, Rodrigo Carazo." They cited 
Carazo's attention to expanding the park system, increasing 
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ground services, and creating CIDA as examples of his support. 
Political motives aside, the Costa Rican national parks pro-
gram not only survived but thrived during the debt crisis of the 
early 1980's. The crisis certainly challenged conservationists, 
but as Karen Olsen de Figueres put it when asked to describe 
those years, "obstacles became opportunities." Surmising that 
"development is an attitude" and not merely governmental pro-
posals, projects, and agendas, Doffa Karen posited in an interview 
that the historical patterns of conservationist thought in Costa 
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Rica led to its very ability to withstand the crisis. The vision 
of certain individuals was instrumental in channeling this 
course. Among those people, she related, was her late husband 
"Don Pepe" who by abolishing the Costa Rican armed forces in 
1948 provided the means to fund other causes, and who again as 
president in 1970 designated the first national parks. (She won-
dered if any of the environmental successes of the past two 
decades would have been possible if Costa Rica had been support-
ing a military.) She also listed people like Mario Boza, Alvaro 
Ugalde, and 1980's ASCONA leader Alexander Bonilla ("all of whom 
I love dearly") who never waivered in their diligence to preserve 
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Costa Rica's natural heritage, especially during the crisis. 
Both presidents Oduber and Carazo would have agreed with 
Mrs. Figueres on the military vs. conservation comparison. Odu-
ber had stressed that very point when he delivered his address 
to the United Nations in October of 1977. And when asked by a 
reporter from the Washington Post what Costa Rica's secret was 
for a lack of some of the social problems that were affecting 
other Latin American nations, especially in view of the country's 
rapidly accelerating conservation program, President Carazo did 
not hesitate to answer, "The explanation is very simple. We 
don't waste money on weapons, so we have resources for other 
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things. The needs of our people come first." 
So opposed was Carazo to militarization that he believed 
Costa Rica would be the perfect host country for an international 
institute dedicated to the study of peace. His administration 
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approached the United Nations in 1979 with such a proposal and 
the General Assembly approved the University for Peace as an 
autonomous entity with partial U.N. support. While the school's 
mission is to teach students from all over the world the ways 
of non-military conflict resolution, it also has an important 
environmental focus. Carazo explained in an interview with the 
World Policy Institute's Andrew Reding in 1985 that the school 
concerns itself with everything that causes con-
flict in our time. We are, for example, enormously 
preoccupied with the destruction of the natural en-
vironment because that destruction is in turn 
causing serious outbreaks of violence in many 
parts of the world. What's more, the lack of re-
sources for human survival is itself a source of 
violence. So one of the areas of concern for the 
university is natural resource management and the 
quality of life. ( 7 5 ) 
The university is located on land that was donated through an 
estate settlement near Ciudad Colon (20 miles from San José) 
on a wooded hillside with a vast view overlooking the Central 
Valley. The campus sits on 700 acres of primarily forested land, 
500 acres of which are to be preserved for their aesthetic value 
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and scientific study. The current chancellor, Robert Muller 
(formerly of UNEP), is committed to a conservation curriculum 
which includes a Master's Program in Ecology and Peace. The 
relation between peace and conservation is further addressed in 
the university's Basic Documents: 
One of the problems which more notably affects in-
ternational and national peace is that of natural 
resources. This is the starting point of some of 
the main problems of misery, injustice, and social 
tension. . . . [T]he relation between natural re-
sources and population, sources of food and energy, 
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and the conservation of the natural habitat, we 
consider . . . interrelated and must be approached 
together within the same area. 
For his part in the school's creation, Carazo received the 1981 
World Peace Prize from the International Association of Univer-
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sity Presidents. 
It is the position of this author that Carazo, an economist, 
understood these concepts quite well and knew what he was doing 
to help weather Costa Rica's debt crisis despite being severely 
criticized for his actions at the time and since. The facts are 
clear, not only on the more visible scale of increased acreage 
for protected areas, but also in terms of connecting conservation 
issues with solutions to social problems. The number of preca-
ristas (squatters) on public lands, for instance, was at an all-
time high in the Oduber administration that preceded Carazo's 
term—despite a robust economy with low unemployment. Precarismo 
was more than halved, however, during the Carazo years which 
unfortunately were characterized by the economic crisis and in-
creased unemployment—conditions that usually result in greater 
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population shifts to public lands. Attention to housing concerns 
and other urban social issues helped to ease the brunt of the cri-
sis, but standing firm against the IMF also played a significant 
role. Elaborating on this philosophy, he told Andrew Reding: 
The International Monetary Fund obeys the orders of 
its owners, the developed countries. That is the 
reality. . . . I don't believe in the IMF because 
it mainly focused on monetarist issues and not on 
social questions. . . . As for the World Bank, its 
representatives came to me with a suggestion while 
I was president. In response to our foreign ex-
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change problems in 1981, they told us we should 
stop eating meat, that we should export all we pro-
duce in order to obtain more foreign exhange. Had 
I taken them seriously, there would have been an 
uprising here. I would have had to tell the Costa 
Ricans, 'Look, we can no longer eat meat. We're 
going to close all the butcher shops and all our 
meat will be eaten by the señores of the United 
States.' How can the World Bank dare to suggest 
such a thing to a friendly country that has serious 
problems in this very difficult part of the world? 
But the policymakers in the Reagan administration 
don't have the slightest idea what they're doing 
because they simply don't know us. A very impor-
tant U.S. official whom I met at a cocktail party 
said to me, 'Someday I will have to come visit 
your beautiful island.' I had to tell him that 
at that rate he would never make it. . . . And 
this was a high ranking official! (79) 
And of course producing more cattle for export would have acceler-
ated pasture expansion and deforestation. 
Concluding here, then, Rodrigo Carazo viewed conservation as 
a vital activity within his administration. "The national 
parks," he wrote in the introduction to Boza and Mendoza's book, 
are "splendid natural laboratories which we offer to the inter-
national scientific community and also to the children, young 
people and adults who should not be denied the joy of direct con-
tact with nature in its pristine state." And tieing this belief 
to his concerns for world harmony, Carazo stated that his coun-
try's national parks "represent the contribution of the Costa 
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Rican people to peace among men and good will among nations." 
The Palo Verde Controversy 
There was little peace and less good will among conservation-
ists toward President Rodrigo Carazo in the summer of 1981. One 
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year (almost to the day) from when Carazo had designated Palo 
Verde National Park near the Gulf of Nicoya in southern Guana-
caste, he indicated that he would be "segregating," or withdraw-
ing 9,900 acres from the park (he later upped it to 17,300 
acres). The land, roughly three fourths of the total park 
acreage, according to Carazo had been expropriated improperly by 
the government—the landowners had not been paid the indemnity 
due them. The park's creation therefore had violated Article 45 
of the Constitution of Costa Rica (regarding "inviolable private 
property") and Article 22 of the Ley Forestal which concerned 
compensation for the acquisition of private lands. 
Constitutionality notwithstanding, environmentalists inside 
and out of the government were infuriated. The controversy 
dragged through the summer and into the fall of 1981 with some 
interesting twists and turns along the way. The issue itself 
reflects very well the deepening conservation conviction among 
Costa Ricans and their willingness to fight for a cause. The 
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literature on the subject, however, is polemical and imprecise. 
What merits attention here, then, is a review and analysis of the 
complete series of events as best as possible to understand the 
controversy in its proper perspective. 
At the heart of the matter was the fact that the Tempisque 
River Basin (where the park is located) is characterized by low 
marshy wetlands—Costa Rica's largest area for local and migra-
tory waterfowl—but also prime real estate for the cultivation of 
rice. The land had been owned and operated by various agricultur-
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al conglomerates from Costa Rica, the United States, and Cuba, 
and with the recession in full swing, Costa Rica needed to pro-
duce as many agricultural crops as possible to increase its 
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balance of trade. In July of 1981, when world prices for coffee 
continued to plummet, President Carazo anounced a "new agricul-
tural policy" that would promote increased production of other 
crops like beans, corn, sorghum, sugar, cotton, soybeans, African 
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palm oil, fruits and vegetables, and rice. 
News that President Carazo was considering separating a part 
of Palo Verde National Park known as "La Catalina" that could be 
used for rice farming reached the desk of his natural resources 
advisor Mario Boza as early as May of that year. Meeting with 
SPN director José María Rodríguez and SPN attorney Ana Maria 
Tato, Boza decided to mount a letter-writing appeal to Carazo 
with the hopes of swaying him against the decision. Tato's 
letter of May 25 listed six reasons against splitting La Catalina 
from the park system: 1. The water basis was needed; if agricul-
ture was permitted in the area, chemicals and pollution would 
pass through the national park; 2. "It would break the harmony 
of the ecosystem itself, given that the boundaries are natural 
and not man-made;" 3. Agrochemicals used for rice production 
would endanger the area's bird life; 4. La Catalina was a "bio-
geographical area found nowhere else in the dry Pacific region;" 
5. "Costa Rica and its president had been so duly congratulated 
for their pro-conservation zeal and efforts;" and 6. The split 
would be contrary to the reasons the park was established. Tato 
229 
signed off her two-page communication by pleading "in the name of 
all conservationists in Costa Rica" for Carazo to study the issue 
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and rethink the decision. 
Boza and Rodriguez wrote a longer letter to Carazo two days 
later outlining some of the legalities involved if Carazo segre-
gated La Catalina. First, such a cut would be in violation of 
the Convention for the Protection of the Flora, Fauna and Places 
of Scenic Beauty of the American Countries that the Legislative 
Assembly had ratified in 1966. Article 3 of the Convention de-
clared that national park boundaries could not be "altered." 
Second, it would be in opposition to Article 76 of the 1969 Ley 
Forestal that stated very clearly, "once a national park is cre-
ated, no part can be segregated from it . . . without the approv-
val of the Legislative Assembly." And finally, excising La Cata-
lina would violate Article 13 of the 1977 National Parks Act 
(which created the SPN), declaring that "the boundaries of the 
national parks could not be changed except by means of a new 
law." They then waxed rather philosophical and emotional in 
stating their case: 
Because of the actions that have been completed dur-
ing this last decade, and particularly during your ad-
ministration, Costa Rica is an example for the world, 
and the world has placed its eyes on us. . . .[Cutting 
the park] would represent a hard blow to the world 
conservation movement and a very dangerous precedent 
for our program; it would endanger all the successes 
we have made up to now. . . . We are sure that the 
national and international scientific and conserva-
tionist community and the public opinion in general 
are going to react very strongly if the government 
of the Republic does not follow world tradition and 
international standards already established. . . . 
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As technicians and public officials responsible for 
safeguarding Costa Ricans1 natural heritage, . . . 
we very respectfully request that if the government 
of the Republic considers Palo Verde National Park to 
be reduced, that it go to the Legislative Assembly. 
From a technical and legal viewpoint, this is the 
only available route, . . .We're convinced that 
keeping it a national park would bring the best ben-
efits for Costa Ricans in the long run. (85) 
The next stop was the Attorney General's office. Ana Maria 
Tato wrote Attorney General Manuel Freer Jimenez in June request-
ing his opinion on the legalities of the question, given both 
sides were now throwing different statutes and legal clauses back 
and forth at each other. In his "pronouncement" of June 24, 
Freer wrote that private inholdings that the State "did not have 
the capacity to buy" could in fact be excluded from the park 
designation. Acquistion could only occur via funded expropria-
tion, he wrote. Tato did not accept the decision. Two weeks 
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later she petitioned Freer's office to re-study the case. 
Meanwhile, Carazo had decided to proceed with the park segre-
gation plan. On July 2 he issued Executive Decree 12.765-A reduc-
cing Palo Verde National Park by 4,000 hectares (9,900 acres) be-
cause "the State did not have available the economic means to 
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complete the purchase of, nor the expropriation of, the farms." 
Coincidentally, the decree came on the same day that Alexander 
Bonilla, conservation chairman of ASCONA wrote a ten-page letter 
to Carazo urging him to change his mind. Bonilla was used to 
park controversies—he had been an SPN technician and a director 
of Santa Rosa and Poas Volcano national parks. He thus wrote 
with the authority of both knowledge of Palo Verde's ecology and 
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of the interworkirigs of the Park Service and went more into de-
tail on some of the scientific and legal points that had been 
expressed earlier by Tato, Boza, and Rodríguez. Carazo re-
sponded in kind a month later with an eight-page letter to 
Bonilla. In it he explained that the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Flora and Fauna also was set up "to respect each nation's 
judicial laws under which the national parks were created." He 
likewise re-explained his position on the unconstitionality of 
the La Catalina expropriations and assured Bonilla that "this 
88 
administration has and will continue to work on conservation." 
Soon after the presidential decree, San José newspapers 
solicited reactions from members of conservation organizations. 
Hardly fast-breaking news or front page material in San José, the 
first paper to run a story on the matter was La Nación on July 6 
on page 6-A with the headline "Government Intends to Segregate 
Palo Verde National Park." The article quoted agricultural mini-
ster Hernán Fonseca who spelled out that the government simply 
did not have the funds to pay the landowners. It also quoted 
Alexander Bonilla who went into detail about the park's ecologi-
cal features and the country's conservation laws as reasons why 
he and his organization opposed the plan. ASCONA's president, 
Oscar Hutt, also made a statement, exaggeratedly proclaiming that 
President Carazo was "trying to eliminate systematically, by one 
form or another, almost the entire system of reserves and nation-
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al parks in Costa Rica." (Interestingly, near this item in the 
paper was another article about a legislative committee's approv-
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al of the proposed Cacique Garabito Biological Reserve that Cara-
zo had supported.) 
ASC0NA stayed in the forefront of the Palo Verde matter 
and led the movement against the administration. By July 9 it 
had announced that it was considering filing suit against the 
government if the proposal did not go to the Legislative Assem-
bly. A few days later the group announced it was also preparing 
a draft bill to send to the Assembly that would require that body 
to ratify park creations—to reduce the authority of the Presi-
dent. On June 14 La República reported ASCONA's decisions and 
headlined that "a battle" was brewing "to prevent the government 
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from destroying parks." 
On the same day, ASCONA received the well-publicized support 
of one prominent figure for its Palo Verde battle: ex-President 
Daniel Oduber. Oduber offered no political niceties when he an-
nounced his support for ASCONA. "The childish pretext that there 
is no money to pay for that part of the park," La Nación quoted 
him as having said, "is very poor and there are many doubts." 
He went on to state that Carazo should have known that the park 
segregation would violate the Convention for the Protection of 
Flora and Fauna since he (Carazo) was president of the Legisla-
tive Assembly the year that body ratified it. He also suggested 
that the plan would decrease Costa Rica's international prestige 
and ended his press statement by urging people to ask, "who will 
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benefit the most?" from the administration's plan. Later that 
month, Oduber (an attorney) expressed interest in assisting 
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ASCONA with its legal suit. (On July 29 La Nación released the 
results of a poll which showed that a majority of Ticos consid-
ered Daniel Oduber their "best president" and that Carazo1s popu-
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larity was continuing to decline.) 
The Costa Rican economy also continued to decline as that 
summer moved slowly along in 1981. By July 15 the colon had been 
devalued by seventy-four percent. With that in mind, Carazo had 
a tough choice to make concerning the construction of a govern-
ment subsidized petroleum refinery (Refinadora Costarricense de 
Petróleo, or RECOPE) that many people in the nation wanted. The 
President chose the politically rough, but fiscally sound, route 
and vetoed the proposal which, according to newspaper sources, 
would mean the price of gasoline would increase. Carazo justi-
fied the move based on the belt-tightening austerity measures the 
country would have to endure to get through the crisis. On that 
same day (July 15) and as further evidence the government had no 
money to spare, Carazo's minister of housing resigned citing a 
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shortage of funds with which to run his department properly. 
The administration recited these examples as proof it had no 
funds with which to expropriate the La Catalina holdings. 
But an even bigger bomb dropped the next day when La Gaceta 
(the Legislative Assembly's official publication that prints the 
laws and decrees of the land after they have been made—no law is 
a law until it is published here) printed President Carazo's Exec-
utive Decree segregating Palo Verde. The big surprise for every-
one was that instead of the 4,000 hectares he orally announced to 
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to be split from Palo Verde on July 2, there were 7, 000 hectares 
(1 7, 300 acres) listed officially in La Gaceta on July 16. As one 
can imagine, the outcry against this news was loud. A La Nación 
article stated that there "was severe opposition from conserva-
tionists" and that Ana María Tato had renewed her request for the 
Attorney General to reconsider his earlier pronouncement. It 
quoted Alexander Bonilla's reaction on behalf of ASCONA and also 
said that the Organization of American States (OAS) and the U.N. 
had voiced opposition to the plan. It quoted Mario Boza asking 
of his employer, "What interests are moving behind this new 
illegality of our current government?" The paper did quote one 
person who sided with Carazo, Minister of Justice Elizabeth Odio 
Benito, who reiterated that the "confiscation" of the Palo Verde 
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property without due payment was unconstitutional. 
The reduction of national park land was bad enough in and of 
itself, but conservationists' biggest fear was that the Palo Ver-
de case would set precedent for landowners around other protec-
ted areas to press for segregations also. The fears were well 
founded. On July 17 La República wrote that "the authorization 
of this segregation has brought fatal consequences for the rest 
of the parks and reserves." It reported that farmers near five 
other parks including Barra Honda and Cahuita were clamoring for 
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land to be released. Two days later, SPN director José Maria Rod-
riguez explained to reporters that the Cahuita petition, based 
entirely on the administration's decision for Palo Verde, called 
for cutting 260 acres to be returned to farm land. At that 
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point ASCONA officials wasted no more time and sent their 
National Parks Ratification Law proposal directly to the Assem-
bly. A supportive diputado there (Miguel Angel Chaverrfa) de-
manded that agricultural minister Hernán Fonseca explain the Palo 
Verde decision in person to the Assembly. La Nación carried the 
news of these other possible park cuts on the front page—the 
first such coverage since the controversy unravelled. A few days 
later, the DGF (Forest Service) received a petition to trim land 
off the La Carpintera ("The Woodpecker") Protective Zone that was 
under its jurisdiction. DGF director Francisco Chacon did not 
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allow it—a move that ASCONA was quick to applaud. There was un-
derstandably a great deal of concern centered on whether the gov-
ernment would trim acreage off of the Rafael Lucas Rodriguez 
National Wildlife Refuge, an earlier established reserve adjacent 
to Palo Verde. The administration, however, made clear early in 
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the controversy that there would be no such plans. 
Carazo's delayed revelation regarding the size of the cut 
at Palo Verde and news that landowners around other parks were 
petitioning for park reductions sent college students and others 
to protest in the streets. The day after the La Gaceta notice 
(July 18), a group of protesters in Ciudad Neilly near the Panama 
border blocked the road to the airport after President Carazo had 
inaugurated a new stretch of paved road. His exit temporarily 
delayed, Carazo spoke to the protesters for over a half hour in a 
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downpour of rain about the Palo Verde issue and other concerns. 
On July 28, a group of biology students from the University of 
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Costa Rica and the National University staged a protest in front 
of the Casa Presidencial specifically because they opposed the 
Palo Verde cut. Displaying a banner that read "Defendamos Nues-
tros Parques Nacionales; ALTO a la Segregación" (We defend our 
national parks, STOP segregation), the students met with the Min-
ister of the Presidency, José Cordero, who listened to their con-
cerns and promised to relay their message to Carazo. The group 
also had a "round table" discussion with Mario Boza and Alexan-
99 
der Bonilla to plan what else they might be able to do. 
There was other public reaction. A La República article re-
ported that really "no one was in agreement" with the administra-
tion's proposal. Letters to the editor were sent to all the 
major newspapers protesting the move. A one-inch thick file of 
letters is also in the SPN archives from various groups and 
individuals upset at Carazo fs decree. Included in said file 
are numerous letters and signed petitions from members of the 
Colegio de Biólogos (Costa Rican Biologists' Association), labor 
unions, legislative diputados, local school employee groups, en-
raged citizens, national and international conservation organi-
zations, municipal leaders, sports clubs, and even one from the 
members of a dance troupe. SPN employees also practiced their 
rights and wrote letters of protest to their own ministry. One 
particularly stinging letter was sent by beekeeper Victoriano Hi-
dalgo who lambasted the government for altering the environment 
in a way that could adversely affect the production of honey. 
And someone even wrote a poem entitled "Requiem por un parque" 
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(Requiem for a Park) lamenting the segregation and the precedent 
it sets for other parks. No author's name was included, but the 
poet wrote: 
Entre decreto y decreto se acaban los parques, 
los patos, los piches y el guayacán; 
adiós Palo Verde, no volverá a verte, 
las aves que emigran no te encontran. . . . 
Traigo penas en el alma 
por las pailas del Rincón; 
cavernas de Barra Honda 
bellezas de esta nación. 
Que poca huella dejaron, 
la ley y la convención; 
con un decreto enterraron 
tesoros de esta región.* 
(For the complete poem, see Appendix 4.) It is for good reason, 
then, that Alexander Bonilla called Palo Verde "the national park 
1 0 0 
protected by public opinion." 
There was not much official response to such public outcry. 
The administration did issue a press release on July 22 in which 
Carazo complained that many of the attacks on his decision were 
"unfounded . . . and did not deserve any special comment." The 
* transí.: Between decree and decree the parks all die, 
the ducks, the swans, and the guayacans, 
good-bye Palo Verde, I'll not see you again, 
the migratory birds will never find you. 
I feel pains in my soul, 
for Rincón Volcano, 
for the caves of Barra Honda 
for the beauties of this nation. 
What small marks were left 
by the law and the convention, 
with one decree they buried 
the treasures of this region. 
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release also quoted Carazo responding to a letter written by 
Michael Wright of the World Wildlife Fund assuring that the admin-
istration was proud of its conservation record and would continue 
to do more. In fact, the administration directed the Park Ser-
vice to draw up a report to document Carazo*s conservation record 
thus far into his term. The result was a paper entitled "The 
National Parks Program During the Carazo Administration" which 
listed new parks and reserves and compared the record to that of 
Oduber's term. (The report showed that Oduber had signed 316,758 
new acres into the system while Carazo had approved 572,756.*) 
Likewise, on July 28 the administration ran a half-page display 
advertisement in La Nacidn proclaiming in bold letters that "El 
Estado No Puede Adueñarse de las Propiedades Privadas" (the State 
cannot take possession of private properties). It again stressed 
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the budgetary and constitutional positions. 
One particularly enraged citizen was Mario Boza. Surely it 
must have been difficult to be the President's natural resources 
advisor during that summer of 1981 and be so opposed to the 
Palo Verde decision and so at odds with the Minister of Agri-
culture who supported it. But the La Gaceta notice about the 
additional acreage to be chopped from the national park was the 
coup de grace. Boza tendered his resignation on July 22. Both 
major San José newspapers reported his departure and La República 
printed his entire letter of resignation. In it he manifested 
* Of the figure for the Carazo administration, 500,000 acres were 
from the designation of La Amistad International Park. 
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his disgust about Palo Verde and his deep concern that the admini-
stration's decision was putting in jeopardy seven other parks. 
"Could you imagine a worse blow to the system of protected areas 
in the country," he asked hypothetically in his letter to the 
president, "and could you imagine a more grave precedent against 
conservation of the country's natural resources?" He went on to 
assert that very few countries, and none in the developing world, 
had ever succeeded in completely paying property owners for lands 
dedicated to conservation. And he closed by stating that he and 
the many other Costa Ricans who had "fought for the creation of 
the national park system" were in "pain" because of the Palo 
Verde decree and its attendant bad precedent. Boza returned to 
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his university post at that point. Carazo named Murray Silber-
man to fill the position of Advisor on Natural Resources. 
Carazo was uncharacteristically reticent about Boza's de-
parture. The only official response on record was in a letter 
he wrote to MAG minister Hernán Fonseca which the president's 
office made public in the form of a press release. The letter 
does not directly address Boza's announcement but it does 
allude to its cause and is important here to help decipher the 
whole situation. Carazo alerted Fonseca in this letter that he 
had "given the order to purchase" those 17,300 acres of Palo Ver-
de for the coming fiscal year's budget (even though it would be 
of a different administration since the elections for a new pres-
ident were close at hand'). Thus, as suspected by this author 
based on the President's past conservation accomplishments, 
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Carazo proved he did want to preserve Palo Verde—the money was 
simply not available in his budget—and that accusations of 
ulterior motives, i.e. who or what was "getting to him," were 
more in the imagination of his opponents than can be found in 
1 0 3 
the historical record. 
Meanwhile, two other issues were pending in the Palo Verde 
situation: the National Parks Ratification bill in the Legisla-
tive Assembly and ASCONA !s suit filed against the government. 
The Assembly took up debate on the ratification proposal in late 
July and early August. While the motion was eventually shuffled 
off to a committee where it remained for over a year, discussion 
on the bill was telling. It represented the thoughts and opin-
ions of people, many of whom agreed with Carazo, that did not re-
ceive the same kind of media coverage like that of the student 
protesters and officials from international conservation organi-
zations. Diputado Hubert Rojas Araya, for example, led the cause 
against the proposal because he felt the President should have 
the right to adjust conservation policies based on the needs of 
people. Rising to speak on August 2, Rojas criticized ASCONA 1s 
proposal as "absolutely inconvenient" and "an unsolemn [sic] irre-
sponsibility" to attempt including parks and reserves in "one 
package deal." He went on to state that such policies "affect 
thousands of Costa Ricans whose land is there one day and taken 
away the next" and that there had been "hundreds of injustices" 
of this sort. He said there were still people in his district 
who had not been paid for their land that the government had ex-
2 4 1 
propriated years earlier. "Let's not do this," he argued, "I 
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know that many in your districts will suffer too." 
Diputado Rojas and others also spoke on what they perceived 
was a dangerous direction in which the budding conservation move-
ment was headed. Because ASCONA and the influence it was start-
ing to have to affect policy was a relatively new concept in 
Costa Rica, Rojas enjoined his fellow legislators to be cautious: 
I'm not really against ASCONA, but ASCONA wants to 
make Costa Rica into one big national park. Let's 
make national parks and biological reserves—but 
where's the money to pay Costa Ricans for their . 
land? Or should all the land just be given over 
to ASCONA? . . .All this has come about because of 
what the administration is doing to Palo Verde. 
But why? Because the government does not have 
the money to pay for the whole area. Then comes 
ASCONA and protests, but I ask where's the money? 
It's like what happened to the people at Quebrada 
Honda de Guatosa who have been fighting for eight 
years for their money. We can't just go in and 
freeze their land and tell them not to work it any-
more. . . .Let's give audience to the thousands of 
affected campesinos. . . . 
When debate on the floor resumed later that day, Rojas continued: 
I'm not against national parks, just the way in 
which they are created, from the desk of the Pres-
ident. . . I respect ASCONA's philosophy very much, 
but I can't accept that a Costa Rican who has worked 
his land for years wakes up one morning surprised 
to learn that his land has been demarcated and that 
it's no longer his. . . . 1 know that many diputados 
will vote for this because they are against the 
President, but this is a bad reason, . . . it af-
fects many Costa Ricans. . . .This is an error we 
are committing. ( 1 0 5 ) 
On the other side of the issue supporting the Ratification 
Law was Diputado Chaverria Méndez. He agreed with Rojas that 
thousands of people were "being evacuated from their lands . . . 
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for the creation of national parks and reserves/1 but argued 
that it was not being conducted in an irresponsible manner. He 
also refuted Rojas 1 point about voting against any one particular 
president and noted that the law would affect whoever had been 
elected. Most importantly, he hastened to the attention of his 
fellow diputados that often, like with the case of Palo Verde, 
it was not poor campesinos whose land was being expropriated, but 
rather that of agricultural conglomerates—"millionaire business-
men"—who were often from abroad. In closing his speech, Chaver-
ria quoted from the ecological and legal research performed by 
Mario Boza and Ana Maria Tato on the Palo Verde issue and said 
that he "admired and respected ASCONA" because its philosophy rep-
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presented "the majority of Costa Ricans." Rojas1 motion won. A 
year later the bill made it out of committee and was approved by 
the Assembly. The next president, Luis Monge, signed it into law 
ASCONA ' s law suit was, ultimately, not as successful as its 
legislative proposal. When the environmental group first pro-
ceded with its case its attorneys had trouble with Carazo re-
sponding to their requests. Nonetheless, a lower court ruled 
in ASCONA's favor (based on the legalities of the Forestry Law 
and National Parks Act clauses) and invalidated the President's 
d e c r e e to segregate Palo Verde. At that, the administration 
quickly appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the lower 
court's decision and ruled in the government's favor (on the 
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constitutionality question). 
Thus, the trimmed off section of Palo Verde remained sepa-
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rate from the national park for the next few years. But what 
started as a lengthy, drawn out controversy, ended in a quick 
and surprising way: the agribusiness landowners donated the 
land back to the National Park Service by the end of the decade. 
What the environmental groups, court cases, legislative action, 
citizens' protests, and international lobbying could not achieve, 
the rice growers made happen with one single move. The park, now 
connected with the Rafael Lucas Rodriguez National Wildlife 
Refuge, is as Mario Boza has written, "one of the most ecologi-
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cally diverse places in all of the natural areas of the country." 
What conclusions can be drawn from the Palo Verde experi-
ence? First, it is safe to admit that it was an unfortunate con-
troversy that tainted the conservation record of Rodrigo Carazo. 
Alvaro Ugalde's pointed opinion about the administration clearly 
illustrates this point. The words "Carazo" and "Palo Verde" seem 
inherently interconnected when researching Costa Rican conserva-
tion during the early 1980 !s. It was the first response of Kirk 
Koepsel, the Peace Corps volunteer who worked with the SPN at 
that time, when asked about those years. However, keeping things 
in perspective was more of Mario Boza's role when approached on 
the subject in a recent interview. Obviously not fond of the 
memories of that summer in which he resigned from Carazo's ser-
vice, Boza also admitted that the Carazo years witnessed valuable 
conservation advances. Likewise, he praised Carazo for his accom-
plishments on peace and other issues that have characterized his 
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post-presidential years. In fact on this regard Carazo shares re-
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markable similarities to the experience of former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter who seems to enjoy greater public esteem now than he 
did during the troubled years of his term. 
Second, it is important to question the element of inevita-
bility that seemed to characterize the controversy. That it was 
avoidable by either 1. the President's refusal to cow to the agri-
businessmen (as the record shows there were other examples of as 
yet unpaid land acquisitions); or 2. that the landowners could 
have cooperated from the beginning and saved many people a great 
deal of grief, is ahistorically hypothetical, but nonetheless 
realistically possible. The problem, however, is in researching 
these points—there is simply very little evidence to reconstruct 
the entire picture. The Park Service and Legislative archives 
offer no clues and newspaper accounts are basic at best. Journa-
lists of the day did little to investigate the root cause of the 
dilemma. Obviously, political reasons were not at the heart of 
the decision—Carazo by all accounts would have gained political 
popularity points had he backed off his decree.* Future political 
aspirations were moot anyhow since Costa Rican presidents may not 
be re-elected to consecutive terms (and this is a good case in 
point on why not). And, by Carazo's admission, he duly desired 
to see the area protected—he called for its budget allocation 
* While the presidential campaigns were starting to rage that sum-
mer, it is interesting to note that neither Luis Alberto Monge 
(who won) nor Rafael Calderón (who lost) mentioned the Palo Verde 
affair in any newspaper advertisements or press releases. Per-
haps it was just too much of a political liability either way it 
was addressed. 
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for the next fiscal term. Thus we are left with few choices on 
the decree's motivations, and given the overwhelming preponder-
ance of economic evidence of the timeframe, must consider that 
the government simply was broke. Making tough, unpopular econom-
ic policy decisions like expelling the IMF, vetoeing RECOPE, and 
excising part of Palo Verde, then, all must be lumped together. 
Finally, the controversy represents a significant step in 
the evolution of the Costa Rican environmental movement. It be-
came a rallying point for conservationists and biologists to band 
together to work for effecting change—experience that would be 
to their advantage in the not so distant future with other envir-
onmental crises. Moreover, it represents a genuine sincerity 
toward an ecological cause. People were not fighting to preserve 
their favorite lake to go boating on or some other popular recre-
ational destination; they were fighting to save the country's 
most important system of wetlands that is home to nearly three 
hundred species of birds and is one of the most important stop-
over points for migratory waterfowl and waders. Most of the par-
ticipants in the movement, to be sure, probably had not ever 
visited the area. Just knowing its ecological value, however, 
served as incentive enough to be involved. 
Such enthusiasm, it should be noted, at times clouded the 
good judgment of the conservationists. ASCONA president Oscar 
Hutt's public accusation that Carazo was trying to ruin the en-
tire park system, for example, did not really help his cause. 
And Alexander Bonilla tended to exaggerate unfairly when he wrote 
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in his essay "Segregación de Parque Nacional Palo Verde" that Ca-
razo was working for the "elimination" of Palo Verde. Bonilla 
went on to quote Carazo's words of praise for conservation that 
he had written in the prologue of Mario Boza and Rolando Mendo-
za's The National Parks of Costa Rica (see page 227 above), and 
wrote "Oh what irony! Judge for yourselves, Costa Ricans. Yes, 
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our environmental history is full of ironies." 
The Monge Administration 
The debt crisis in Costa Rica hardly evaporated with the 
election of a new president, Luis Alberto Monge, in the fall of 
1981. Monge, of Figueres 1 National Liberation Party, had prom-
ised to work on improving the economy by increasing agricultural 
production and putting "unused land" to work—a concept that un-
derstandably worried conservationists. James Barborak was quoted 
in an October 15 Tico Times article as saying that "the Costa Ri-
can government has the legislative power to reclaim lands inside 
parks for development." So because the Park Service wanted no 
more Palo Verdes, the times now called less for adding new parks 
to the system and more for improved protection of existing ones. 
Mario Boza claimed in the article that "We are moving out of the 
decade of declaration and into a period of consolidation and re-
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fined management of the parks." 
Continuing in the tradition of the Oduber and Carazo presi-
dencies, Luis Alberto Monge made thoughtful appointments to gov-
ernmental agencies responsible for conservation. He named Fran-
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cisco Morales as head of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) who 
retained José Maria Rodríguez as chief of the SPN. Rodriguez had 
been serving as "acting" SPN director during Alvaro Ugalde's grad-
uate school leave, keeping in close touch with him during the ab-
sence, but now assumed full directorship duties. Morales had 
other plans for Ugalde (who had missed the Palo Verde ordeal by 
being in the United States) upon completion of his studies in 
Michigan: full time fundraiser for the parks program with an of-
fice in Washington, D.C. Actually, the idea for the job had come 
from Geoffrey Barnard of The Nature Conservancy who maintained 
that Costa Rica Ts conservation program was developed enough by 
this time to warrant such a position. The Conservancy worked 
very closely with Ugalde, the SPN, and the Fundación de Parques 
Nacionales (FPN) in those days and supplied office space for Ugal-
de at its Washington headquarters. Glad to have a new adminstra-
tion, Ugalde sent President Monge and his wife Doris their own 
separate copies of the book The National Parks of Costa Rica "as 
a small showing of our welcome." He indicated in a note to the 
new First Lady that he would like to meet with her to discuss his 
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program of increasing park funding. Meanwhile, Mario Boza con-
tinued his work at the National University and became an ever 
more active president of the FPN. Ugalde in his fundraising po-
sition was the FNP's Executive Director. 
Fundraising by the FPN was at the center of national parks 
activity during the Monge administration (1982-1986). "The eco-
nomic crisis itself was a new lesson," Ugalde later recalled, 
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"[n]either could we trust the national economy or the financial 
system that we had." Thus, while Costa Rica's economy reached 
rock bottom in 1982-83, the FPN launched a five year 5.5 mil-
lion dollar fundraising campaign—a drive that made similar ef-
forts during the Carazo years pale in comparison. The goal was 
to reach three million dollars during President Monge fs term 
alone. In a letter to the Vice Minister of the Presidency, 
Ugalde alerted the administration to the goal and encouragingly 
noted, "We think this is doable, we are very optimistic." "How-
ever," Ugalde continued, "we will depend on the strong moral sup-
port of the President of the Republic and of the government in 
general." A few months later, Ugalde wrote directly to the Presi-
dent suggesting how "indispensable" it was for him "to show that 
he and his administration were endorsing our efforts." He also 
asked him to lend his name to the campaign committee as an honor-
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ary chairman. Monge agreed to the request. 
In February 1982 the FPN issued an eight point "Priorities 
Plan" to outline the goals of the fundraising campaign.* At the 
top of the list was what was to become the FPN's principal focus 
in the early eighties: acquisition of private in-holdings within 
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park boundaries. It was the in-holdings that were needed to con-
* In descending order of priority, the Plan called for 1 . Acquisi-
tion of lands; 2. Projects for the administration and improve-
ments of the parks; 3. Training programs (for park personnel); 
4. Research, inventorying, and planning of facilities; 5. Proj-
ects for "conservationist and ecological development;" 6. FNP 
budget funding; 7. Interpretative service at national parks; and 
8, Publications. 
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solídate the management of the parks and to better protect their 
ecological characteristics. José María Rodríguez explained, 
By 1982, . . . the [economic] crisis was hitting 
really hard. . . . [W]e were getting all kinds of 
pressure from owners of private inholdings in the 
parks. They all started screaming, fWe want the 
money! We want the money! Or we'll cut the trees 
in the night! We have the right! We're the legal 
owners!' Many of them started pushing very hard 
in different ways: going to the press, threatening 
to go to court to get establishment of the park 
declared illegal on their land. We were really 
afraid of the legal precedent that would set. (115) 
Examples of what Rodriguez was talking about were occurring at 
Cahuita, Braulio Carrillo, Poa's Volcano, and Santa Rosa national 
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parks. 
The brunt of this legal problem, as in the case of Palo 
Verde, fell on the shoulders of SPN attorney Ana María Tato. De-
cribed by David Rains Wallace as someone with "an almost relig-
ious faith in the Park Service's mission," Tato literally worked 
nights to keep the landowners' demands out of court. She was a 
"very energetic woman," Rodriguez remembered, "although they [the 
landowners] made her life miserable." He went on to explain how 
the landowners would call her at home and threaten her because 
they had not yet been paid for expropriated properties. Compound-
ding the problem was that ASCONA had filed suit against the gov-
ernment (specifically against MAG) for allowing private conces-
sions within national parks. The environmental group pressed all 
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the way to the Supreme Court to force expropriations. 
The problem was simply financial. Alvaro Ugalde elaborated 
on the dilemma in a 1981 interview with David Carr of the Carib-
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bean Conservation Corporation (CCC): 
The government has had no doubts or qualms in estab-
lishing the present system, but it has not been able 
or willing to provide the funds necessary for land 
acquisition. That is definitely the biggest part of 
our . . . expenses. It is very easy to pass a law, 
to freeze the land, to say 'That's a park,' and for 
us to send a few rangers to take care of the land. 
But then what? We probably own about eighty percent 
of the land in the system, but around twenty percent 
is private property. (118) 
Thus Ugalde's work was laid plainly out for him in his Washington 
office in 1982. By May of that year he had met with a variety of 
international conservation organizations in Washington and New 
York and reported successful meetings with them. The Nature Con-
servancy had accepted a proposal to contribute $320,000; the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) had accepted one for $25,000; and the 
Rare Animal Relief Effort (RARE) and the CCC were considering 
similar proposals at the time of a report he made to the FNP's 
executive board. Gerald Leiberman of RARE, Ugalde noted, had 
also agreed to help him get an article published in Audubon Maga-
zine to further publicize the need for funds.* Later that year, 
OTS director Donald Stone informed Ugalde that his organization 
had come up with $50, 000 to help with the Zona Protectora land 
* All fundraising appeals were not equally as successful. In 
1983, for example, the OTS turned the FPN down for a similar re-
quest to continue helping with Braulio Carrillo land acquisition. 
OTS board member Thomas Yuill wrote Ugalde saying that the cur-
rent situation at Braulio Carrillo was just too "discouraging." 
He explained that there was too much private land within the Zona 
Protectora and that the FPN was being "overly optimistic" with 
its land-swaps plan. He also mentioned that Peter Raven (of the 
OTS board) had met with "unrewarding" fundraising attempts on 
behalf of this cause. (Yuill to Ugalde, 12 October 1983, SPN 
file no. 1206.) 
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acquisition in Braulio Carillo National Park.- And in 1984, the 
WWF, the Norway Chapter of the WWF, and the New York Zoological 
Society contributed a total of $84,000 for help with land pur-
119 
chases at Tortuguero, to list but a few of the donors. "It was 
breaking new ground," as Ugalde described his campaign effort, 
"It was not a fad to donate money for conservation in those weird 
third world countries with unrest and corruption and whatever. 
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Costa Rica, they [the donors] didn't even know where it was." 
To educate the donors, then, the Costa Ricans' fundraising 
campaign became more sophisticated than it had been in the past. 
The plan now was to bring potential contributors to Costa Rica 
and show them first hand what the projects were all about. Such 
was the approach that Mario Boza took when he directed a grant 
proposal for the Tinker Foundation in mid-1983. The foundation's 
president, Renate Rennie, visited the country that summer and, in 
a memo to SPN and FPN staff, Boza listed specific assignments for 
each person (who was to pick her up at the airport, e t c ) , issued 
a complete schedule of activities for her stay, and directed them 
"to attend to her well." The grant proposal itself was for 
$149,050 as "seed money" for the first three years of a national 
environmental education program (as per one of the FPN's priori-
ties) which would become a permanent, self-supportive fund. 
Ugalde summed up the importance of these visits when he said, "I 
think we raised the funds because we could bring the donors here 
to show them what we were doing; because we had a good record of 
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democracy; and because of our own dedication to the cause." 
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Another benefit to the program came when Mario Boza and Al-
varo Ugalde were awarded the Getty Prize (for conservation) in 
1983. They accepted the award in Washington at a Rose Garden 
ceremony presided over by U.S. President Ronald Reagan. "Cre-
ating a park on paper is easy/ 1 Boza stated in his acceptance 
speech, "preserving it is another story. We have to teach the 
people what conservation is . . . [that it] is a tool of devel-
opment." Ugalde later lamented that there was a lack of press 
coverage of the event and that Secretary of Interior James Watt 
was not in attendance because of the troubles he was facing in 
those last few days of his in office. Other coverage of the 
FPN's campaign, and especially of the Costa Rican national parks 
themselves, did come in the form of articles in U.S. and British 
conservation magazines and journals which helped greatly to raise 
awareness of the cause. But in conclusion, and to make a long 
fundraising story short, the FPN's 5.5 million dollar drive 
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succeeded by 1986—in less than the hoped for five year period. 
There is a human side to Costa Rica's quest to consolidate 
its park holdings. As Diputado Hubert Rojas had orated to his 
colleagues in the Legislative Assembly during the Palo Verde af-
fair, people's land was often confiscated for park creation pur-
poses. A representative case in point made it to the office of 
the presidency in the spring of 1982. Nelly Boza Guadamuz 
wrote directly to the president begging him to prevent the 
government from taking over her land in Alajuela province. 
Writing as a "campesina, worker of the land, mother of several 
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children, and becoming elderly in age/' the woman cited how she 
had heard that her "parcel of land" could "be taken away to make 
into a park, projected to be [named] Garobito."* Closing, she 
wrote emotionally, "I beg you to tell them not to take away what 
has cost me so much pain and tears." The letter was forwarded to 
the desk of José María Rodríguez at SPN who later informed the 
President's office and Nelly Boza Guadamuz that the area had 
since been withdrawn from park feasibility study "for its lack 
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of appropriate national park characteristics." 
Others who were forced to move for the improved conservation 
of the country were usually paid for their land (when money was 
available) and were assisted in their move to another location. 
The issue became more complicated in the mid-1980's, however, 
when a gold boom hit the Osa Peninsula in southwestern Costa Rica 
and prospect miners (oreros) flooded into Corcovado National 
Park. Mining operations in the park environs had been suspended 
when President Oduber decreed the park's creation and when Roger 
Morales spearheaded the orero relocation effort. But with the 
Costa Rican economy in shambles and high unemployment (n = 79,000 
in March of 1982—a forty-four percent increase from that time 
one year earlier), many individuals sought work and wealth mining 
for gold. A study in 1985, however, estimated that ninety per-
cent of the miners in Corcovado had other sources of employment 
* The proposed Garobito National Park was named after a legendary 
regional indigenous leader who during the Spanish conquest of Cen-
tral America had eluded conquistadors by his clever tactics and 
intimate knowledge of the environment. 
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and that thirty to fifty percent owned farmland in the region. 
Permits to reroute the Rincón River for placer mining were de-
nied by the Ministry of Industry, Energy, and Mines (MIRENEM) 
but that hardly slowed the influx of oreros who set up their own 
individual mining operations in and around the park. Another 
study showed that there were 1,500 illegal oreros in Corcovado 
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and 3,500 "legal" mining concessions in areas surrounding it. 
The problem for the Park Service was that MIRENEM issued a 
report outlining how public lands could be used for mining (in 
accordance with Article 39 of the Mining Code). It also encour-
aged miners to continue their pursuits as long as they had a 
mining permit and followed certain norms. The report further 
indicated that the Central Bank in San José would continue to buy 
gold at international market prices ("representing its importance 
to the Costa Rican economy"). In October of 1982, for instance, 
Costa Rica had exported 568 kilos of refined gold at a value of 
$3,558,080. Also, in 1983 a legislative committee met with 
members of industry and of the conservation community to discuss 
what sort of mining could be allowed. It was generally agreed 
that placer gold mining for small scale artisanry would be 
allowed and that water pumps and dynamite would be restricted to 
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certain areas. But when oreros continued to stream into the 
area, the few guards posted at Corcovado could not come close to 
monitoring permits or seeing if Mining Code "norms" or regula-
tions were being followed. 
By 1985 Alvaro Ugalde had left Washington, D.C., to resume 
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his duties as director of SPN. Ugalde sensed very closely the 
growing crisis in Corcovado and wanted to do what he could to pro-
tect the park. He commissioned Dan Janzen, an OTS board member 
and University of Pennsylvania tropical ecologist famed for his 
specialty on the tropical dry forest ecology of Guanacaste, to 
conduct an on-site study of the orero impact on Corcovado. Jan-
zen !s research team found significant damage to the park ecosys-
tem: mammal species were nearly eliminated, streams were sterile 
and muddy from sediment run off (Janzen learned that a common 
local saying was "if the river isn't muddy, you're not working 
hard enough"), organic life in rivers and streams was almost com-
pletely absent, and plant communities had been severly altered. 
The report concluded that "several centuries will pass" before 
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pre-mining ecological conditions could be restored. 
Not surprisingly, then, Janzen's study called for the com-
plete removal of oreros without compensation. His study cited 
a series of laws that had been violated by having miners in the 
park and recommended that SPN utilize the Rural Guard to assist 
in removal. On March 2, 1986 (nearing the end of Monge's term) 
the Rural Guard drove out the oreros, destroyed their makeshift 
shelters, and seized their mining equipment.* Alvaro Ugalde 
later told David Wallace that "The gold mining situation was 
another awakening for the Park Service, it was our biggest mis-
* Later in 1987, many of the evicted miners camped out for sever-
al weeks in San Jose's central park demanding compensation for 
the Rural Guard's destruction. The government ended up paying 
$3,800 to each of the displaced miners. 
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take." He related how it woke up the Service to realize that 
"if you think people are going to respect the parks just because 
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they're parks, forget it." Illegal mining activity resumed in 
Corcovado and its surroundings in the late 1980's and early 90's. 
One conservation lesson gleaned from the Corcovado orero ex-
perience was that the buffer zones surrounding national parks and 
reserves are as important to the ecological health of the environ-
ment to be protected as the park itself. With that in mind, Ugal-
de and Rodrigo Gámez, a plant virologist active in conservation 
issues, decided to form an organization dedicated to the protec-
tion of ecological buffer zones in 1986. Called Fundación Neo-
trópica, the foundation began similarly to Fundación de Parques 
Nacionales (they even shared the same office space for several 
years) but with a different focus for raising and channeling 
funds and, now, without the ties to the government. It is a pri-
vate foundation that works to acquire land for conservation, and 
more recently, to promote programs in environmental education. 
It also has served as a "bank" for debt-swaps and other fundrais-
ing activities and is yet another example of Costa Rica's suc-
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cesses in conservation through crisis. 
There were also some successes on the legislative front. In 
the fall of 1982 the Legislative Assembly passed the National 
Ratification Law (no. 6794) that ASCONA had lobbied for during 
the Palo Verde situation. President Monge inked it into law at 
a ceremony on October 16. The speech he gave at that event, how-
ever, had been written almost entirely by Alvaro Ugalde upon the 
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request of a Monge aid who had written him asking for ideas. The 
President (or Ugalde) outlined in the speech a plethora of advan-
tages acrued from conservation practices and ended by saying 
Perhaps I will be the last President of Costa Rica 
who will be able to create new and indispensable 
natural conservation areas like national parks, 
biological reserves, and national forests. My suc-
cessors will only be able to improve them or allow 
for their destruction. . . . Let's consolidate the 
system of national parks and let's establish others 
that the scientists recommend as ones of great im-
portance to save. . . . I urge all Costa Ricans to 
join groups like Fundación de Parques Nacionales 
and ASCONA so that, together with the government 
of the Republic, we can achieve concrete actions 
in the field of rational use of natural resources 
and conservation of our biological diversity. (129) 
Other goals were achieved during the Monge administration. 
In the fall of 1982 the government inaugurated the "Volvamos a 
la Tierra" (Return to the Earth) program to encourage "balance 
between man's actions and the ecological possibilities and limi-
tations in which they develop." It was a program "with profound 
conservationist ingredients" designed to show how the basic 
necessities from the land (i.e. food, fibers, medicines, etc.) 
could be used "without reducing the natural environment on which 
we depend." (See Figure 1.) 
At the same time OFIPLAN approved funding a program to re-
search the needs of the country's forestry education. It's goal 
was to discern "what directions should be taken in forestry re-
search" and to discuss the idea of creating one consolidated uni-
versity level forestry program. And in October of 1983 Jose 
Maria Rodriguez noted in an SPN report that significant advances 
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VOLVAMOS A LA TIERR 
(source: Manuel Rojas, Los affos ochenta y el futuro incierto 
[San José: Editorial UNED, 1991] 
had been made in his departmentf s environmental education pro-
gram. Some of the achievements included nation-wide radio spots, 
school presentations, university conferences, short television 
announcements, pamphlets produced for each park, outdoor exhibits 
and booths at the parks, and a two week workshop on environmental 
education held at Poás Volcano. "The results have been satisfac-
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tory," wrote Rodríguez, "despite the limitations of budget re-
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sources and personnel that we have had." 
The nation's financial limitations gave birth to a variety 
of plans that supposedly would boost the economy. However, many 
of these plans, like gold mining in Corcovado, presented grave 
dangers to the environment. Another such controversial environ-
mental dilemma that the Monge administration had to confront was 
a proposed trans-isthmian oil pipeline (oleoducto) that would 
connect the Caribbean coast with the Pacific. Different plans 
for such a project had been in the works since the late 1970's. 
Neither plans for a pipeline near Golfo Dulce (scuttled by Pres-
ident Oduber) or one across northern Costa Rica (supported by 
President Carazo) had ever materialized, thus opening the possi-
bility for a new proposal in 1982-83. Proponents, including the 
government, supported the plan as a boon to the economy. Environ-
mentalists opposed it based on potential ecological impacts that 
could result from the oleoducto's construction and possible rup-
ture and spills. The environmental group ASCONA presented espec-
ially strong opposition to the proposal. 
ASCONA carried the banner against the pipeline. The group 
worked to publicize the environmental and economic effects of 
recent oil spills in Alaska and Panama. It cited how possible 
spills in Costa Rica would negatively affect the coastal fish-
ing industry and the budding tourism industry. It showed how 
the pipeline's construction, and parallel maintenance roads, 
would augment deforestation, contaminate rivers, and forever 
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damage wildlife habitat. Alexander Bonilla, who dedicated him-
self in those years to the fight against the pipeline, wrote that 
"we ecologists believe that construction will bring serious 
environmental consequences that would have repercussions on the 
national economy." He further explained that "this position is 
not romantic, unpatriotic, and much less of the extreme left as 
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some sectors of the government have been suggesting," 
Although no trans-isthmian oil pipeline was ever built, the 
oleoducto controversy caused ASCONA's eventual demise. Bonilla 
has asserted that "pro-government persons infiltrated" the orga-
nization at the height of the campaign and "tried to get ASCONA 
to adopt an official position in favor of the project" despite 
its own statutes and history of vigorously opposing such measures 
in the past. Those people did not succeed in altering ASCONA's 
position, Bonilla claimed, but through the infighting they gener-
ated and negative publicity they caused, ended up breaking the 
organization. And while the group still exists "on paper" today, 
Bonilla (who has since left ASCONA) explained in a recent inter-
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view, "it does not have any power; the oleoducto ruined it." 
It was during this same time period that Bonilla was active 
on another environmental cause: the creation of the Partido Ecolo-
gista Costarricense (the Costa Rican Ecology Party, PEC). After 
years of studies and committees, the political party was formed 
in 1984 by a group of ambitious environmentalists and university 
scientists. Calling it a "new hope" for Costa Rica, Bonilla, 
who served as the party's first president, wrote that "the PEC 
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was born as a new alternative among the traditional political 
parties whose environmental misinformation, ignorance of the 
ecological interrelationships of a society, and adherence to an 
ancestral economic hegemony have been transformed into the 
depredatory economic principles of the economic, social, and 
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political structure of Costa Rica." 
The PEC, which was modelled loosely on the concepts of the 
European "Greens," focuses on national environmental concerns, 
agrarian reform, and the principles of non-violence. It urges 
rigid adherence to Costa Rica's tradition of permanent unarmed 
neutrality. Bonilla has stated that the PEC goes beyond en-
vironmental activism, explaining in an interview with Bill 
Weinberg that "the problem with many ecology groups in Central 
America is that they fail to address the political and economic 
problems as part of the environmental problems."* But while 
the party has suffered from financial problems and, as another 
study put it, "not brought with it the fortification of the 
ecological movement" in Costa Rica, it has made a presence in 
many local and national elections. It is one of the few 
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"green parties" in Central America. 
President Monge did not play a big role in the Corcovado 
orero situation or the oleoducto debate, but he was personally 
* More recently Bonilla has disaffiliated himself with any envir-
onmental organizations and is a private, environmental consul-
tant. He was the recipient of a U.N. "ecology in action" prize 
for his work on sustainable development. He continues to write 
books, provides environmental training workshops, and hosts a 
weekly radio program on ecological issues. 
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involved in another environmental controversy: scandal number 
six at Santa Rosa National Park. The El Murciélago unit joining 
the park continued to be used for a military training grounds 
by the Civil Guard during the Monge administration and by 1983 
became a staging base for the Nicaraguan contra faction of Eden 
Pastora. Financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency during 
the Reagan administration, Pastora!s forces attacked Sandinista 
soldiers at the border post (Peñas Blancas) just north of Santa 
Rosa and returned to El Murciélago. That and other border skir-
mishes caused damage and property loss on Costa Rican soil which 
prompted Mongefs Minister of Public Security, Angel Edmundo Sola-
no, to crack down on contra activity in Costa Rica and Monge to 
issue a Proclamation of Neutrality on November 17.* 
Solano, who had gone public with his views that the CIA 
wanted to militarize Costa Rica's Civil Guard to join President 
Reagan's efforts against the Sandinistas, worked to enforce Mon-
ge 's neutrality stance and met with Nicaraguan officials about 
reducing the border skirmishes. But right-wing groups in Costa 
Rica (i.e. the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, La Nacidh, and 
officials in the Ministry of the Interior) as well as U.S. Ambas-
* According to Andrew Reding ("Costa Rica: Democratic Model in 
Jeopardy," p. 309), Monge's proclamation was supported by eighty-
three percent of Costa Ricans, the Roman Catholic Church, and 
every country in the world, except the United States. U.S. Ambas-
sador to Costa Rica Curtin Winsor, Jr., failed to attend Monge's 
proclamation ceremony. Bill Weinberg (War on the Land, p. 117) 
relates how Winsor was eventually called home from Costa Rica 
"apparently for insufficient subtlety" after he mentioned in a 
public speech that Nicaragua was "an infested piece of meat that 
attracts insects from all over." 
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sador Curtin Winsor, Jr., opposed Solano's interference with the 
CIA plans and pressed to have him removed.* Monge relented (in 
fact he shook up the entire cabinet) and named arch-conservative 
Benjamin Piza to Solano's position. 
Piza was a founder of the MCRL (Free Costa Rica Movement, a 
John Birch-type paramilitary organization affiliated with the 
World Ant i-Communist League) who immediately into his position 
accelerated the anti-Sandinista operations at El Murciélago. 
When Monge was gone on an official trip to Europe, Piza ignored 
the neutrality stance (and long range Park Service plans to con-
serve the area for annexation to Santa Rosa, for that matter) and 
worked with the CIA and the Pentagon to arrange the arrival of a 
U.S. Army Special Forces division (Green Berets). Along with 
West German and Israeli military advisors, the Green Berets con-
ducted ten two-week sessions training 1 , 000 Civil Guards in 
jungle survival, counter-insurgency warfare, riot control, and 
border patrol operations in the fragile environment of the tropi-
cal dry forest of Santa Elena Peninsula. 
The Guard units became known as Batallones Relámpagos (the Light-
ning Battalions) and supposedly were geared for anti-Sandinista 
warfare and for training other troops. Their staging ground in 
the forest was off limits to civilian Costa Ricans. Soon after 
* In 1987, Winsor admitted that working to have Solano fired 
was part of his role in the Reagan administration s illegal 
Iran-contra operation. He suggested that silencing Solano would 
help ití¡íii the investigation of Lt. Col. Oliver North s secret 
activities with the contras. (See Weinberg, p. n'-J 
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the unit was discovered, former President Rodrigo Carazo advised 
that "these Lightning Battalions should be dissolved . . . be™ 
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cause a spirit of militarism is like a contagious disease." 
But that was not all the peninsula adjoining Santa Rosa 
National Park was being used for. President Monge was reportedly 
furious upon his return from Europe to learn that Benjamin Piza 
had converted El Murciélago into a Green Beret training field. 
But, as was discovered when the story started to unravel after 
his term had expired, Monge had approved the construction of 
a secret contra resupply airstrip to be built on land that had 
been earmarked for national park expansion (scandal number sev-
en) . The 6,500-foot airstrip, part of the whole Oliver North 
"contragate" drugs-for-arms disgrace, was built in an ecologic-
ally sensitive part of Guanacaste where wildlife seasonally mi-
grate between the Pacific dry forest and the cooler highlands of 
the volcanic slopes. The peninsula is home to rare species of 
vegetation that have evolved over time due to the fact that the 
ground there has been above the ocean longer than elsewhere in 
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Central America. 
President Monge claimed he sanctioned construction of the 
airstrip because officials from Washington had warned him of an 
imminent Sandinista invasion of Costa Rica. The landing field, 
he believed, would be used to airlift in border defense supplies. 
Lewis Tambs, who had replaced Curtin Winsor as U.S. Ambassador to 
Costa Rica, pressured Monge to approve the plan by threatening to 
cut off U.S. aid—an unattractive scenario during the economic 
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crisis.* Then, representatives from a Panama-based "dummy corpo-
poration" called Udall Research (engineered by Richard Secord and 
Albert Hakim of the "Project Democracy"), arrived in the town of 
Liberia, Guanacaste, to solicit cooperation from the local Civil 
Guard commander. They informed him that they were preparing to 
build a tourist project on the Santa Elena Peninsula and needed 
his support to transport workers, construction materials, and 
heavy equipment through Santa Rosa National Park. Advised by 
Figure 3: Political Cartoon Regarding Secret Airstrip near 
Santa Rosa National Park 
(source: Joshua Karliner, "Contragate: The Environmental 
Connection," EPOCA Update [summer 1987], 4-5) 
* In the Tower Commission that the U.S. Senate used to investi-
gate the "contragate" scandal, Tambs admitted that he and Oliver 
North had also attempted to bribe Mongefs successor, Oscar Arias, 
to cut off aid if he went public with the airstrip's discovery. 
Arias refused to be intimidated and held a press conference to 
announce not only the strip's existence, but also its closure. 
U.S. aid, however, did decline; it dropped from $180 million in 
1986 when Arias came into office to $85 million by 1987. (Wein-
berg, War on the Land, p. 119-120.) 
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Public Security Minister Benjamin Piza to cooperate, the command-
er then pressured park officials for such a request and lent 
Guardsmen to assist with the airstrip's construction. The U.S. 
construction crew and Costa Rican Guardsmen, however, hardly 
respected the environment. They set forest fires in the area, 
hunted deer without permission, dined on rare Kemp's ridley sea 
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turtle eggs, and at least on one occasion shot a tapir for sport. 
The affair finally came to light when local residents became 
suspicious in the fall of 1986. After repeatedly seeing large 
military transport aircraft flying low and landing (especially at 
odd hours) and military trucks moving fuel drums and other equip-
ment in and out of the area, they alerted officials who discov-
ered the secret strip.* By early 1987, the new President—Oscar 
Arias—had declared his intent to work with the SPN to develop 
the area into Guanacaste National Park. Such a plan was to be 
the start of a whole new administrative restructuring program 
that would characterize the future of Costa Rica's conservation 
agenda. 
For their part, the individuals who had been so instrumental 
with conservation programs during the last two administrations 
* Via the hearings from the U.S. Senate's Tower Commission and an 
investigative committee of Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly, 
facts surfaced regarding how the strip was used not only as a 
base from which to fly U.S. arms for the contras into Nicaragua, 
but also allegedly to fund Manuel Noriega's drug smuggling opera-
tion with funds from an arms-sale to Iran. The Legislative Assem-
bly barred Oliver North, John Poindexter, Richard Secord, Lewis 
Tambs, and CIA Costa Rica Station chief Joe Fernandez from ever 
returning to Costa Rica. It also indicted Benjamin Piza and the 
Liberia commander who were a part of the team. 
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would continue to be involved, if not in different capacities in-
side or out of the government. Alvaro Ugalde, for example, who 
in 1985 had returned to his position as SPN director to work on 
the Corcovado crisis, left again in 1986 at the end of Monge fs 
term, "burnt out" from the work and emotional toil involved with 
the orero evictions. For the next four years he worked in a 
variety of non-governmental conservation positions, including 
ones at the Conservation Foundation and The Nature Conservancy, 
as an advisor to conservation programs in Paraguay and Guatemala, 
and even as a national parks guide for a major ecotourism firm in 
Costa Rica. Vera Várela succeded Ugalde as Executive Director of 
Fundación de Parques Nacionales. She later served in the same 
capacity at Fundación Neotro'pica. José María Rodríguez decided 
to take a leave of absence for his own training and professional 
development in 1984. Following in Ugalde's footsteps, he left 
the SPN for graduate work at the University of Michigan. Luis 
Méndez, a biologist who had been serving as SPN Assistant Direc-
tor since the late 1970's, assumed acting directorship duties for 
1984, moved over when Ugalde came back in 1985, but then was 
named SPN Director by the new Arias administration in 1986. 
Mario Boza remained active with the environmental studies progam 
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at the State Open University and as president of the FPN. 
The people and organizations like the ones mentioned here 
and throughout this chapter played an indispensable role in see-
ing Costa Rica meet the challenging goals of conservation through 
crisis. The experience gained from the 1978-1986 fundraising 
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efforts was not shelved in the coming years. New opportunities 
and ideas for the 1990's and beyond would mean drawing on past 
lessons and successes to continue and expand on the way the 
country's environment could be protected. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESTRUCTURING AND DECENTRALIZING CONSERVATION 
We Costa Ricans have achieved important successes in 
the preservation of our natural patrimony. In just a 
few short years we have been able to consolidate a sys-
tem of protected areas . . . that perpetually guaran-
tees the majority of our natural treasures. But we 
should recognize that until now the concept of sustain-
able development has not formed part . . . of the ways 
implemented for socioeconomic development. 
- Oscar Arias Sánchez (1 ) 
When Oscar Arias was elected President of Costa Rica in 1986 
the national parks program of his country was in the beginning 
stages of undergoing a philosophical change in strategy. What 
conservationists and politicians now saw as the coming role of 
national parks and preserves was their ability to be incorporated 
into the nation's larger socio-economic context. Tropical ecolo-
gist Daniel Janzen, active for so many years in ecological re-
search in Guanacaste but now moving into a conservation advocacy 
role, perhaps best explained the new phenomenon when he wrote, 
"The traditions of tropical conservation in general, and certain-
ly in Costa Rica specifically, have to evolve with urgent haste 
to a mode where the integration of the park into the social con-
sciousness is dominant and central to the entire [management] 
2 
plan." The ideas of Arias and Janzen here, then, reflect the 
growing attention to "sustainable development" that started to 
flourish in international conservationist thought by the mid-
1980 's and would set the tone for environmental policymaking in 
the next three administrations: Oscar Arias Sanchez (1986-
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1990), Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier (1990-1994), and José 
María Figueres Olsen (1994-1998). 
One of the first testing grounds where the principles of sus-
tainable development would be incorporated into the management 
plan of a protected area was with the creation of Guanacaste 
National Park in the late 1980's. When President Arias was hand-
ed the Green Beret and "contragate" airstrip scandals at Santa Ro-
sa from out-going President Luis Alberto Monge, he was confronted 
with decisions that had to be made for the long-range use of the 
Santa Elena Peninsula and surrounding areas of tropical dry for-
est. To the east of Santa Rosa (and east of the Pan American 
Highway) plans had been in the offing since 1985 to develop a 
vast area of dry forest and sloping volcanoes into a large con-
servation area based on "tropical restoration." 
The plan was the brainchild of entomologist and tropical 
ecologist Daniel Janzen who had been working, researching, and 
living in Guanacaste for over twenty years. He usually spent 
half of the year in Costa Rica and the other half back at his 
post in the biology department at the University of Pennsyl-
vania. His research focus had centered on the life history of 
saturniid moths and on co-evolution (plant-animal-insect adap-
tations and interdependencies). But after an invitation by the 
government of Australia to study that country's dry forests 
(which were rapidly becoming extinct) and after his experience in 
Corcovado that Alvaro Ugalde had requested he do for the National 
Park Service (which alerted him to how endangered an ecosystem 
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can become)—both experiences that took place in 1985, Janzen 
became converted to the gospel of conservation. Before that "I 
never gave a second thought to conservation,1' he mentioned to one 
reporter. To another he admitted that he "used to chain saw big 
trees just to count rings for my research with no more thought 
than you'd flick an insect off your sleeve." It was then that he 
witnessed with greater concern how the Pacific dry forest that 
once had spanned much of the west coast of Mexico and Central 
3 
America was at the brink of ecosystem extinction. (See map, 
Figure 1.) Wasting no time, Janzen authored a study in 1986 
study in 1986 entitled Guanacaste National Park: Tropical, Eco-
logical, and Cultural Restoration as a format to present to the 
Figure 1 : Original Extent of Pacific Tropical Dry Forest 
OCK A NO PACIFICO 
(source: Carlos E. Valerio, La diversidad biológica de 
Costa Rica [San José: Heliconia, 1991]) 
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Costa Rican government in hopes the area would be considered for 
conservation status. Janzen noted in the work that only two 
percent (or 6,600 square miles) of the original 330,000 square 
miles of Mesoamerican Pacific dry forest yet remained relatively 
undisturbed and that only .08 percent (or 264 square miles) 
existed in legally protected areas (Santa Rosa National Park and 
4 
several small reserves in Costa Rica and other countries). 
The ecosystem disappearance, of course, was due to intensive 
burning and agricultural development. Since the days of the Span-
ish encounter, the tropical dry forest of Costa Rica had been 
used more than the country's rain forests for farming due to its 
vast savanna clearings and long dry season (November to April). 
It is a windy, leafless, and brown environment during that time 
and lush green and wet from May to October. The area has been 
cleared with annual fires for four hundred years which kept sap-
lings down and moved the grasslands further into the forest mar-
5 
gins. Answering his own hypothetical question concerning what 
would happen if the Guanacaste National Park Project (GNPP) area 
were not preserved, Janzen wrote: 
We retreat to Santa Rosa (the Muriciélago area 
will be roasted off the map by the wildfires) and 
carry out all of the goals for Guanacaste National 
Park on an inferior scale and in a gradually de-
composing habitat. All of the inventory and other 
biological studies for Guanacaste will be priceless 
as salvage biology, and at least tell future gener-
ations what they lost. ( 6 ) 
Thus his goal was to "put biology back into [the local people's] 
cultural repertoir—back on the same status with music, art, and 
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religion" as opposed to their current preoccupation with rice, 
cotton, sorghum, and cattle. And looking at the larger picture 
of Guanacaste fs importance for Costa Rica and for the study of 
ecology in general, Janzen asserted that "to lose the abundance 
of tropical dry forest to the damands of agriculture is compara-
ble to processing the books in the Library of Congress to relieve 
7 
a temporary paper shortage." 
What made the park specifically different from others was 
that its management plan retained some local economic uses. 
Cattle grazing, for instance, was allowed (although managed to 
prevent pasture depletion) which Janzen saw as beneficial for 
seed dispersal, grass control, and generating local support. 
Burning and hunting, however, were banned and reforestation 
projects launched as preliminary methods to restore the ecosys-
tem. The plan was to plant just a few trees in the pastures that 
once had been forests and to let nature take care of the rest. 
Janzen !s research found that the wind and the manuring effect of 
seed-dispersing animals (i.e. deer, monkeys, peccaries, agoutis, 
cotton rats, bats, and magpie jays which eat fruits and nuts then 
defecate seeds elsewhere) could work to start the restoration 
process in roughly ten years time. Restoring the entire area 
with "all the plants and animals that were here when the Span-
8 
iards arrived,"* however, will take hundreds of years. 
* Janzen notes that there are twenty to forty percent fewer plant 
and bird species in the tropical dry forest than in Costa Rica's 
rainforests. The number of mammal, reptile, amphibian, and in-
sect species is about the same. (In Constance Holden, "Regrowing 
a Dry Tropical Forest," 809.) 
274 
Janzen's strategy for restoring and protecting this ecosys-
stem in Guanacaste called for manipulated management using both 
the natural and human resources of the area. Believed to be the 
first place in the tropical world to test such a theory, the goal 
was "to integrate the park itself into . . . local and national 
society." The park was to be geographically large enough "to 
maintain healthy populations of all animals, plants, and habitats 
that are known to have originally occupied the site" and which 
would work for "habitat replication." The park would also serve 
as a "gene and seed bank," provide "watershed protection," and be 
available to limited numbers of both ecotourists and "convention-
9 
nal" tourists. 
This kind of a management scheme breaks from the past ex-
perience of Costa Rican national parks, which according to Janzen 
were modeled after their counterparts in the United States espous-
ing a "caretaker" philosophy. The "parks basically have been 
taken care of by a police force," he argued in a 1988 interview, 
"they have not been managed with regard to their biological 
needs. "* Nor, as he continued, have they succeeded in adequately 
10 
including local residents into their overall operation. At Guana-
caste National Park, Janzen set up programs for local school 
children such as field trips to the beaches for biology lessons. 
Some of the children even helped pick seeds out of horse dung 
to be planted later where needed. He also employed area work-
* This thinking has not always endeared him to Park Service em-
ployees. Resentment finally led to the government's request that 
he leave Costa Rica for awhile. (Tom Barry, Costa Rica, 75.) 
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ers to help collect and catalogue specimens from the park's 
plant and animal life and to be on fire control teams ("broom 
squads") during the dry season. "The fire crew is deadly," he 
told a reporter in 1989, "only six percent of the GNPP burned 
this year, as compared with the traditional thirty percent 
11 
barbecue." Some local farm families elected to stay on their 
farms but work for the park—adding to the complete "self-
supporting . . . biocultural restoration" of the environment. 
"We have to integrate the park into the minds and pocketbooks 
12 
of the community," he added. 
The pocketbook of the government at the time Arias took of-
fice, however, could not sustain purchasing the amount of land 
called for in Janzenrs proposal. Janzen had approached Arias 
about the park idea and received his blessing for it, but was 
informed that the government could not support it financially at 
that particular time. Undaunted and satisfied to have Arias' sup-
port for the project, Janzen launched his own fundraising blitz. 
Mario Boza at Fundación de Parques Nacionales (FNP) gladly en-
dorsed the idea and enlisted the support of his organization. Al-
varo Ugalde (soon before his departure from the National Park Ser-
vice) was less enthusiastic at first—based on the number of 
other pressing needs at SPN—but warmed to the idea later after 
an on-site hike with Janzen. Fundación Neotrdpica, the organiza-
tion that Ugalde helped found, also joined the effort. With his 
"engaging personality and eccentricities," as one reporter de-
scribed him, (he was known to wear a snake bag with specimens on 
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his head, share his specimen-cluttered home/laboratory in Guana-
caste with skunks, and utilize a rich and colorful vocabulary), 
Janzen became the darling of international conservation organiza-
13 
tions. He was the subject of a BBC television documentary and 
many journal and magazine articles- Shying from the publicity, 
however, he mentioned in an interview with David Wallace his dis-
taste for the media "to lionize individuals:" 
A particular need or challenge occurs. Somebody 
puts his hand up first and says, 'Okay, I'll do 
that job. ' So he does it, and we look at the job 
and say 'That was important.' But if he hadn't 
done it, somebody else would have." (14) 
Nonetheless, his efforts garnered major contributions from The 
Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, and other groups 
amounting to three million dollars by 1987 (one fourth of his 
estimate that was needed to purchase the land in the area)—only 
one year into his fundraising drive.* In that time he had con-
vinced fifteen farmers and landholders in the area to sell (the 
land within the park boundaries was not of great agricultural 
quality anyway). He also had received the promises of other 
property owners to resist selling until the next year when he 
* Thomas Lewis, who interviewed Janzen regarding the fundraising 
in 1989 wondered "whether he, who owned neither a home nor a busi-
ness suit, was the man to raise $12 million? Whether he, with 
the scholar's usual distaste for politics, could achieve the deli-
cacy of maneuver such an undertaking required? Whether a man who 
had spent much of his life probing the secrets of animal excre-
ment, for clues to the distribution of seeds, was prepared for 
truly distasteful tasks such as asking for money and dealing with 
journalists? 'You see something that needs doing,' he shrugs, 
'and you do it.' [Thus] Janzen undertook a metamorphosis worthy 
of one of his beloved moths: from reclusive biologist to garru-
lous after-dinner speaker." ("Daniel Janzen's Dry Idea," 36.) 
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would have more funds. By the end of the decade the park was 
complete. 
Janzen got a great deal of assistance in those years from 
the conservation foundations, environmental groups, and the gov-
ernment of Costa Rica. One qf the biggest boosts came with the 
innovative introduction of "debt-for-natureM swaps in the late 
1980 fs. An idea conceived by Thomas Lovejoy at the World Wild-
life Fund (WWF) in 1984, debt swaps were intended to help develop-
ing countries reduce their foreign debt while at the same time 
increase their budgets for conservation. The plan involved for-
eign banks selling off their loans they had made to deeply in-
debted nations to international conservation organizations. For 
Costa Rica, the loan notes went for seventeen cents on the dollar 
which were then donated to Fundación Neotropica. The govern-
ment's Central Bank then issued bonds to Neotropica for seventy-
five cents on the dollar (using colones), which multiplied the 
value of the discounted loans and allowed Neotropica to use them 
as collateral which drew twenty-five percent interest. Mean-
while, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service sweetened the incentives 
for banks by ruling that they could write off the swaps as par-
tial charity contributions. The Fleet Bank of Rhode Island, for 
example, retired a portion of Costa Rica's debt to the bank by 
16 
donating $250,000 for land acquisition and park management. 
With this kind of program in gear, then, the Arias adminis-
tration formed the Costa Rica Debt Conservation Plan in 1987. 
Its goal was to "enable the government to pay off part of its 
debt and simultaneously invest in long term environmental 
projects." By 1991 over forty million dollars of external debt 
had been erased by purchases from international organizations.* 
Costa Rica was the third country in the world to participate in 
the swap program and the first to receive European support when 
17 
the Netherlands and Sweden forgave their government loans. Swe-
den's contribution was specifically earmarked for restoration of 
the Pacific dry forest in Guanacaste. The Nature Conservancy 
worked as an intermediary with Sweden and the United States on 
these swaps and parlayed 5.6 million dollars of Costa Rican debt 
into a $784,000 sale.** Geoffrey Barnard, the Conservancy's 
director for Latin America (and the group's former Costa Rica 
field representative), stated at the time that Costa Rica was 
chosen over Panama and Nicaragua—countries with equal if not 
greater conservation needs—because of the security of the in-
* While debt-for-nature swaps have been beneficial for Costa Ri-
ca's conservation program, some studies have warned of possible 
abuses. Michael Redclift and David Goodman (Environment and De-
velopment in Latin America, pp. 15-16), list ten potential pit-
falls inherent in the debt reduction plans, not the least of 
which are their inattention to management of protected places, 
and questions of national sovereignty and local control of re-
sources. Bill Weinberg (War on the Land, p. 114) agrees and cau-
tions against the swaps to be used by governments "to allocate 
resources according to a foreign agenda." 
** A supporter of debt swaps, environmental activist Alexander 
Bonilla said in an interview with Bill Weinberg (War on the Land, 
p. 114) that the approach allowed the "wealthy nations of the 
North to take their share of the responsibility for tropical 
forest restoration" and was a way "to avoid both the twin global 
disasters of economic collapse brought about by massive debt 
default and ecological collapse brought about by rampant defor-
estation. " 
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•vestment with Costa Rica's stable government. 
Fundación Neotropica' s end of the business was handled by 
Mario Boza who had become its director during the Arias adminis-
tration. "Debt swapping is the most important tool to achieve 
conservation," he stated in a 1988 interview, 
You multiply money by five. It's a lot of money 
that's free. We can use it to buy land, pay per-
sonnel, and do everything. It's an incredible 
scheme. 
He went on to relate how the funds were to be used not only at 
Guanacaste National Park but at other areas as well. They were 
needed to improve the parks to attract more tourists and scientif-
ic research projects. "Then we can ask the government for more 
money," Boza continued, 
That's the way to sell parks. You can argue 
that conservation is important for our heri-
tage and good for our children and grandchil-
dren. But if you do, you're lost. No one is 
interested in future generations. People want 
their reward now. (19) 
The Fundación' s main goal was to enlarge the existing parks from 
ten to fifteen percent of the nation's territory by the year 
2000. Neotropica also managed certain sections of land to be 
protected until the government had the proper financial re-
sources. Alvaro Umana, Arias' Minister of Natural Resources, 
clarified some of the goals by stating that his ministry wanted 
"to buy the inholdings in parks, improve the management of the 
parks, and develop management plans for buffer zones with inte-
20 
grated rural development." 
Buffer zone integration into the park system was a relative-
ly new conservation ideal. At the same time efforts were mount-
ing in the United States to protect areas around national parks 
(i.e. the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem movement in the early 
1980's), similar attempts were underway in Costa Rica. Universi-
ty of Costa Rica biologist Sergio Salas had argued for "park 
ecosystem" protection—as opposed to protection for fenced off 
areas only—in 1981 at the First Symposium on National Parks. 
Daniel Janzen, another outspoken proponent for the concept that 
he referred to as "edge biology," advised that protecting up to 
approximately three miles depth surrounding parks was essential 
to the natural integrity of the parks themselves. Without man-
aging the buffer zone of Santa Rosa effectively, for example, Jan-
zen warned that a scheduled oak reforestation plan there would 
have "as much chance to influence the overall climate of the park 
21 
[to improve environmental conditions] as [would] an ice cube." 
Thus the overall plan for Guanacaste National Park was for 
it to combine with Santa Rosa to form an ecosystem "mega-park" of 
tropical dry forest.* This was the beginning of SPN's new focus 
on restructuring conservation to fit biological realities. Jan-
zen explained that Costa Rica's national park system should not 
be "viewed as a series of islands, but rather as a network partly 
* Simultaneous to the "mega-park" plans was a concerted effort to 
establish more small forest reserves. Ever since Luis Fournier 
and Maria E. Herrera de Fournier published an important article 
on the subject in 1979 ("Importancia científica, económica y cul-
tural de un sistema de pequeñas reservas naturales en Costa Ri-
ca," Agronomía Costarricense 3:1 [1979], pp. 53-55) there had 
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connected by migrants." To achieve this goal in Guanacaste meant 
acquiring lands to the west of the Pan American Highway also—the 
land on the Santa Elena Peninsula that had been used for military 
training during the Monge administration. In 1987, President 
Arias announced that the "Udall Research" land where the 
clandestine airstrip had been constructed would be annexed into 
adjacent Santa Rosa National Park. It required financial ne-
gotiations—what Janzen termed "bureaucratic chug-along"—with 
the North American investors from whom "Udall" (read: the CIA, 
etc. ) rented the land. The deal was completed one year after 
the scandal was uncovered. On the other hand, Arias decided 
against incorporating the El Murciélago hacienda into the park. 
It remained a Civil Guard training facility although minus the 
22 
Green Berets. 
But the Relámpago Battalion controversy near Santa Rosa was 
not the end to the U.S. Army Special Forces' experience in Costa 
Rican national parks. In the summer of 1989 the Green Berets 
were in a remote part of Braulio Carrillo National Park at the 
been a growing interest in local small reserves. The Fourniers 
wrote that small reserves (especially in the Central Plateau) 
would represent "true relics of great importance for future com-
parative studies with disturbed areas" and that they would be a 
"complement to the National Park System." Mario Boza (in Mar-
jorie Sun, "Costa Rica's Campaign," p. 1369) tended to agree but 
thought that they would be "heavily used for recreation, but they 
won't be important for ecology." And on the far other side of 
the spectrum was Daniel Janzen (in Thomas Lewis, "Dry Idea," p. 
34) who called small reserves "biological Rembrandts" which give 
the illusion of forest preservation but in reality do not provide 
room for all the diverse natural fragments (i.e. soil types, rain-
fall, drainage patterns, elevations, wind exposures, slope gradi-
ents) which combine to make small but vital contributions to the 
complex ecology of the area. 
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request of President Arias' Minister of Public Security to train 
Civil Guards in anti-narcotrafficking tactics. The park recently 
had been consolidated when ex-President Monge, as one of his last 
acts in office, approved the annexation of the Zona Protectora 
that Rodrigo Carazo had decreed years earlier. Likewise, in 
February of 1988, UNESCO had declared a central portion of the 
park as a World Biosphere Reserve.* Thus, when news of the 
Berets' presence there reached the press, conservationists were 
stunned. 
The surreptitious military training was discovered in August 
1989 when a Costa Rican naturalist with two American ecotourists 
stumbled onto the training session while hiking in the cloud for-
est. After the soldiers escorted the trio from the area, one of 
the members of the party told a reporter for Mesoamérica that "We 
didn't understand why Americans in camouflage uniforms were throw-
ing us out of a national park in Costa Rica. We thought it was 
outrageous." The park director at Braulio Carrillo was equally 
appalled and told reporters that the Green Berets and the Civil 
Guards had no permission to enter the park as per Forestry Law 
23 
clauses that prohibit military manoeuvres in protected areas. 
* Not all conservationists were eager to embrace the "biosphere" 
concept—in Braulio Carrillo or anywhere else. Daniel Janzen 
("The Evolutionary Biology of National Parks," p. 110) warned 
that "by giving these parks [a] new name . . . as they evolve, 
the administration runs the risk of abandoning a significant 
part of the substantial body of social approval already accumu-
lated in the public and governmental mind for any entity called 
a national park. . . . We simply cannot afford to have two spe-
cies of wildlands conserved for their biodiversity—one being 
static national parks and the other socially dynamic biosphere 
reserves." 
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But while the Green Berets went home, and an embarrassed 
Arias administration dealt with damage repair (it was only two 
years earlier that Oscar Arias had received the Nobel Peace Prize 
for his efforts to halt the wars in Central America), the U.S. 
Army was also conducting activity with environmentally dangerous 
implications in southern Costa Rica. In 1989 the Army Corps of 
Engineers began building and improving roads on the Osa Penin-
sula as part of its "Roads for Peace" mission. The plan was 
actually part of the Reagan administration's paranoia about 
communist infiltration in Central America—believing improved 
roads in the region could assist U.S. military efforts in the 
event its presence was needed to counter some aggressive force. 
One study concluded that the roads were being built as a prepa-
ration for a U.S. armed invasion of Nicaragua. In addition to 
the unrealistic philosophy behind these scenarios, the project 
alarmed Costa Rican environmentalists because the roads that the 
Corps was constructing led directly into Corcovado National Park. 
With the gold mining situation still not firmly resolved, the 
concern was that the road would be a conduit for oreros to bring 
24 
futher ecological destruction to the park. 
The conservationists had reason to worry. Despite the ef-
forts of the SPN to rid Corcovado of mining activity during the 
Oduber and Monge administrations, in 1987 the government hosted 
the International Gold Conference in San Jose as a means to lure 
investment to the Osa Peninsula. A joint University of Costa 
Rica/U.S. Geological Survey study recently had confirmed the 
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presence of large deposits of gold on the Osa, a fact that was 
highlighted at the conference. The Tico Times reported on 23 
October 1987 that Arias' Minister of Natural Resources Alvaro 
Umaña told the conferees that "There exist areas in which you 
can't mine—like our national parks, for instance. If we're 
going to develop the industry, we must also protect the envir-
onment. However, the majority of the area is certainly open 
25 
to exploitation." 
The problem was that if the area was open to mining it was 
easy for an orero to cross over into Corcovado. In 1988, for ex-
ample, eighty some miners were arrested in the national park. 
And according to the Tico Times, fifty more were caught inside 
park limits in September 1989, including two who had held park 
26 
guards hostage overnight. Actually the problem illustrated very 
clearly the need for what Daniel Janzen and others were calling 
for: park management guidelines that included socio-economic cri-
teria. The problem was bigger than campesinos wanting to strike 
it rich; it reflected an absence of agrarian reform. Alexander 
Bonilla addressed this very concern when he stated in an inter-
view with Bill Weinberg that he would endorse a Corcovado plan 
that included 
a limited group of oreros exploiting gold in the 
park for artisan purposes using traditional tech-
niques. Indigenous and traditional people must 
be incorporated into national parks systems. The 
large-scale corporate gold exploitation can only 
be allowed in the context of a rational plan for 
sustainable development, a strategy which will pro-
tect natural resources and contribute to the devel-
opment of the region and Costa Rica. (27) 
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In a more recent interview, Bonilla explained that "a clear 
vision'1 of sustainable development was needed—one that recog-
nized that "humans are animals first; that they are a part of 
Nature" and therefore should hardly be excluded from park use 
plans. "We need to find the point of equilibrium," he advised, 
"without it there will always be socio-economic problems. . . . 
28 
Conservation with hunger is impossible." 
Although Corcovado's management plan did not include small-
scale gold panning (even avid "socioeconomic use" advocate Daniel 
Janzen had recommended total removal of miners in his Corcovado 
report to Alvaro Ugalde back in 1985), the National Park Service 
did start to consider locally-based economic park uses during 
the Arias administration. The problem, as former Arias natural 
resources advisor Rodrigo Gámez remembered, was that 
We'd never heard of the phrase 'sustainable develop-
ment' then. It didn't exist in 1985. But I'm a gen-
eralise I know the practical problems of food pro-
duction in marginal areas, which is where most of the 
parks are. It's not possible for a population to have 
a sufficient level of development, a satisfaction of 
basic needs, working under such poor conditions. I 
could see that if we didn't pay attention to that, 
we'd be like Africa in a few years, with impoverished 
people pressing on the parks from all sides. (29) 
Thus one of the new tactics that the SPN worked on was a "mixed 
management" program to integrate people who lived within or near 
the borders of protected areas into the park planning itself. 
For some residents it meant being trained as tourist guides or 
to help with agroforestry projects. Eric Ulloa, assistant to the 
Minister of the Natural Resources in the Calderón administration, 
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stated that this plan was part of the "new criteria . . . to 
create protected areas where the people living there will not 
be expelled." He explained that the idea was to help them to 
30 
develop an economic base using the local natural resources. 
The ministry where Ulloa served, Ministry of Natural Re-
sourcs, Energy, and Mines (MIRENEM), was a new branch of the 
government conceived during the Arias administration. The Presi-
dent created the agency (approved by the Legislative Assembly) 
to restructure and unify the management of Costa Rica's public 
lands and to deal with other conservation issues outside of 
agriculture. The plan moved the Park Service and the Forestry 
Directorate (DGF) out of the Ministry of Agriculture and Live-
stock (MAG)—a move roundly applauded by conservationists and 
something that Mario Boza had been urging for years. Also fall-
ing under MIRENEM's umbrella were the Department of Wildlife, 
31 
the Department of Geology and Mines, and the National Zoo. Dur-
ing the Calderón administration MIRENEM relocated to the vacant 
ten-story Hotel Talamanca near downtown San Jose and SPN moved 
its offices into an adjoining house—moves that saved millions of 
dollars and conserved natural resources had a new facility been 
built. MIRENEM's name was changed to Ministry of the Environment 
* The program has been slow to succeed in Cahuita National Park 
on the Caribbean coast. Kurt Kutay ("Cahuita National Park: A 
Case Study in Living Cultures and National Park Management," 118-
119), an outside researcher, found that in 1990 the local Afro-
Caribbean population had not had much input on park uses and that 
their basic needs had not been met ever since the park had been 
established. He concluded that "a working relationship between 
park authorities and local people ha[d] completely broken down." 
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and Energy (MINAE) as part of the government's on-going restruc-
turing process when Jose Maria Figueres was elected in 1994. Its 
offices have remained at the MIRENEM building. 
Arias appointed Alvaro Umaña to head the newly created minis-
try. A Stanford-educated economist and environmental engineer, 
Umaña took a very hands-on administrative role with the depart-
ments in his agency. He kept Luis Méndez as SPN director for the 
first few years of the term but replaced him with Alfonso Mata-
moros, a DGF official, in 1989 when the Service was starting to 
slide. Alvaro Ugalde, who came back to SPN in the Calderón admin-
istration, explained that in the Arias years nthe power rested in 
the minister (Umana) and his advisors . . . [p]olicy was made 
without consulting the Park Service." The way Ugalde saw it, 
There was no internal leadership. . . .The power 
within the Park Service all split into little groups 
here and there. There was no institutional concen-
sus of what to do, where to go. What with the gov-
ernment being broke, Luis Méndez didn't have the 
political leverage to keep the budgets up or get 
government support, so it was an economic debacle, 
losing positions, losing all kinds of support. It 
was very bad to watch the internal fighting. It 
was kind of a lost institution. . . .[Umaña] was 
never able to work as a team with anyone here. (32) 
Budgets continued to be too small for needed services, the SPN 
could not afford to hire additional park guards, and employee 
dissatisfaction was on the rise. Park Service personnel went 
on strike in April 1990—shutting down the offices and the parks 
for a few days in the process. 
Administrative constraints aside, Umana carried the ball for 
the process of restructuring the administration of protected 
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areas, especially given the new emphasis placed on "mega-park" 
connectedness. Working with other MIRENEM officials he developed 
a system of regional conservation units (Unidades Regionales de 
Conservación, or URCs) to incorporate the parks and reserves 
within a geographic area into a new administrative district. The 
Lower Tempisque URC, for example, included Palo Verde and Barra 
Honda national parks, the Lomas Barbudal Biological Reserve, and 
Rafael Lucas Rodriguez National Wildlife Refuge. Guanacaste and 
Rincón de la Vieja national parks fell into the Guanacaste URC. 
La Amistad and Chirripó national parks and Hitoy-Cerere Biologi-
cal Reserve became the La Amistad URC. The URCs included all of 
the parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, wildlife refuges 
and indigenous reserves within that district. The plan called 
for a "management strategy" for each URC that included community 
input from people who lived in or around the protected areas and 
from park personnel there, as opposed to management decisions 
coming only from San Jose. It was the birth of decentralized 
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park administraton. 
The URCs were also an experiment in alternative financial 
management. NGO's, especially the Fundación de Parques Nacional-
es, controlled the park finances using a core committee of SPN 
and FPN officials as well as local business and community lead-
ers. Juan Carlos Crespo, FPN president in the late 1980's when 
Mario Boza became its director (he was also director of Fundación 
Neotrópica), called the system "visionary planning" to protect 
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and manage the parks and the area of influence around them. 
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Umana was also a foot soldier for incorporating the theory 
of sustainable development into the policymaking duties of his 
agency. More than just a verbal proponent of the ideal, Umana 
was active in promoting what he called an "aggressive" and "am-
bitious" reforestation program in parts of the denuded country-
side as a way to prevent erosion, restore farmland, and protect 
hydrologic resources. In a press release in the fall of 1987 
he made known that in the administration's first year alone 
(1986) almost 15,000 acres had been reforested which was double 
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the acreage of 1986 and more than in all the years since 1969. 
He also oversaw a MIRENEM study that created and implemented the 
National Conservation Strategy for Sustained Development. The 
strategy was the offshoot of Costa Rica's participation at the 
1980 World Strategy for Conservation (jointly sponsored by the 
U.N. Programme for the Environment, the IUCN, and the World 
Wildlife Fund) but was not fully completed until the late 
1980's. The Strategy's objective was to "change the thrust of 
development toward a more sustainable form" and inhered an 
evolving effort to keep up with advances in technology and 
discoveries. It was also created as a mechanism to respond to 
the "inadequate and unenforceable legislation, poor organization, 
inadequate environmental planning, and lack of conservation-
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based rural development" of the past. 
Nine principal objectives and fourteen sectors of focus were 
identified in the Strategy (see Appendex 5). The objectives were 
national environmental goals that would work for balance between 
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development and conservation. The sectors were specific areas of 
focus (i.e. watersheds, mining, etc.) that were earmarked for pro-
fessional attention and research. Each sector was assigned a 
coordinator (a specialist in the field) and five professional 
research assistants. Over time these teams were to prepare com-
prehensive, interdisciplinary reports on how the identified objec-
tives could be applied to the individual sectors. The plan was 
viewed as a tangible vehicle to help guide the government' s role 
in protecting Costa Rica's natural resources for long-term, sus-
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tainable use. Implementation and enforcement of its recommenda-
tions are underway, but time and ecological restoration will be 
the litmus test of its success. 
The Strategy's emphasis on balanced agricultural production 
is evidence that the government's attention to conservation dur-
ing the past three administrations has not been limited to parks 
and reserves. Studies and practices of sustainable farming are 
an equally important contribution to Costa Rica's conservation 
history, especially given the largesse of the agricultural 
scene. Agriculture remains the country's number one industry— 
accounting for over half the country's land use and two thirds of 
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its national economy. Thus research, training, and development 
of sustainable practices have become important factors for far-
mers and policymakers. 
A study that originated during the Arias administration came 
to have special significance on this subject. Entitled "Natural 
Resource Management in Costa Rica" (and partially funded by U.S.-
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AID), the study came up with a system of geographical land use 
capabilities (LUCs). It identified five land types "where the 
most intensive use that a piece of land is able to sustain on a 
continuous basis without suffering from degradation" was possi-
ble. The categories included land for clean-tilled crops, pas-
tureland, permanent crop cover areas, forest, and protected re-
serves. Using soil studies, drainage data, topography reports, 
and climate information, the study was able to discern the size 
of each land use category and to define their locations across 
the country. This type of data had useful implications for 
for policy making. For example, the study showed that 4,656 
square kilometers (2,800 square miles) were viable for pasture 
but that 19,000 square kilometers (11,400 square miles)—almost 
one third of the country—were presently being used in that ca-
39 
pacity. It showed very graphically the degree of deforestation 
caused by the expansion of the livestock industry. But that the 
study identified the importance of agricultural land (three of 
the five LUC's) shows that conservationists were interested in 
more than just fencing off areas and taking land out of produc-
tion. The goal was to show how production could be sustainable 
and less harmful to the environment. 
Sustained development was also the theme of the Seventeenth 
General Assembly of the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN, presently called the World Conservation Union) 
that took place in San Jose in 1988. Members of the Costa Rican 
conservationist community were proud to host this event and show-
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case their accomplishments. They actively participated in differ-
rent conferences and panels presented at the gathering of conser-
vationists who attended from all over the world. Alvaro Umaña, 
for example, spoke on how ,!the concept of sustainable develop-
ment" was an important "new style" of meeting the challenges of 
agriculture in the tropics. "It used to be that conservation 
meant preservation without [the presence] of man, that land 
should be kept in a bubble," Umaña stated, "but in Central Amer-
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ica, that's not possible." It was at this conference that Costa 
Rica's first debt swap plan was announced. 
President Arias also addressed the IUCN Assembly saying that 
his country "should feel satisfied and proud to bring its grain 
of sand to the future of life on this planet." But while saying 
that it was "with humility [Costa Rica] aspires to convert itself 
as a prototype of the new societies necessary to live together 
peacefully on earth," he also shared a revelation that was great 
cause for concern: the deforestation rate in Costa Rica was worse 
than previously believed. He reported that "no country in Latin 
America ha[d] a higher rate of deforestation" and that "less than 
five percent of the nation's dense forests exist[ed] outside of 
protected areas." Thus, he continued, Costa Rica's notable devel-
opment of national parks was becoming offset by forest destruc-
tion—"a paradoxical situation constitut[ing] a serious threat to 
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the advanced successes of conservation." 
The reality of Arias' words, and in fact the whole campaign 
for sustainable development, was the result of a satellite photog-
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raphy study that showed how acute the problem of deforestation 
was becoming. Instead of the eight to nine percent of forested 
land that aerial photos showed to exist outside of parks and 
reserves (bad enough as that was), the satellite images showed, 
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like Arias mentioned, that only five percent remained. The cause 
for such destruction was pasture expansion and logging. Alvaro 
Umaña explained to reporters that much of the logging was illegal 
and that he had ordered the Rural Guards to be put on duty to 
conduct surprise searches. Their work resulted in the discovery 
of illegal cuts in and around national parks, trucks hauling logs 
out of restricted areas by night, the common practice of hiding 
logs under agricultural produce on truck beds, and the common use 
of forged logging permits. The problem grew so out of hand that 
in 1988 officials from the Forestry Directorate petitioned Presi-
dent Arias to declare a national state of emergency. Agreeing to 
do so the following year, the proclamation empowered the DGF to 
suspend all permits to fell trees outside of private plantations 
and to prohibit the export of unfinished wood products. The 
declaration also freed government funds to beef up the enforce-
ment of these policies, again making use of the Rural Guard. As 
to be expected, the timber companies reacted negatively and con-
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servationists very positively to the measures. 
At the root of the problem, policy-wise, was an obsolescent 
forestry code. In 1 983 (during the Monge administration) the 
Legislative Commission on Agricultural and Natural Resource Af-
fairs convened to consider a "total reform" of the 1969 Forestry 
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Law. That law established national parks, forest reserves, and 
other land use limitations, but did not do much to control the 
logging or livestock industries—especially on private forested 
land. Diputado Carazo Paredes recognized the urgency of legis-
lative reform and told fellow commission members that after see-
ing "more and more logging trucks" in the country, he was "wor-
ried that total deforestation" would soon follow "if we don't 
put a stop to it now." "If the forest disappears," he reminded 
the committee, "so will everything else." Later he told the 
committee that the reform was of special interest to him ("as 
a farmer and one-time wood cutter") and that the roads and 
trucks themselves were destroying the forests. He advocated 
the more sustainable use of selective cutting and the use of 
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oxen to pull logs out of densely forested areas. 
There were others who supported reforming the Ley Forestal. 
Alexander Bonilla of ASCONA lobbied for its approval by empha-
sizing the problems of unregulated burns. The DGF supported it 
because it would grant that agency more power "to intervene 
against the exploitation of timber resources." Nonetheless, 
most debate on the bill centered around the question of regulat-
ing private property. The bill's focus was to enforce "forestry 
management plans" on property owners for the long-term benefit 
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of the environment and the industry. Three years later, after 
considerable discussion and amendments on these points, the com-
mission sent the bill to the Assembly. It was approved there 
and signed into law in 1986. 
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It hardly went over well in certain sectors of the public. 
The logging industry and various landowners complained that it 
violated the Constitution of the Republic by infringing on their 
rights as private property holders. Roxana Salazar, one of Costa 
Rica !s leading environmental attorneys, explained that at issue 
was the right of the government to impose "limitations on private 
property." Those opposed to the measure presented several cases 
to lower courts, but because the matter was of a constitutional 
nature, it ended up being resolved by a Constitutional Tribunal 
(Sala Constitucional) made of Supreme Court judges. In 1990 the 
Sala ruled that the new Forestry Law did in fact violate Articles 
Forty-five and Forty-six of the Constitution by imposing the re-
strictions on private land. The Legislative Assembly had the pow-
er to make such a law, but it required a two-thirds vote on the 
third debate of the motion. The Assembly had approved the bill 
by a majority of thirty-seven votes in 1986—one vote short of 
the required two-thirds needed for constitutional issues. Thus, 
the Sala annulled the reformed Forestry Law and reincarnated its 
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1969 predecessor. 
According to Salazar, the environmentalist community in Cos-
ta Rica did not react very strongly to the Sala's decision. "It 
was more of a blow to the government," she explained, in that 
legislative committees had to go back to the drawing board, a 
bill would have to trudge anew through the legislative process, 
and agencies like the DGF were denied the meaty authority needed 
to slow deforestation. Luis Fournier, on the other hand, was 
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annoyed. Fournier, a member of the original committee that 
hammered out the Ley Forestal bill in the late 1960's, men-
tioned that the Sala's ruling was based "more 
on the letter of the law than on the spirit in which it was 
made." But, as he added, "you have to work with [the court's] 
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decisions." 
The work fell on the Legislative Assembly which raced to put 
a "band-aid" provisional law together until a new, authoritative 
forestry law could be enacted. A team of diputados prepared a 
study outlining the good and bad points of the 1986 law and what 
needed to be changed. The diputados1 concluded that consolidat-
ing state forestry policy, more strongly regulating the logging 
industry, and filling in the gaps of the 1969 law were advantages 
of the recently anulled law that needed to be continued but that 
its constitutional faults outweighed any benefits accrued. Thus, 
as "a very urgent" measure they proposed an alternative forestry 
policy that arrived at a plenary session of the Assembly on June 
5, 1990—an apropos date since it was the International Day of 
the Environment, a point aptly exploited by more than one speaker 
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during that session. 
The proposed law's principal objective was "to guard for the 
protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, admin-
istration, and development of the country's forest resources in 
accord with the principles of rational use of renewable natural 
resources." The bill gave the DGF authority over those broad re-
sponsibilities and established an interdisciplinary Forestry Coun-
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cil (in some ways similar to the one Jose Figueres had created in 
1949) to serve as an advisory committee for policy implementa-
tion. The Council was to be made up of various forestry industry 
associations, representatives of forestry cooperatives, universi-
ty scientists, government agency officials, and was to be headed 
by the Minister (or Vice Minister) of MIRENEM. And finally, 
among other duties, the law clarified state and private forestry 
categories and how regulations would apply to each. The tone of 
the section on private property was one of encouraged coopera-
tion. It urged industry representatives to maintain relations 
with government agencies and to participate in research and 
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policy forums. 
As in 1969, speakers supporting the proposed law on the 
floor of the Assembly exploited references to "future genera-
tions" and "for the future of all Costa Ricans" as reasons why 
they were in favor of its passage. Diputado Castro Retana 
asserted that Costa Rica "could be a desert in five to ten years" 
without the law in place. Another Assembly member (Diputado Gon-
zález Salazar) looked backward and invoked "the memory of illus-
trious Costa Ricans who down through history had seen to the cre-
ation of laws to adequately protect our forests." He listed such 
figures as former presidents Cleto González Vfquez (who in 1906 
promulgated the first law giving the Assembly the power to create 
forest protection laws) and Josa Figueres who established the 
Forestry Council soon after the Revolution of National Libera-
tion, and others in the 1950's and 60's. "Let's not shrug off 
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this enormous responsibility," González implored, "we know that 
this law is not perfect, but we also know that that which is 
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perfect is the enemy of that which is human." 
Other Assembly members, however, were quick to point out 
that the proposed law did not seem too different than the 1986 
version which was deemed unconstitutional. Even with his under-
standing that "we must do something," Diputado Aiza Campos felt 
like the emergency forestry law was nothing more than "some cos-
metic changes" that would lead eventually to "the same error as 
the previous legislation." Diputado Muñoz Quesada thought that 
it was "perfectly possible" that the bill could be declared un-
constitutional too but considered that the Sala's ruling on the 
old law could have been beneficial "because now we'll correct 
those matters." But like the other forestry bills preceding it, 
Law 7174 received wide support from municipal leaders and conser-
vationists around the country and was approved by the Legislative 
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Assembly after a third reading on June 28, 1990. 
It was approved with provisions. The most important one for 
this study was Provision VI which, because the law was temporary 
in nature, required that a report be made by a "special commis-
sion . . . to study and propose reforms to the Ley Forestal." 
The commission was to convene immediately upon passage of the 
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bill and had but two months to issue its report. The commission 
got right on the job, but in the meantime there had been a change 
of government with the election of Rafael Calderdh as President. 
Oscar Arias left office after having revamped the government's 
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public lands managment and environmental agencies (i.e. MIRENEM, 
URC's), after having supported the protection of tropical dry for-
est ecosystems with the Santa Rosa expansions and the creation of 
Guanacaste National Park, and after having overseen the integra-
tion of sustainable development policies within protected lands' 
management programs.* Before his term expired he also decreed 
the creation of Arenal National Park (the home of Arenal Volcano 
—the country's most consistently active volcano—in the Tilarán 
Mountains not far from the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve**), 
and he created InBio—the National Biodiversity Institute to 
inventory the nation's biological wealth (see Chapter 11). 
The new president, Rafael Calderón Fournier of the conserva-
* David Wallace (Quetzal and Macaw, p. 116) relates how one of 
Arias' last environmentally oriented duties in office was to 
attend the historic, internationally commemorated Earth Day rally 
(marking the twenty years that had passed since the big Earth Day 
celebration in 1970) on April 20, 1990 at the Plaza de la Demo-
cracia in San Jose'. Ironically, the event took place on the same 
day that the Burger King fast food chain (a major importer of 
Costa Rican rainforest beef) hosted the grand opening ceremony 
for its first franchise in Costa Rica which attracted a larger 
crowd than did the Earth Day rally. 
** It took several years to complete all the land expropriations 
for Arenal's official opening as a national park. The courts 
nullified the proclamation because Arias had decreed the park's 
creation before all the landowners had consented to sell. Today 
it is a restricted-access national park because of the severe 
danger the eruptions present. Several scientists and climbers 
have died trying to study its geological mysteries. The park 
also represents part of a corridor protection plan of endangered 
cloud forest ecosystem in the Tilarán range as it is linked with 
the Children's Rainforest project and the Monteverde Preserve. 
Located at the east end of Lake Arenal (Costa Rica's largest pro-
ducer of hydroelectrical power), the park's mission is also to 
protect the densely wooded slopes surrounding the volcano as a 
means to reduce the lake's growing siltation problem which was 
caused by deforestation in the area. 
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tíve United Social Christian Party (PUSC), was the son of ex-
President Rafael Calderdn Guardia (arch-rival of "Don Pepe" 
Figueres in the 1940's) and the godson of ousted Nicaraguan dic-
tator Anastasio Somoza. He was elected President in 1990 after 
two unsuccesful tries in the previous elections against PLN 
winners Luis Monge and Oscar Arias. He won this time in a very 
close and bitter race with the help of campaign manager Roger 
Ailes (the mastermind behind George Bush's negative campaign for 
president against Michael Dukakis two years earlier) who worked 
to link the PLN with complicity in narcotrafficking and had 
Calderdn appeal to the populist sentiments of campesino voters. 
Calderdnfs conservative resume and positions logically 
worried Costa Rican conservationists. They were further alarmed 
when the environmental group ASCONA came out with reports that 
Calderdn's PUSC supporters in the Osa Peninsula had promised area 
oreros access to Corcovado National Park. Calderón denied the 
charges, but the director of the park told reporters for the Tico 
Times that "We've identified these people as Calderón people, and 
they were telling the goldminers that Corcovado National Park 
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would be given to them." 
Calderdn did not mention Corcovado gold panners in his inaug-
ural speech, but he did talk about preserving Costa Rica's "un-
told ecological riches" and his interest in creating a "new eco-
logical order of international cooperation." These words sur-
prised conservationists since in none of his three campaigns for 
President had he ever given much attention to environmental con-
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cerns. But he did make some appointments which seemed to please 
the conservationist community. While he named outsider Hernán 
Bravo (a beverage company executive from Cartago) as the new Min-
ister of Natural Resources (MIRENEM), he appointed Mario Boza as 
MIRENEM sub-director, he retained Alfonso Matamoros as head of 
SPN, and named Alvaro Ugalde as head of the Wildlands and Wild-
life Department—a newly created office that was part of the ad-
ministration's reorganization scheme, Ugalde was transferred 
back to the directorship of SPN in the spring of 1991—less than 
a year into Calderón's term—to utilize his expertise in the day-
to-day management of the park system. 
Back in the government saddle again, Boza and Ugalde wasted 
no time in working to influence conservation policy. The most 
important policy under consideration at the time was the rework-
ing of the emergency Forestry Law that the Legislative Assembly's 
Special Commission was engaged in during that summer of 1990. 
When Boza was called on to testify before the commission on July 
28 he brought his slide projector with him. In it were pictures 
rendered from the Land-Sat images that had been taken from over 
five hundred miles above the Earth which showed the extent of 
Costa Rica's deforestation problem. Edward Cyrus, chief of 
MIRENEM's Technical Services Department, also came to the meeting 
to interpret some of the satellite images. He talked about the 
waste involved in deforestation and explained that while sixty-
three percent of the timber cuts were destined for industrial 
purposes, in reality only thirty-four percent of the wood made it 
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to the industries and of that, only seventeen percent was con-
verted into "products that reach the consumers." Thus, Cyrus 
pushed the need to legislate for "a more efficient timber indus-
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try." Also present were DGF officials José Luis Salas and Luis 
Angel Villalobos who spoke more about their department and field-
ed questions from commission members. 
The commission members were receptive to the data presented 
to them. They had recently learned that there were only 250,000 
hectares (617,500 acres) of forest remaining in Costa Rica out-
side of protected areas. This number was down from the estimate 
of only a few years previous that indicated that 400,000 hectares 
(988,000 acres) remained. They knew, then, that Boza was not 
exaggerating when he told them that his office received "letters 
daily from all over Costa Rica from groups and citizens who were 
worried and upset about deforestation in their area." He con-
tinued, 
The people say 'come, see this, do an investiga-
tion, stop the culprits, buy out the land, posi-
tion some guards,' which is almost impossible for 
us to do . . . we just don't have the economic means 
. . . to acquire more land, which is the only effec-
tive protection in this country. . . . The people 
beg for more surveillance, but we're constantly 
losing park guards, and guard positions. We're 
tied down. On the one hand, exploitation contin-
ues and the people clamor for more conservation, 
but everyday we have less personnel, fewer funds 
to complete the job. We have reached a period of 
great crisis in this respect. 
Therefore, he urged the commission to pass a tough forestry bill 
on to the Assembly—"an effective instrument to manage what natu-
ral forest we have left." "Let's not let the last 250,000 hec-
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tares disappear," he said ending his prepared remarks. 
It was at this particular hearing that Boza introduced a com-
pelling new argument: changes in land use were the most destruc-
tive for the environment. He showed that farming, ranching, and 
logging could occur in certain areas without ecological damage 
because the land was being properly managed for those uses. He 
cited how Portico (a private enterprise) and CATIE regularly 
practiced such wise use strategies, but did not change the land 
use patterns once operating in a renewable, sustainable way. It 
was when a radical change took place (i.e. clearcutting) that 
the long term damage started to mount which eventually affected 
not only the forest but also caused erosion, flooding, and loss 
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of hydrologic resources. 
A question and answer session followed Boza's presentation. 
Because the commission members1 questions reflected their and 
their constituents' concerns regarding forestry regulations, they 
are important to consider here. Several diputados wondered how 
landowners could get permission to cut any wood at all on their 
places. Boza responded that the regulations would have to vary 
from region to region. Diputado Daniel Gallardo was especially 
concerned for the small farmers in his district from whom he had 
received protests because they had been denied permits to cut 
wood for buildings and fenceposts while their neighboring big 
landholders "cut indiscriminantly." Acknowledging the problem, 
Villalobos answered that one of his department's concerns was 
that often small farmers did not have "adequate certification" of 
land ownership and that soil types had to be taken into consider-
ation. Boza also mentioned that organizations like the OTS were 
studying reforestation issues and were experimenting with differ-
ent tree species (especially the chancho tree) that seem to grow 
very rapidly as good news for both small and large land-holders. 
Gallardo wanted to know if any areas of the country were being 
considered completely off-limits to woodcutting and if more 
private organizations were getting involved. Boza listed several 
groups that were engaged in the deforestation crisis and high-
lighted how Amigos de Lomas de Barbudal (Friends of the Barbudal 
Hills Biological Reserve) had been actively and effectively man-
aging that protected area in the Lower Tempisque drainage region 
of Guanacaste for two years. He said that MIRENEM was starting 
to look more closely at such private "contract management" ideas 
for other areas as well. Gallardo also expressed his concern for 
animal life in deforested areas. Boza responded that "what is 
happening . . . is a disaster" and explained how his office 
received complaints every summer about how some farmers burn 
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forests—including parts of national parks—just to drive deer. 
The greatest problem according to Boza, however, was still 
with agricultural colonization and specifically with the IDA 
(Agrarian Development Institute, formerly ITCO) which continued 
to help peasant families move onto public lands without suitable 
guidelines on sustainable farming and forestry. Salas also re-
minded the committee that several campesino groups had formed to 
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demand sustainable practices and had reforested 9,900 acres in 
1989 alone. And Villalobos added that within the DGF was a 
Department of Campesino Forestry Development aimed especially at 
assisting rural people in need. He also related how the DGF was 
pushing hard for reforestation of native species—for management 
of "natural forests" as opposed to teak-wood or other non-native 
tree species. Boza closed the presentation by reiterating the im-
portance of including "no change of land use" language in the new 
forestry law. "Without it," he advised, "we have nothing legal 
to enforce the law; it is absolutely vital to incorporate it into 
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this legislation." 
The Special Commission continued to meet into the fall of 
1990 and on into 1991. Evidently the two month deadline had 
been extended since more testimony was entered into the record 
and deliberations continued for the next few years. Mario Boza 
addressed the committee members again in September 1990 with a 
renewed concern about Corcovado National Park. Mincing no words, 
he said, "either we do something very soon, . . . or within four 
to five years [the park] will be an island surrounded by pas-
tures." He informed the legislators that 1,000 hectares (2,470 
acres) of forest a year were disappearing from the Osa Peninsula 
and that MIRENEM was considering creating an Emergency Forest 
Zone around the park. The committee later heard testimonies from 
Tirso Maldonado from Fundación Neotro'pica and Raúl Solórzano from 
the Tropical Science Center on efforts their organizations 
were doing for reforestation and suggestions they had for a new 
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forestry law. They stressed the need for a "more effective" con-
cession granting process for forest cuts and more penalties (dis-
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incentives) for deforestation. 
The testimony of Boza and others before the Special Commis-
sion reflected the evolution of conservation thought in the early 
1990's. The concern for the area surrounding Corcovado National 
Park was more than just arguments for buffer zone protection, it 
inhered a concern for optimal park size. Conservationists like 
Boza and Ugalde were now questioning what could be the ideal park 
size for protecting an entire ecosystem. New MIRENEM Minister 
Hernán Bravo addressed this concern in a letter to Special Commis-
sion chairman William Cordero in which he told of how his agency 
was working to create "conservation areas" (an expanded version 
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of the URCs from the Arias administration). 
Along those lines, then, Boza prepared the Renewable Re-
sources Action Plan for the Calderdn Administration. In it he 
wrote that the "ultimate goal" was to maintain twenty-five per-
cent of Costa Rica's forests outside of protected areas. It 
advocated integrating national wildlife refuges into a park sys-
tem that would link biological reserves, national parks, and 
forest reserves into these large conservation areas.* Its long-
* Alvaro Ugalde, who headed the Wildlife and Wildland Department 
for one year in the Caldero'n administration, explained to David 
Wallace (Quetzal and Macaw, p. 188) why Boza preferred incorpor-
ating wildlife refuges into national parks: "In Latin America, 
Fish and Wildlife is perceived as a little bureaucratic office 
with no political support, no support of any kind. That's been 
the case in Costa Rica. It used to be the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice—'Fish' meaning basically fishing, and 'Wildlife' meaning 
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range goal was to form a corridor of forested areas in Costa 
Rica that would connect with protected areas in Panama to the 
south and with Nicaragua to the north, and eventually to form 
"a biological migration corridor throughout Mesoamerica." The 
plan also included sections on ecotourism and environmental edu-
cation and proposed that ICT (tourism institute) be actively in-
volved with planning and promoting the protection of natural 
areas. To accommodate ecotourists better, Boza wanted the Minis-
try of Public Works to improve roads to national parks and for 
private foundations to become more active in park management 
(along the lines of the successful Monteverde and Lomas Barbudal 
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experiments). 
Meanwhile, President Calderón was working to advance another 
item on his administration's conservation agenda: promoting Costa 
Rica to be the headquarters of a proposed Earth Council as part 
the "New Ecological Order of International Cooperation" that he 
had alluded to in his inaugural address. The plan was to present 
such a proposal in the form of a resolution to the U.N. Confer-
ence on the Environment and Development (the "Earth Summit") that 
was held in Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992. The plan also had 
the support of the delegates from other Central American nations 
who co-sponsored the resolution. MIRENEM Minister Hernán Bravo, 
head of the Costa Rican delegation to the conference, introduced 
the resolution which outlined how Costa Rica could be the ad-
basically white-tailed [sic] deer research, and hunting permits 
and seasons. Very symbolic activities." 
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ministrative seat of the Earth Summit to follow up on agreements 
reached in Rio de Janeiro. And in a speech to the assembled 
delegates, President Calderdn stressed how Costa Rica had been 
"fighting to attain the ideal of development with a human face 
and in harmony with nature." Boldly inviting the rest of the 
world "to emulate Costa Rica . . . [where] ecology enjoys a long 
tradition and solid prestige," Calderdn stressed how his country 
was committed to the task of hosting the Earth Council. "Our 
government, following the dictates of its own convictions and the 
desires of its citizens," he proudly concluded, "has put special 
emphasis on accelerating programs in this [environmental] 
field." The international delegates, made up of over one hundred 
heads of state and over 9,000 representatives of NGO's and other 
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groups, approved the resolution. 
In addition to the honor hosting the Earth Council bestowed 
on Costa Rica in recognition of its active commitment to environ-
mental conservation, many Ticos believed that the Earth Council 
would generate important economic and educational resources for 
the benefit of the country. Full page ads in Costa Rican news-
papers congratulated President Calderdn and Minister Bravo for 
their efforts and success in Rio. An editorial in La Nación soon 
after the U.N. conference proclaimed that 
Calderdn has obtained his greatest foreign policy 
victory with the Rio Summit's designation of Costa 
Rica as the permanent seat of the Earth Council. 
We are converting ourselves as a nation into one 
of the principal centers of world ecology. (63) 
Not everyone agreed with this assessment. Leaders of Costa 
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Rican environmental groups were quick to point to contradictions 
in policy. ASCONA' s Ce'sar Castro (who during the presidential 
election had called Calderón's plan "a campaign trick"), main-
tained that "the government is scrambling for eleventh-hour 
strategies." The director of the Costa Rican Ecological Associa-
tion, Orlando Avila, called the idea "demagogic and opportunis-
tic" and was more succinct in his specific criticism: "While the 
government is promoting Costa Rica abroad as a model of environ-
mentalism, the rape of natural resources continues at home with-
out the political will to stop it." And Guillermo Barquero of 
the National Organization for Wildlife and Conservation, who had 
earlier called Calderón's Earth Council idea "a rhetorical plan," 
now stated that "Costa Rica is creating a myth, without meaning 
or content in practice, in legislative and environmental poli-
cy." Likewise the conservationists complained that the environ-
mental groups had not been consulted in the planning process of 
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Calderón's proposal. 
There is a sidenote to the story that produced bold head-
lines in Costa Rican newspapers at the time. The government dis-
covered soon before the start of the Rio Conference that a resort 
project under construction on Costa Rica's far southeastern Carib-
bean coast had improperly crossed (or had ignored) the legal boun-
daries of the Kekoldi Indigenous Reserve and of the Gandoca-
Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge. The resort, to be called 
"Ecodesarrollo" (Ecodevelopment), however, was the project of 
Maurice Strong—the Canadian businessman and self-proclaimed 
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environmentalist who had brainstormed and organized much of the 
Earth Summit in Rio, Pictures of the bulldozed area crossing 
the property lines of the protected areas were emblazoned across 
front-pages and added to the irony of the timing. Strong later 
claimed that the whole affair had been blown out of proportion 
in that the bulldozer had inadvertently crossed into a protec-
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ted area and caused little ecological damage. 
Strong's alleged transgressions notwithstanding, the Earth 
Council did headquarter in Costa Rica following the Rio Confer-
ence. Original plans called for the seat to be located at the 
Universisity for Peace near Ciudad Coldn (because of its [par-
tial] U.N. sanction, its emphasis on environment and peace, and 
its location in a beautiful setting) but instead the Consejo de 
la Tierra was set up in a vast office space on the eleventh floor 
of a government building in San José. The arrangement was tempo-
rary. Plans as of 1996 were for the construction of a new head-
quarters building to be completed by the turn-of-the-century that 
would be designed to use solar energy and other environmentally-
friendly construction concepts. According to one official 
there, the organization has and will continue to benefit the 
host country as was originally hoped by its proponents in the 
Calderón administration. Fifty percent of the employees who 
work there are Costa Rican (and, as the official assured, they 
are not solely in secretarial and janitorial positions—they 
include department chiefs, administrators, assistants, etc.). 
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Likewise, plans for constructing the Council's new facility in-
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elude using only local materials and local firms. 
The Earth Council's mission is "to operationalize the Earth 
Summit agreements and sustainable development through the empower-
ment of civil society." Its charter calls for "a world-wide par-
ticipatory process . . . that will guide people and nations . . . 
[and] will be the Sustainable Development equivalent to the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights." In 1997 it will convene a 
"Rio + Five" assessment conference "to evaluate progress (or lack 
thereof)" of the Earth Summit's recommendations. It will also 
"highlight the best sustainable development practices and re-
search . . . articulate values from these best practices, . . . 
[and] assess the impact of international conferences on global 
governance for sustainable development" among other goals. 
Two Costa Ricans serve on the Council's executive secretariat: 
Francisco Mata as the Deputy Executive Director and Lorena 
San Ramon as a Programme Coordinator. Gerardo Budowski serves 
as a representative to the Earth Council Institute and former 
MIRENEM Minister Alvaro Umana is an institutional representa-
tive from the Central American Institute of Enterprise Adminis-
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tration where he currently serves. 
President Calderón's success at landing the Earth Council in 
Costa Rica was not matched by the passage of a new forestry law 
during his term. That legislation would have to wait for the ad-
ministration of Jose Maria Figueres who became President in 1994. 
With the new administration came new appointments to conservation 
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positions and a continued restructuring of environmental agen-
cies. Mario Boza left MIRENEM for a position with the Caribbean 
Conservation Corporation (CCC) in its San Pedro office. He be-
came director of CCC's "Paseo Pantera" project that continues the 
work he started with his MIRENEM Action Plan to connect green 
corridors throughout Central America. Alvaro Ugalde left the 
National Park Service to work for the U.N. Environmental Pro-
gramme (UNEP) whose Central America office is located in Pavas, 
a San José suburb. Hernán Bravo left MIRENEM to serve in the 
Legislative Assembly after winning a seat from his home district 
in Cartago. 
President Figueres replaced Bravo with Rene Castro who over-
saw his ministry's change of nomenclature and direction. When 
MIRENEM became MINAE (Ministry of Environment and Energy) in 
1996, the agency combined the SPN, DGF, and Wildlife and Wild-
lands Office into one subagency called Sistema Nacional de Areas 
de Conservación (National System of Conservation Areas, or 
SINAC). The government leased a large 1950's-style mansion two 
blocks from the MINAE tower to house SINACf s offices that former-
ly were scattered at DGF and SPN facilities elsewhere. 
Part of the reason for the reorganization project was due 
to the multiplicity of bureaucratic agencies. Between the office 
of the President, the Legislative Assembly, and the "megastruc-
ture" of environmental agencies involved, there was, according to 
UCR biologist Sergio Salas who often worked with government agen-
cies, "too much diffusion of responsibility." And because of 
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institutional jealousies, the practical absence of 
interinstitutional coordination, and the difficulty 
of having interdisciplinary teams within the plan-
ning agencies . . . there exists competition be-
tween the institutions that diminishes their overall 
efficacy. As a final result, we see a growing inep-
titude between the government, its employees, and 
the environment. (68) 
By the early 1990's there were twenty-seven different divisions, 
councils, offices, institutes, and juntas that, according to one 
outside study, worked "at cross purposes and almost never act[ed] 
in cooperation with each other." The different offices often had 
conflicting or overlapping results. The study contended that the 
problem stemmed from how different departments were created dur-
ing different administrations (each with its own political pres-
sures and lobbies) and how it proved easier to launch new agen-
cies than to regroup existing ones. Further, many ministries 
developed their own environmental sections in response to the 
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duties the State required they perform. 
The creation of MIRENEM as an umbrella organization did not 
seem to correct the problem. One study in the late 1980's con-
cluded that agencies were "swimming in information [and] over-
specialization" and that the "multitude of policies" and "number-
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i e s s agencies" represented "expansion without concept." Even the 
assistant to President Calderón's minister of MIRENEM, Eric Ulloa 
pointed out that there was 
too much duplication of efforts, especially between 
MIRENEM and MAG. Likewise, we have a commission on 
Women in the Environment and recently the Office of 
the First Lady [Señora de Calderón] has created a 
similar council. We want coordination, but it has 
not happened yet. (71) 
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There was also duplication of efforts within certain departments 
via planning commissions, councils, and committees with overlap-
ping responsibilities. 
Thus SINAC was the result of the government's drive to re-
structure and decentralize conservation policy in Costa Rica. It 
was a direct descendant of the URC (regional conservation units) 
concept started at the tail end of President Arias' term. Like 
the URC's, the new system divided the country into ten Conserva-
tion Areas (called los AC) based on geographical characteristics 
(See map, Figure 2.) Each AC was assigned its own director to 
be over several subdirectors charged with promoting conservation 
policy for different parts of the area. A "visidn-misidn" state-
ment issued by the new agency defined SINAC1s vision to be "an 
organized and consolidated leader that offers efficient service 
. . . in management and conservation of natural resources, with 
the goal of contributing to the improved quality of life for the 
the country's inhabitants." Its mission was "to consolidate a 
National System of Conservation Areas, integrated and planned 
with other MINAE agencies where authority and duties will be 
delegated to the regions to give wider participation to the local 
society . . . " Or, as SINAC literature proclaims, its goal is 
to follow "the three 'd's"—"de-concentration, decentralization, 
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and democratization" of the nation's conservation policies. 
In many ways the new SINAC system was a continuation of past 
conservation experiments. Rene Castro called it "an ongoing 
process" originating with the creation of MIRENEM and approved by 
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FIGURE 2: Costa Rica's System of Conservation Areas 
(Source: SINAC [used by permission]) 
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the government planning office and the State Commission on Re-
form. Underlying the whole concept was the theory of sustainable 
development that was launched in the Arias administration. Pres-
ident Figueres made known that promoting sustainable development 
would be a "priority action" during his term and that it would be 
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a vital aspect of creating an "Alliance with Nature." SINAC's ob-
jectives called for "controlling the use and sustainable manage-
ment of natural resources," and for "promoting the sustainable 
use of [those] resources in accord with the social and economic 
development of the country." AC's were defined as regions where 
"under one development strategy . . . private and state activi-
ties will be interrelated for the management and conservation of 
natural resources and for seeking sustainable development solu-
tions. . . . " And the goal of democratizing the process by in-
cluding the voices of local people in each region's decision-
making process harkened back to Daniel Janzen!s principles for 
administering Guanacaste National Park but extended the concept 
to all conservation areas in the country. Finally, the agency's 
objective "to guarantee the conservation of the nation's biodiver-
sity" was a product of the push in the mid-1980's to protect 
ecosystem bioregions and buffer zones for the free transfer of 
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diverse biological services. 
At stake with the new system's eloquent, if not redundantly-
worded, goals was whether a policy that advanced "economic devel-
opment" via sustainable use of natural resources could mesh with 
the ideals of "conserving biodiversity." The apparent contradic-
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diction was not lost among some conservationists.* Speaking to 
that very point earlier when the URC system was inaugurated, for-
mer parks consultant James Barborak expressed that his concern 
was that "they're going to draw down something [the national park 
system] they've done well to bring up . . . So, do you want the 
parks to go downhill in a general trend of everything going down-
hill? Or do you at least keep your islands green?" He explained 
that he was worried that parks and preserves would lose protec-
tion with plans to consolidate the agencies 
like something they've never managed to do in the 
United States—to combine the Park Service, Forest 
Service, and Bureau of Land Management in one bu-
reaucracy. That to me is the most troublesome point 
of everything that's going on right now. Everyone 
has caught on to sustainable development—it's the 
buzzword of the moment—but I'd like to see the 
cores assured. (75) 
More recently, the environmental group AECO (Costa Rican 
Ecology Association) has been an outspoken critic of the reorgani-
zation scheme and has criticized the duality of SINAC's mission. 
AECO director Alvaro Ledn explained in a recent interview that 
* Somebody who has duly noted this type of inherent contradiction 
(not specifically for Costa Rica, but for places throughout the 
world in general) is environmental historian Donald Worster. In 
his essay "The Shaky Ground of Sustainable Development" (in The 
Wealth of Nature, p. 144), Worster writes that "Like most popular 
slogans, sustainable development wears thin after a while, reveal-
ing a lack of any new core idea. Although it seems to have 
gained a wide acceptance, it has done so by sacrificing real sub-
stance. Worse yet, the slogan may turn out to be irredeemable 
for environmentalist use because it may inescapably lead us back 
to using a narrow economic language, to relying on production as 
the standard of judgment, and to following the progressive mater-
ialist world-view in approaching and utilizing the earth, all of 
which was precisely what environmentalism once sought to over-
throw." 
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one of his group's concerns was that the Directorate of Geology 
and Mines was not incorporated into SINAC—"excluding that agencj 
from the decision-making process because of the boom in gold." 
Thus, with decentralized authority and increased local input, 
Leon contended, mining interests in the Osa Peninsula were able 
to exert more influence in the management scheme of that AC at 
the expense of the buffer zone protection goals and biodiversity 
preservation talk of SINAC officials. He also claimed that the 
plan would result in increased exploitation of resources, espec-
ially by the U.S. and Japanese paper industries, and increased 
construction of resort hotels in pristine areas—events that 
many local residents would actually oppose. So instead of in-
creased local decisions, there would be increased external in-
fluence for economic development projects being exerted on 
regional AC personnel who could make their own decisions without 
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regard for stricter national environmental standards, Leon said. 
Anselmo Flores Reyes, a native leader from the Térraba In-
digenous Reserve on the west slope of the Talamancas in southern 
Costa Rica, corroborated Leon's point. He mentioned to this 
author that commercial deforestation continued to be a problem in 
and around the Térraba people's reserve: "There's a great deal of 
logging, watersheds are endangered, there are laws but they're 
not enforced, the wood-cutting regulations are not put into 
effect, the police do not help." He said he did not know much 
about the new reorganization system but mentioned that the for-
estry officials from the the regional AC office "do not visit 
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very often; they go when they want and then don't do very much." 
In the past, however, Flores claimed that pre-consolidation DGF 
personnel regularly visited the area to inspect and control the 
woodcutters. He also mentioned that he knew of no indigenous 
people on any of the SINAC study commissions—the government 
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solicited little input from the Talamancan Térrabas. 
AECO's Alvaro Ledn voiced another concern his group had 
about the agency restructuring process: it had no legal founda-
tion. He remarked that the Legislative Assembly had never 
passed any law allowing MIRENEM (or MINAE) officials to consoli-
date and regionalize the government's conservation arms. This 
point was also criticized by former MIRENEM official Eric Ulloa 
who during the Figueres administration was serving as a legis-
tive assistant to Hernán Bravo, his former MIRENEM boss and now 
a diputado in the Assembly. "It's a fatal disaster!," Ulloa 
said of the whole SINAC organization, "it's never been approved 
by the legislature, it's part of the new president's goals [and] 
very typical of how this administration ignores laws." He went 
on to lambaste how MINAE had gone from one extreme of central 
coordination to the far other extreme of "way too much regional-
ism." But while calling it "nothing more than a matter of poli-
tics," Ulloa alluded to how the problem was actually deeper than 
political differences. He related how a decentralized SINAC was 
decreasing Costa Rica's prestige abroad among international lend-
ing organizations. The government of Canada, for example, "was 
so bothered" by the potentially environmentally harmful policy 
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changes that it diverted a financial aid deal from Costa Rica 
to Nicaragua, The government of the Netherlands was considering 
a similar move, he said in the interview.* "Before the Rio Con-
ference [Earth Summit], it was only Costa Rica," Ulloa remem-
bered, "but now there's a lot of competition" for international 
funds. He also mentioned that Daniel Janzen was equally per-
turbed by the SINAC changes and was raising his own funds for 
projects at Guanacaste National Park. Thus, "the new restruc-
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turing is not going very well," Ulloa concluded. 
Environmental attorney Roxana Salazar disagreed with Leon's 
and Ulloa's contention that SINAC was an extra-legal entity. 
"No, there's no problem with legislative law," she rejoined, 
"MINAE can [legally] make changes" in the administration of the 
agencies under its domain. In fact, Salazar praised the direc-
tion SINAC was taking: "It's good; it's a different vision, 
more independent . . . that will allow greater local participa-
tion. Forestry ecologist and conservationist stalwart Luis 
Fournier agreed with this assessment. The UCR professor admitted 
that there "will be problems at first," but went on to suggest 
that "local people know much more [than San José environmental-
ists]." In the long run, then, the decentralized policies "are 
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going to be a benefit in the future," he added. 
Most conservationists and organizations contacted for re-
* MINAE Minister Rene Castro wrote in his report to the commis-
mission studying the changes that he felt a benefit of the re-
structuring process would be "to guarantee international credibil-
ity to our donors." ("Proyecto de Reestructuración," p. 258.) 
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search on this chapter concurred with Fournier. Fellow UCR biolo-
gist Jorge Cortés said that SINAC was "good1' for bringing about 
more local input and keeping resources in the area instead of 
"disappearing" at the central office. He also applauded the 
agency's plans to hire area residents and to have conservation 
personnel living and working closer to the protected areas. Over-
all, Cortés thought SINAC would be "a benefit for national parks" 
but agreed that "corruption like [gold] miners" would continue 
to be a "difficult" problem to deal with. Gerardo Budowski said 
he liked "the idea of joining together" the different government 
agencies and "decentralizing the regions into one administrative 
organ." But, agreeing with Ulloa here, he warned that the 
changes could be "a pendulum [going] from one extreme to the 
other—there's the danger of losing central authority for policy 
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control . . . and the tendency to think on a short-term basis." 
Alexander Bonilla said he too "believe[d] in the importance 
of decentralizing—it will help, it's positive to have more 
spaces in which to promote conservation." But "it's going to 
take more than laws," he continued, "SINAC is good only if put 
into practice." Stressing that sustainable development could be 
explained by understanding "society, economics, and ecology" as 
the three points of a triangle, Bonilla said that many groups 
look only at one point (he criticized enviromental groups for 
often seeing only the ecology point, "environmentalists are not 
the owners of truth"). Thus, SINAC was on the right track "to 
have connections with the private sector." But he also waxed a 
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a bit more philosophical on the subject suggesting that "globali-
zation" was "important to consider" for protecting the environ-
ment in places like Costa Rica. "We have the right to develop," 
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he concluded, "northerners do not have the right to complain." 
Another SINAC proponent, but one who came to support it a 
bit more slowly than others, was Mario Boza. In 1990, the Tico 
Times quoted Boza as having called the URC's "a mess" with a 
lack of "vertical organization." He said that he had spoken with 
a director of one of the units who could not even identify who 
his [the unit director's] boss was. Rodrigo Gámez, President 
Arias' advisor on natural resources, explained that while Alvaro 
Ugalde was "totally permeated with the [new] philosophy," Mario 
Boza was "more of a hard-core conservationist . . . [with] doubts 
about whether local communities [were] ready to have influence 
over the parks." Daniel Janzen agreed and said that Boza's re-
action to the URC's was "to go back to the system he knew very 
well, which was, let's say more conventionally protectionist than 
very involved with people and management." Janzen mentioned that 
Boza's reactions could have been political since at the time he 
was out of government service during the Arias administration 
(belonging to the opposition political party). However, he con-
tinued, after having "an awful lot of people talking with him 
. . . he's come to see that the old-style park as just a big 
82 
pretty area managed by putting a fence around it isn't viable." 
Contacted for his more recent thoughts on the subject, Boza 
said that he was "in agreement" with SINAC—that it was "an old 
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idea going back many years." He cited how he had been a member 
of the committee that originally had worked to bring it into exis-
tence. "It's underway," he stated, and "it's a better system 
with the regional input." He explained that he agreed with 
SINAC1s work to dispel the "compartmentalization" theory of manag-
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ing protected areas "like islands." Representatives of the con-
servation foundations where Boza had been so instrumental in the 
1970 fs and 80's more or less agreed with this assessment. When 
asked about her organization's reaction to the SINAC changes, an 
official at Fundacio'n de Parques Nacionales said that the new sys-
tem had "advantages and disadvantages" but that overall FNP 
approved of it and supported it. An official at Fundación Neo-
tropica said "we're waiting to see." He stated that his organiza-
tion was "more non-governmental" and that it would work with what-
ever changes the government came up with. "What's important," he 
said, "was to continue to apply for and receive grant money" to 
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support Costa Rican conservation efforts. 
Probably the greatest supporters of the restructuring pro-
cess are MINAE and SINAC officials themselves. MINAE Minister 
Rene' Castro wrote in his report to the commission studying the 
changes that "restructuring constitutes a necessary project found-
ed in and coincident with the public interest of maximum use of 
existing resources. . . . " He listed a variety of benefits in-
cluding flexibility in policy-making, reducing "operational dis-
tortions," and bringing "effective instruments" to the citizens 
to help with conservation efforts. And Rigoberto Ugalde, an 
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official in the La Amistad AC, wrote that SINAC was "a model of 
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decentralized and participatory institutional management." 
About at the same time that MINAE and SINAC started func-
tioning as new agencies (1996), the Legislative Assembly finally 
passed a new and revised Forestry Law. The same Special Commis-
sion (albeit with different members across the years) had con-
tinued to meet to discuss the proposal and had convened over 
eighty hearings. On 29 January 1996 the revised Forestry Law 
made it to the plenary session of the Assembly where it was intro-
duced into discussion by Diputado Ricardo Garrón Fuguls who had 
been the chairman of the Special Commission. "It is a totally 
innovative project," Garrón began, "it completely changes the 
traditional concepts we have had regarding forestry laws." 
He went on to explain how the law would not see "forests as pro-
ducers of wood, rather . . . as an ecosystem that serves for the 
protection of watersheds, . . . a protector of soils, . . . a 
means to protect biodiversity, and as system with an enormous 
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tourist potential." 
Important points of the law included outlining the duties 
of a new Forestry Administration (within SINAC), i.e. conserv-
ing forest resources, approving management plans, establishing 
guidelines for the prohibited use of endangered tree species, 
and a variety of other administrative functions. The law created 
a National Forestry Office and replaced the National Forestry 
Council with "Regional Environmental Councils" in the spirit of 
the government's decentralization emphasis. The councils would 
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authorize wood cutting permits. Very importantly, different 
articles of the law dealt with conservation and reforestation 
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incentives and various tax and penalty restrictions. 
Perhaps one of the most important new tenets of the law was 
its language concerning forests on private land. Because it was 
the big stumbling block of the 1986 version, the issue had to be 
handled carefully, but firmly. Title III of the law specifically 
dealt with this point, and as would assuredly please Mario Boza 
who so cogently argued for its inclusion, spelled out that "on 
lands covered with forests, a change in the soil use of the area 
will not be permitted, nor will forestry plantations be estab-
88 
lished." The wording was intended to impede the process of defor-
estation for agricultural purposes. Diputado Garrón explained to 
the Assembly that there would be two options available to owners 
of the 200,000 hectares (494,000 acres) of private forested land 
left in the country: 1. the owners could leave their forests un-
touched and receive a [government] incentive Mso that the land, 
we hope, will stay for eternity as forest;11 or 2. the landowners 
could "manage their forests—prohibiting the change of soil use" 
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and every few years undergo an intense management review process. 
There was actually very little debate in the plenary ses-
sions of the Legislative Assembly. One of the new Forestry Law's 
greatest proponents was Diputado Hernán Bravo who as Minister of 
MIRENEM under President Calderón had worked unsuccessfully to see 
it pass years earlier. He explained in one debate that the law 
would not prohibit logging, it would only change it to ensure a 326 
constant forest cover and to ensure against soil use changes. 
The law, he stated, "makes us look for how to protect the forest, 
not just the tree." It passed on 5 February 1996 by a vote of 
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forty-four to one. Eight days later, President Figueres, like 
his father before him in 1969, signed the forestry bill into law. . 
The passage of the new Forestry Law and the implementation 
of the administrative restructuring process bring to a close 
another chapter in Costa Rica's conservation history. The next 
chapter in the future will have to evaluate these changes to see 
if they brought with them the hopes dreamed of by their advocates 
or the disadvantages predicted by their opponents. Certainly the 
examination will include the results of such policy implementa-
tions as called for by current MINAE Minister Rene Castro when he 
stated that his agency's mission was to promote "maximum use of 
natural resources." And certainly the verdict is still out on 
the application of sustainable development and its implications 
for Costa Rican conservation. These ideals and experiments await 
future debate and will be the center of studies for years to come. 
Meanwhile, it seems appropriate here to evaluate other, non-
policy points in Costa Rica's conservation history as they apply 
to its development of a national environmental ethic. If we con-
sider that conservation policies and institutions are the found-
ation of a green republic, then these other points (environmental 
education, non-governmental organizations, ecotourism, and bio-
diversity inventorying) are its building blocks. They are the 
subject of the next and final four chapters in Part II. 
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